

1<sup>o</sup> de marzo de 1995

Tel: Recibe esta tesis  
con mi agradecimiento por el  
apoyo que me brindaste durante  
el arduo proceso de su elaboración.

Jorge Mendoza

**INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO Y DE ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES DE MONTERREY**

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CAMPUS CIUDAD DE MEXICO



**THE CHARACTERISTICS AND BEHAVIOR OF STREET VENDORS:  
A CASE STUDY IN MEXICO CITY**

by

JORGE ALBERTO MENDOZA GARCIA

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Presented to the Instituto Tecnológico y de  
Estudios Superiores de Monterrey

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October, 1994

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CAMPUS CIUDAD DE MEXICO

INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO Y DE ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES DE MONTERREY

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sustentó examen oral en defensa de la Tesis titulada

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A CASE STUDY IN MEXICO CITY**

presentada como requisito final para la obtención del grado de

**DOCTOR EN ADMINISTRACION**

Ante la evidencia presentada en el trabajo de tesis y en este examen, el Comité Examinador, presidido por el Dr. Peter Ward, ha tomado la siguiente resolución:

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
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
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
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To my parents, who live in my heart

To Rocío, whose love makes my heart live

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## ABSTRACT

The present study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the Mexican informal sector, in particular of one of its most important constituents -- street trading. Particularly, it intends to provide some elements to understand the relationships among the street vendors' personal characteristics, social organization, economic rationality, and institutional factors in Mexico. This study is also motivated by empirical concerns, particularly the intense debate in Mexico regarding policies to manage a growing number of street sellers.

The present investigation is a case study realized with a 41-vendor convenience sample, selected from two areas of downtown Mexico City. The study combines two main research instruments: a questionnaire for street vendors, and open unstructured interviews with vendors' leaders. Qualitative information was also gathered through direct observation in the field, and by informal conversations with former city officials and other participants. The methods for data analysis were both qualitative and quantitative, where the latter includes both descriptive statistics and multivariate statistical techniques.

The issues investigated are: 1) the gender-related characteristics and behavior of street traders; 2) the role of urban migrants in street trade; 3) the characteristics of high-earning and low-earning vendors, and the determinants of economic performance; 4) the determinants of vendors' level of education; 5) the

existence and determinants of job opportunities for street vendors; 6) the willingness of vendors to shift to another occupation (wage-job or new enterprise); 7) the role of the family and kin networks in the job; 8) the reasons for entry into the job; 9) the opinions and perceptions of street traders; and 10) the institutional features of this activity.

The present investigation corroborates some general findings reported in the literature on street vending regarding the characteristics and behavior of its participants, but it also provides evidence and plausible explanations for phenomena not fully studied in the literature, such as: the perceived availability of job opportunities; the determinants of vendor willingness to shift to other occupations; the profiles of vendors according to their economic performance; the estimation of an earnings function for street sellers; the social and economic factors influencing the cost of informal property rights (informal fees and bribes); and the role of individual and social variables in the location choice.

One particularly important policy implication of this study is that the relevance of monetary and social/individual opportunity costs of moving to another job, implies that policies promoting either job creation or real wage increases may be only partially effective in reducing the vendors' population. In any case, their main effect would be to reduce the rate of incorporation of younger and more educated newcomers (that is, those having job alternatives), who tend to assign a lower value to job autonomy and flexibility.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### I.1 MOTIVATIONS, CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY

The present study is motivated by both analytical and empirical concerns. On the one hand, regarding the former, it must be recognized that little is known about the relationships among the street vendors' personal characteristics, social organization, economic rationality, and institutional factors in Mexico.

On the other hand, street vending has grown significantly in Mexico City, stimulating an intense debate on this issue. Although a high-scale relocation project has been implemented with the objective of reducing the inconvenience that such activity imposes upon others, the evaluation of this and other alternative policies is still to be done.

Therefore, the general objective of the present case study is twofold. First, it is designed to contribute to a better understanding of the Mexican informal sector, in particular of one of its most important constituents -- street vending. Secondly, it is hoped that the results of this research may provide some considerations to evaluate policies, particularly those recommending that the demand for labor in the formal sector be stimulated to limit the amount of street sellers. In fact the design and implementation of policy measures to deal with street vending must presuppose a more complete analysis of the

issue and its causal relationships with other social and economic phenomena. This is important because if the emergence, permanence, and operations of street vendors are not thoughtfully understood, policy efforts could be misdirected to deal with street vending effects and not with its causes.

In such conditions, contributions to a better understanding of the phenomena involved will help in both the scholarly and policy making arenas, in the latter case by providing some basis for designing more permanent, effective and efficient public policies.

The present investigation is a case study realized with a 41-vendor convenience sample, selected from two areas of downtown Mexico City. The study combines two main research instruments: a questionnaire for street vendors, and open unstructured interviews with vendors' leaders. Besides, qualitative information was also gathered through direct observation in the field, and by informal conversations with former city officials and other participants.

From a theoretical standpoint, this research avoids the adoption of a unique theoretical framework. It rather intends to compare its findings with those reported in the literature, and to provide plausible explanations for the facts encountered. Therefore, instead of stating a set of isolated clear-cut research questions, the study proposes a set of research issues and, within those, the statement of specific research questions.

The issues investigated are: 1) the gender-related characteristics and behavior of street traders; 2) the role of urban migrants in street trade; 3) the characteristics of high-earning and low-earning vendors, and the determinants of economic performance; 4) the determinants of vendors' level of education; 5) the existence and determinants of job opportunities for street vendors; 6) the willingness of vendors to shift to another occupation (wage-job or new enterprise); 7) the role of the family and kin networks in the job; 8) the reasons for entry into the job; 9) the opinions and perceptions of street traders; and 10) the institutional features of this activity.

The adopted research strategy was especially designed to face three important barriers in investigating street occupations: respondents' lack of trust, their lack of time, and their perceptions about the private and social benefits derived from the study. Besides, the methods for data analysis were both qualitative and quantitative, where the latter included both descriptive statistics and multivariate statistical techniques.

The main contributions of the present study are the following:

1) It shows the potential benefits of combining both qualitative and statistical analytical techniques in case studies on informal activities.

2) It corroborates some general findings reported in the literature on street vending regarding the characteristics and behavior of its participants.

3) It studies issues not fully investigated in the literature on street vending, such as: the perceived availability of job opportunities; the determinants of vendor willingness to shift to other occupations; the profiles of vendors according to their economic performance; the estimation of an earnings function for street sellers; the social and economic factors influencing the cost of informal property rights (informal fees and bribes); and the role of individual and social variables in the location choice.

The main results of the study are the following:

1) Female street traders constitute a group of 'disadvantaged within the disadvantaged.' They tend to be older and less educated than males, and hence have fewer alternative job opportunities. Besides, females' traditional household obligations limit their job search and also preclude them from taking a second paid occupation. Women traders tend to own stalls with lower value of stock and earnings than those of males, and tend to sell less durable goods with a higher inventory turnover, permitting a greater degree of flexibility in shifting to other product lines according to seasonal changes in demand.

2) Urban migrants --particularly older long-term migrants-- constitute another disadvantaged group within street traders. In contrast with city natives, migrants

usually lack family tradition in the activity, and receive scarce support from kin to enter the business, which obligates them to depend strongly on self-financing in their start-up. Those migrants who traveled earlier generally lacked social networks in the city by their arrival time, which indicates that they probably faced a more hostile environment than those who traveled later. Long-term migrants tend to be older, long-tenured street sellers, and have fewer job alternatives than short-term migrants.

3) Vendors' economic performance, as measured by their monthly earnings, was found to be plausibly determined by human capital endowments, work capacity, level of capital invested, and zone of operation; however, it was found to be negatively correlated to job experience. Data from the sample permitted definition of a very consistent profile of high and low performance traders. More successful street sellers tend to be male, younger, more educated, and not committed to their suppliers; they also tend to have other job opportunities and lesser tenure in street selling. Furthermore, they tend to feel more proud of their job, to pay higher fees, to have more workers, to operate in the illegal-high demand zone, to sell more durable goods, and to remain in their current line of business. Finally, they tend to assign a low value to the autonomy and flexibility that street vending provides.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The profile of low-performance street traders may be obtained by inverting the features presented for high-performance sellers.

4) Street vendors who perceive themselves as having job alternatives tend to be young, short-tenured, and educated; they have higher earnings and value of stock, pay higher fees, and do not assign a high value to job autonomy. These results suggest the existence of a paradox within street trading: on the one hand, the most successful traders are precisely those who are capable of leaving the job; on the other hand, the most disadvantaged traders are in turn those who have no options other than to remain in their occupation.

5) The analysis of data from the sample supported the hypothesis that differences in educational level may be explained by the trader's gender, place of birth, and age. Particularly, being male, native and young is associated with a higher level of education. Besides, the finding that being female influences the educational level negatively in rural but not in urban settings, provides support to the hypothesis that schooling discrimination exists particularly in rural areas. This assertion leads to the conclusion that older female migrants constitute a especially disadvantaged group within street traders.

6) The family and the household play an important role in the emergence and operation of street vending enterprises. First, the immediate family provides unremunerated labor for the enterprise. Second, family, kin and friends are common sources of credit to start a street vending enterprise. Third, family tradition in street selling constitutes an important factor that influences the individual's preference for the job, but it also contributes to the development of trading skills.



Fourth, social networks in general constitute an important source of useful information concerning entering the occupation and taking advantage of trading opportunities.

7) The sellers' declared reasons for entry into street trade reveal that economic factors constitute the main single motivation of incorporation in the job. However, advantages of street selling over other jobs, kin relationships, and personal limitations also play an important role in the entry decision. Therefore, as far as entry is frequently motivated for more than a single reason, it is plausible that an increase in the demand for labor in formal labor markets may be only partially effective in dissuading people to enter the occupation.

8) Independent of their capability of getting a different job, vendors' preference for autonomy and their perceptions regarding the difficulty of street trading are significant factors explaining their decision to remain in/leave this occupation if a hypothetical same-income formal job were offered to them. This result points out the difficulties of economic policies that consider that the creation of formal low-wage jobs will induce street traders to shift into such occupations.

However, it was found that street traders would be more prone to leave their current job if an 'adequate' salary were offered. These potentially job-mobile vendors tend to be more skilled, less tenured, more concerned with economic rewards, and with a stronger will to leave the job. The implications of this result is that there is a segment of street traders that would not take a formal

wage job, whatever the salary offered. This finding evidences the limited effects of an economic policy that increases salaries in an attempt to induce vendors to shift to formal jobs. Additionally, in concordance with standard neoclassical labor economics, it was found that both monetary and social/personal opportunity costs (current earnings and desire for autonomy, respectively) determine the level of net income that would induce street sellers to shift to a formal wage job.

9) The results presented above have an extremely important implication from a policy standpoint. First, the most disadvantaged street sellers --older, poorly educated, and high-tenured-- will seldom receive employment offers, and, if that happens, they would likely prefer to remain in street trade. Second, those vendors who would be more willing to shift to formal jobs --those who are younger, more educated and with lower seniority-- will seldom leave street trade unless a higher salary were to be offered. Third, the level of salary solicited by those 'job-mobile' traders will surely be too high to the eyes of employers, for two reasons. On the one hand, since vendors are maximizing earnings by choosing street trading as their job, few formal employers would offer them a similar net income. On the other hand, the wage actually solicited will probably be higher than current earnings for it needs to compensate the vendors for their non-economic opportunity costs.

Therefore, it is not likely that employment-generation and even wage-increase economic policies will cause a significant drop in the number of *already established*

street traders. In any case, their main effect would be to reduce the rate of incorporation of younger and more educated newcomers (that is, those having job alternatives), who tend to assign a lower value to job autonomy and flexibility.

10) The importance of capital restrictions in street trade have been thought to limit either the expansion of the stall or the start of new ventures. Interestingly, around one third of respondents would not leave street trading and start new enterprises, if they were to receive free capital. This evidences the existence of other factors that retain sellers in their current occupation.

On the one hand, the fact that females and those vendors with problems with authorities would tend to leave their job in the described situation may be interpreted as an indicator of their repressed desire to 'escape' from the risk and hardship of street selling. In the case of females, this assertion is also supported by the fact that those women choosing departure would not necessarily start a new business. In fact, some females declared that they would allocate such capital in family investments, or as a support for their retirement and return to their homes.

On the other hand, since those vendors who are prone to start a new enterprise are younger, more skilled, and ambitious, these characteristics may be considered as determinants of entrepreneurial propensity. Besides, some negative factors such as lack of pride and perception of high risk in street selling also influence such a

decision. Interestingly, as reported in the literature, a majority of vendors would like to become a formal small retailer.

11) The finding reported in the literature that street traders develop a strong feeling of pride in their job was corroborated. It was also found that vendors perceive their job as a flexible although risky occupation, which provides them with a rather satisfactory level income, where 'satisfactory' is defined in terms of their opportunity costs. Regarding their main motives to remain in street trade or to shift to a wage job with the same income, the main reasons expressed were autonomy in the former case, and hardship and insecurity of the job in the latter situation. Finally, expectable negative opinions were expressed regarding government regulation.

12) Some institutional aspects of street trading not studied in the literature were investigated. First, the fees or bribes paid by vendors to get a sales permit were examined, concluding that experience, social networks and economic performance influence the cost of such informal rights. Second, the profiles identified for those traders selling in a high-demand high-risk zone, and those selling in a low-demand low-risk zone, support the following hypothesis: selection of the illegal/legal zone is positively/negatively related to endowments of experience and social networks, and to higher/lower earnings. Third, the politics of street trade and the economic and political role of vendors' leaders was examined, concluding that the organization of street traders responds to specific social, political and economic rationalities.

Some policy implications emerge as a result of the study:

First, it is probable that --as experiences in other countries have clearly evidenced-- open repression against street vendors would be an ineffective and socially disruptive policy.

Second, the relevance of monetary and social/individual opportunity costs of moving to another job, implies that policies promoting either job creation or real wage increases may be only partially effective in reducing the vendors' population.

Third, although efforts to relocate street vendors to new established markets --as the program implemented in downtown Mexico City has done-- constitute a better alternative than open harassment, they tend to benefit a limited number of the better endowed traders. This measure may also be relatively ineffective if selling is partially tolerated in the forbidden areas by means of bribes.

Fourth, a more adequate policy might include the following complementary measures: A) To promote economic growth to stimulate the demand for labor in other economic sectors; B) To improve labor conditions in the formal sector; C) To selectively facilitate street trade giving preferential treatment to the most disadvantaged traders (those older, less educated, and females); D) To regulate permits and licenses in such a way that the social and private costs of street vending are reduced while the activity remains minimally attractive.

## I.2 STREET TRADE IN A WORLD PERSPECTIVE

Street vending is a deeply rooted phenomenon in economic history [Yunusa 1988, p.103], and it is one of the most visible and widespread activities in most African, Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American cities [Smart 1990, p.259]. Particularly, it is a very important and predominant activity within the urban economy of developing countries.<sup>2</sup> Despite the fact of their numerical importance, street traders received in the past less attention from academicians than other occupational groups [Bromley 1978a, p.1161]. However, in the last decade and in the 90's, a growing number of studies have directed their attention to this phenomenon. Therefore, in more recent times, street trade has been considered as a prototypical informal activity due to its high visibility and growth, hence reaching some prominence in both the academic and political circles [PREALC 1988 p.1].

Besides its recognized absolute magnitude, many recent studies all over the world have reported a significant *growth and persistence* of this phenomenon.<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact, investigations in Asia [Smart 1990;

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<sup>2</sup> See Evers and Mehmet [1994, p.2], Bromley [1978a, p.1162], Rogerson and Hart [1989, p.29], Bijlmer [1989, p.143], Trager [1985, p.268], Lessinger [1985, p.309], and Escobar [1988, p.118].

<sup>3</sup> Picavet [1989, p.203] --in his study on street sellers in Peru-- clearly remarks the point: "we have been witnessing absolute numbers and growth rates which have never before been encountered; more products than ever are being traded in the streets; most hawkers are operating from a site and more women than before are participating in the trade."

McGee and Yeung 1977, p.20]; Africa [Rogerson and Hart 1989 p. 29]; Latin America [PREALC 1988; Picavet 1989; Grompone 1981, p.108; Escobar 1988, p.102]; the United States [Houstoun 1993; Spalter-Roth 1988a and 1988b]; and Spain [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.208], have attested the growth of this activity. However, it has been observed that street traders are still usually underrepresented in labor statistics [Bromley 1982 p.61].

The literature has widely reported the need for a better understanding of this informal activity, its institutions and dynamics [Evers and Mehmet 1994, p.2]. The fact has also been emphasized that the provision of information and analysis on this issue can contribute to the support of better government policies, avoiding the historical inertia that tends to generate prosecution policies [McGee and Yeung 1977, p.17].

### **I.3 STREET VENDING IN MEXICO: MAIN ISSUES**

#### **I.3.1 THE MEXICAN INFORMAL ECONOMY**

The street vending phenomenon can be considered as a constituent of what has been named in the literature as the "informal sector", although several concepts have been developed for identifying economic activities outside the registered economy [Portes, Castells, and Lauren 1989].

In the case of Mexico, some estimates consider that the underground economy --those economic activities that escape national accounts and the fiscal system-- represented in 1985 between 26% and 38% of the country's official Gross Domestic Product [Centro de Estudios Económicos del Sector Privado 1987]. According to CIEMEX-WEFA, a consulting firm which generates economic forecasts, the number of people working in the informal (non registered) economy is about 8 million, while people employed in the formal sector are approximately 23 million [CIEMEX-WEFA 1993].

Regardless of its notable absence from official economic statistics, the informal sector plays a very important role in the operation of the economic system in developing countries like Mexico. In such cases, the informal sector provides employment and a means of living to a great deal of people who either do not have access to formal labor markets or want to run their own micro-businesses and become small-scale informal entrepreneurs; in fact, self employment seems to have become an important source of income and jobs in Mexico in the past several years [INEGI 1994]. It is also possible that the informal sector supports the competitiveness of the formal sector through their mutual links.

#### *THE RE-EMERGENCE OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT*

As in the case of other Latin American countries, it is plausible that the macroeconomic recession experienced by Mexico since 1982 has stimulated the growth of informal self-employment. The Mexican economy faced a severe crisis during the period 1982-1987, after several



decades of experiencing a permanent boom. The disease was readily recognized: stagflation, i.e. the combination of economic stagnation with a high rate of inflation. As a consequence, national income and employment decreased and remained at levels lower than those observed in 1981. Real wages also dropped steadily during this period.

In order to cope with these problems the Mexican government tried to improve its finances by reducing its current and investment expenditures thus negatively affecting economic growth. From 1988 on, however, the macroeconomic performance has improved, although real wages for unskilled people have remained weak and job creation has not grown significantly.

However, it is plausible that the re-emergence of the informal sector in the 80's and 90's is not only a result of the macroeconomic recession. In fact, Roberts [1991] presents another complementary explanation of the persistence and growth of the informal sector in Mexico in the recent years. He considers that the persistence of informal employment is due to the ineffective nature of government regulation which generates an inadequate state welfare system, whereas "the growth of such employment is due to the pressures of an urban poverty made worse by the failure of both state and market to provide adequate housing and other urban amenities" [p.117].

Additionally, Roberts [1991] argues that Mexico's changing position within the international economy during the 80's has partially determined a change in the nature of informal employment: not only do the informally employed lack labor rights but even the formally employed

are suffering an erosion of such rights. In such conditions, the relative advantages of informality have changed for the actors involved --particularly, informal jobs have become a convenient alternative for people running a small firm or working in a formal occupation. Therefore, in Robert's words [1991, p.139], "the supply of labor in the urban labor market has ... become a supply heavily oriented to informal work."

Benería [1991] has also documented such change in the urban labor supply in Mexico, by showing the effects of structural adjustment policies on labor market strategies and other adjustments at the household level. According to her study, several measures have been taken at the household level to cope with economic crisis: A) An increase in the number of household members -- especially women without children-- participating in the labor market (mainly in the informal labor market); B) Household budgets have suffered a reduction and negative investment in the infrastructure of the household has taken place; and C) Purchasing habits have changed in favor of cheaper suppliers, such as street vendors.

If the arguments above are valid, it is likely that workers and employees who lost or left their jobs in the public and private sectors --or those who offered their manpower-- during the last decade faced difficulties since their alternatives were relatively scarce and real wages were lower than in the past. Interestingly, in the late 80's a private advertising campaign implicitly recognized the inability of economic policy to cope with unemployment; it proposed: 'employ yourself' [Bustamante 1993, p.257].

The following table shows indirect evidence on the growth of informal fixed and mobile informal micro-businesses in Mexico. The number of micro-firms with duration of 10 years or less is remarkable as compared with the lower number of enterprises with greater seniority. However, it is arguable that the rate of failure might explain such differences, whereas the rate of starts of informal enterprises remains unknown.

Although it is true that we cannot directly obtain the rate of birth from these figures, the number of firms existing 11 or more years were created in times of economic bonanza, and their numbers show a rather stable pattern. Therefore, the peak in the number of firms in the first two categories (crisis time) may be explained by an increase in the rate of birth, since the rate of mortality also might have expanded. The latter fact may be due to the circumstance that entrants in crisis times are frequently former wage workers who are inexperienced in self-employment, with a higher probability of leaving their business or shifting to another occupation.

Then it is plausible that informal economic activities became a viable alternative for those people looking for subsistence or for entrepreneurial endeavors. Street vending constituted one of the options available for such people, which in fact has a long history in Mexico since the *tianguis*<sup>4</sup> of the ancient Aztec Empire.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> "The word *tianguis* is derived from the Aztec (Nahuatl) word *tianguixtle*, meaning a market." [Pyle 1978, p.141].

<sup>5</sup> "The periodic markets of ancient Mexico made such an impression upon Cortes and his crew that their characteristics were recorded in some detail in the traveler's accounts... They were impressed by the general

**INFORMAL MICRO-BUSINESS IN MEXICO  
BY YEARS IN OPERATION**

<b>EXISTENCE (IN YEARS)</b>	<b>TOTAL FIRMS</b>	<b>FIRMS WITH A FIXED LOCATION</b>	<b>FIRMS WITH NO FIXED LOCATION</b>	<b>PERCENT AGE OF TOTAL FIRMS</b>
TOTAL FIRMS	2 650 406	1 005 346	1 653 060	100.00%
LESS THAN 5	1 487 014	528 784	958 230	56.11%
FROM 6 TO 10	469 344	169 645	299 699	17.71%
FROM 11 TO 15	227 262	89 512	137 750	8.57%
FROM 16 TO 20	213 867	100 002	113 865	8.07%
MORE THAN 20	259 806	116 454	143 352	9.80%
UNSPECIFIED	1 113	949	164	0.04%

Source: INEGI. *Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios 1992*. Mexico, 1994.

The reduction of import restrictions especially since 1985 facilitated the trading activities of imported products. Since Mexican consumers had been relatively deprived of foreign goods for some years, they were anxious to buy them. This huge potential market for imported consumer goods was identified by these people who then decided to become entrepreneurs for either survival or opportunity reasons. Therefore, they became a special type of street vendor different from the traditional ones who sell vegetables, fruits, handicraft

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bustling activity, the variety of merchandise for sale, the regular arrangements of different items in the marketplace and the supervisory authority controlling commercial proceedings" [Gormsen 1978, p.240].

products, traditional Mexican food, medicinal plants, flowers, or traditional sweets.

Nevertheless, this new generation of street vendors started to sell not only imported products such as video and stereo systems, clothes, shoes, electronic devices, etcetera. They also became retailers for Mexican manufacturers who wanted to broaden their marketing channels.<sup>6</sup>

### I.3.2 Street vending in Mexico City

#### *THE MAGNITUDE AND ORGANIZATION OF STREET VENDING IN MEXICO*

As a consequence of the aforementioned factors, Mexico City has experienced in the last decade an important increase in the number of people working on the street. Its current image resembles that of countries of Africa and Asia, characterized by a significant street trading activity [Bustamante 1993, p.246].

In fact, street vending in the whole country seems to have grown extraordinarily in recent years and constitutes an important informal activity. A study by CONCANACO [1993] --the National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce-- estimated that solely in the Federal District of Mexico City there were about 150 thousand street vending stalls, while the City Government

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<sup>6</sup> Notwithstanding, some street markets as *Tepito* have traditionally sold foreign products illegally introduced in the country.

estimated 70.6 thousand stalls. this study also estimated that in 44 other cities of the country there were 143 thousand stalls, which implies a total estimate of almost 293 thousand vending stalls in 45 Mexican cities (see Chart 1). In addition, according to the 1990 Population Census, there are nearly 506 thousand people whose main job is street seller [INEGI 1992].

CONCANACO also estimated that street-vendors operating in 45 cities of Mexico had total sales equivalent to 41.2 billion new pesos (equivalent to 13 billion dollars), which represents 3.7% of the projected 1993 national Gross Domestic Product, and 20% of projected public expenditure [CONCANACO 1993].

In Mexico City, hawkers operate --if and when permitted-- in many and diverse places: on streets and sidewalks, outside established markets, in dedicated places, etc. Additionally many city neighborhoods receive the visit of a *tianguis* (periodic market) once a week.

According to CANACO [1987] in Mexico City there are four types of street trading: 1) Concentrations of vendors on sidewalks or streets with relatively improvised stalls; 2) *Mercados sobre ruedas*, that is, itinerant markets that operate every day in a different location within the city; 3) *Tianguis-bazar*, which are fixed-location week-end markets; and 4) Fixed stalls on sidewalks.

The concentrations of street vendors generally form an association through the emergence of a leader who establishes and maintains contact with city authorities

to get their 'permission' to operate in the selected zone [Bustamante 1993, p.261]. Interestingly, the leaders are frequently (but not always) linked to the official party (PRI),<sup>7</sup> thus establishing a political relationship that facilitates their operation in exchange for political support to the party, and economic benefits to city officials [Castro Nietò 1990, p.68; CANACO 1990, p.15]. However, from the standpoint of leaders their organizations emerge as a response to the threats posed by authorities who intend for them to pay bribes [Petche 1992, p.1].

#### *THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S POSITION ON STREET TRADING*

Diverse analysts of the street-vending phenomenon and groups of interest have emphasized the related social and private costs and benefits.<sup>8</sup> Regarding the *social benefits*, street vending is considered as a source of employment and income for an important social group (stall owners, their relatives and their employees). In contrast, several *social costs* have been argued such as traffic congestion, garbage generation, tax evasion, and bad tourist image [CONCANACO 1987, 1990].

Regarding *private costs* the unfair competition to the formal retailers has been noted by formal retailers' associations. Excessive profits appropriated by formal and informal manufacturers, wholesalers, vendors' leaders and street vendors, have also been identified as *private benefits* form this activity [CONCANACO 1987, 1990].

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<sup>7</sup> Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), in power since 1929.

<sup>8</sup> See the literature review, below.

Moreover, another type of "private" benefit for the state was identified in a recent theoretical study by Marcouiller and Young [1992]; this study shows that, under certain conditions, tolerance of economic informality may be part of the state's strategy to increase the surplus it can extract from the formal sector either by reducing expenditures on public order or by raising taxes.

As a reaction to the growth of street selling, established retailers have adopted in recent years an especially aggressive attitude towards sellers, especially against those operating in downtown Mexico City. The Vice-president of CONCANACO --which is the most important association of established traders in the country-- has declared that the underground economy seriously damages the activities of established traders in Mexico. He also said that these unfair competitors have been the cause for the drop in established traders' sales: "many formal business are suffering losses and face additional problems with tax payments" [*Excélsior*, March 15th, 1992].<sup>9</sup>

According to him, informal street vendors do not pay taxes, do not fulfill their labor responsibilities and other obligations and, in summary, do not operate within the Mexican laws. He expressed that it is unfair that formal established traders have the obligation to pay taxes while informal street vendors do not do so. Therefore, in his opinion, the Mexican Congress should

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<sup>9</sup> Newspaper's section corresponding to Mexican States, pages 1 and 4.



fight those "spongers and corrupt leaders" associated with street vending [loc. cit.].

The statements above can be integrated in a chain of arguments which constitute the radical view of established retailers for explaining the 'unfair' competitive advantage of street vendors over formal traders:

- 1) Street vendors use a public resource --the downtown streets-- for private benefit without paying any user fees.
- 2) Street vendors enjoy a substantial cost advantage since they avoid taxes and their official payments are artificially low. Bribes by definition are also lower than the officially required payments.
- 3) Street vendors practice bribery in order to receive protection from authorities and police officers; another possibility is that street vendors receive protection from organized criminal groups. In any case, street vendors enjoy the benefits of protection. Hence, street trading should not be seen as additional competition that benefits both the commerce sector and the consumers, it is rather an illegal monopoly officially or unofficially protected.
- 4) Therefore, street vendors' competitive edge has a shady source. It is the result of the exploitation of an artificial cost superiority, and of location-related advantages obtained from using a public resource for private benefit. These advantages are tolerated by

authorities who use discretionary criteria of dubious origin.<sup>10</sup>

According to a more moderate private view on the issue [CANACO 1990], several factors explain the increase and permanence of street selling: 1) insufficient demand for labor in the formal sector; 2) individuals' characteristics, such as: lack of education and skills, and older age; 3) excessive state regulation of commercial activities that makes the establishment of a formal retailing enterprise difficult [p.13]. CANACO [1990] identifies the existence of two types of street sellers: the subsistence-oriented vendors, and the profit-oriented traders [p.14].

A series of round tables on street vending organized by CANACO [1990] made the following policy recommendations, which recognize some social and economic determinants of street vending, but, at the same time propose some more or less radical adjustments:

- 1) Facilitation of the formalization of street vending.
- 2) Simplification of legal requirements for the start-up of new business.
- 3) Pressing authorities to act energetically against street trade.

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<sup>10</sup> In contrast with the latter view, an alternative (although not exclusive) interpretation will be presented in the literature review: street vendors possess unique entrepreneurial and organizational characteristics that enhance their performance. In contrast, established traders lack these features.

- 4) Obligating street traders to accomplish their ethical responsibilities with their customers.
- 5) Stimulation of the macroeconomic activity to generate new employment.
- 6) Decentralization of the economic activity away from Mexico City to reduce migration.
- 7) Improvement and clarification of the laws regulating street trade.
- 8) Informing consumers of the risks they run by buying from street vendors.
- 9) Obligating vendors to operate under clean and hygienic conditions.
- 10) Relocating street traders from streets and sidewalks to predetermined suburbs.
- 11) Building public markets to incorporate street marketers.
- 12) Simplification of the tax system to motivate vendors to pay taxes.

#### *RECENT POLICY MEASURES*

During the first half of 1992, Mexico City's downtown witnessed an intense conflict between established traders and street vendors. The City Authorities intervened in order to prevent violence, since established retailers wanted street vendors to leave downtown streets and, on the other hand, the latter did not want to abandon their main zone of activity.

Established traders pressured the government to "formalize" street vending, and by mid-1992 the latter declared the stations of the city's subway --also called *Metro*-- off limits to street-vendors [*El Financiero*

*International*, June 29, 1992]. In July 1992 the City government presented the *Program for the Improvement of Mass Retailing* (Programa para el Mejoramiento del Comercio Popular), and by September 1993 the City government negotiated with 54 associations of street vendors (which grouped some 10 thousand vendors) their abandonment of a specified zone of downtown Mexico City, and offered them spaces in some newly constructed markets [Coordinación General de Abasto y Distribución del Distrito Federal 1993].

It is interesting that while official data seem to indicate that the economic crisis and restructuring has fueled the emergence of street vendors in Mexico, it is not clear that economic growth will lead to their re-incorporation into the formal sector. As will be shown later, this issue is one of the subjects of the present research.

In fact, some government officials, leaders of established retailers, and scholars consider that, as far as street vending is the direct result of economic crisis, it will tend to disappear as the economy recovers its pace of growth.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast, other scholars have argued that the informal sector seems to be intrinsically linked to the formal economy in such a way that the two sectors reinforce each other, and that the informal economy does not tend to disappear but to grow even in developed

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<sup>11</sup> *El Financiero International* [June 29, 1992]. See also the literature review, below.

countries [Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989]. Others have expressed further doubts that street sellers would shift to wage jobs even if they were readily available [Smart 1988, 1990].

Therefore, the issue of street vending in particular --and the question of the informal sector in general-- is at the center of an ongoing debate in both political and academic circles, which makes necessary a deeper understanding of this phenomenon.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The conceptualization of the proposed research problems in the present investigation is supported by three convergent fields of study which may jointly contribute to explain the creation and development of informal street vending micro-firms: A) the informal sector approach which focuses on explaining the determinants of formation and growth of informal economic activities [Roberts 1990]; B) the literature on street vending as a specific informal occupation, and C) the entrepreneurial approach, in both their psychological [Shaver and Scott 1989] and sociological perspectives.

Although the latter two entrepreneurial approaches seek to explain why and how small firms are created and developed, the former emphasizes the role of the individual's personality and psychological traits. The second approach --called "Sociology of entrepreneurship" [Butler 1991]-- focuses on the sociological conditions, including ethnic and other commonalties, that encourage enterprise formation and development within certain social groups.

Additionally, contributions from other disciplines are also important for the issue studied: A) labor economics which tries to explain individuals' choices among jobs (including self-employment) as a result of an earnings maximization process, given their attitude towards risk, and subject to restrictions on human capital endowments [Balkin 1989]; and B) what has been

called the 'economic sociology' approach [Granovetter 1992], that the sociological analysis to account for economic processes.

## II.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDIES ON THE INFORMAL SECTOR

The informal sector has become an attractive area of study for many scholars in the last 20 years. The reason for this concern is that the significance of informal activities in diverse economies has increased through time, and seems to remain as a structural component of economic systems not only in less developed countries but also in developed and formerly socialist nations [Castells and Portes 1989].

The literature on the informal sector has grown at an impressive rate since the seminal work by Hart [1973], in which he introduced the term 'informal sector.' From an economic-legal perspective [Thomas 1992], the informal sector "generally consists of small scale producers and their employees, together with the self employed working in the production of goods, plus those engaged in commerce, transport and the provision of services..." [p.4]. It is an economic sector that produces and distributes mostly legal goods and services and "generally no laws are being broken in their production or distribution..." [loc. cit.].

This broad definition permits the differentiation of the informal sector from both the *irregular* and *criminal*

sectors, the former being composed of economic activities which produce legal goods and services but which simultaneously "involve some illegality such tax evasion, the avoidance of regulations..., and social security fraud" [loc. cit.]. In the case of the 'destructive entrepreneurial activities' [Baumol 1990], taking place in the criminal sector, the products and services generated and their business procedures are both illegal.

However, it should be recognized that some overlap may exist between the informal and the irregular sector, as much as the former may include the operation of small-scale firms or self-employed which do not meet all the legal regulations or tax obligations. Therefore, in the present study we consider street vending as a component of the informal sector; and although its activities are not generally registered officially by the government, such operations are not considered as illegal *in themselves*. That is, such activities perhaps are not paying taxes nor offering social security to workers, but they are not *essentially unlawful*.

Some studies show that informal economic activities have flourished in both developed and developing countries, and that industrialization and modernization does not preclude or limit the development of the informal sector [Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987; Portes, Castells and Benton 1989].

In contrast with some theories of industrial development, that generally assume that informal economic activities are a characteristic of Third World economies which will tend to disappear as the economic growth is



gradually led by a modern industrial sector, Portes and Sassen-Koob [1987] show that informality is not exclusively a developing-country phenomenon. They also show that high industrial growth does not limit the informal sector growth in Third World Countries; in fact, in a number of developing countries "the informal sector... has actually increased in size and scope" [p.33].

Trying to summarize the state of the informal sector, Portes and Castells [1989] present three general characteristics of this sector:

- 1) The informal sector is an integral part of total national economies, rather than a marginal appendage to them.
- 2) Workers in the underground economy can be considered as *down graded labor* and among them immigrants, ethnic minorities, women, and youth play a significant role.
- 3) "Governments tolerate or even stimulate informal economic activities as a way to resolve potential social conflicts, ... to promote political patronage, ... (to) reduce the open rate of unemployment and to provide new incentives to battered economies." [pp. 26-27].

Regarding the links between the formal and informal sectors, several studies have shown that considerable flows of resources and people go back and forth from one sector to the other [Roberts 1989; Capecchi 1989; and Sassen Koob 1989].

Sassen-Koob [1989] shows evidence regarding the important informal sector of New York City, and indicates that international competition operates as an incentive for the existence of informal activities which permit formal firms to cut down costs. Besides, according to her, informal retailing is stimulated by an inadequate provision of services by the formal sector.

According to Bryan Roberts [1990], the study of the informal sector in urban Latin America has three different but complementary perspectives:

- 1) The *formal rationality approach* adopted by the International Labor Office (ILO) and its Latin American Office (PREALC), which tries to understand the informal sector by studying the product and labor markets.
- 2) The *political economy perspective* which focuses on the external determinants of the informal sector, especially state regulation.
- 3) The *substantive rationality approach* that is based on the work of anthropologists and sociologists concerned with how the poor make out in the cities of developing countries.

The substantive rationality approach identified by Roberts [1990] --which is concerned with how the poor make out in the cities of developing countries-- seems to be theoretically close to the sociology of entrepreneurship approach. Some entrepreneurship scholars have identified common areas between Sociology and Entrepreneurship [Reynolds 1991], and between the latter and Anthropology [Stewart 1991]. In addition, other

studies on entrepreneurship have focused on the role of enterprise formation and development in poor countries [Harper 1985, 1991].

## II.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDIES ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The sociological contributions to the understanding of the ethnic enterprise or entrepreneurship can be classified as pertaining to three major theoretical frameworks: the *cultural approach*, the *structural approach*, and the *situational approach* [Min 1988]. Each one of these perspectives in turn can be separated into several particular views.

According to Min [1988], "the cultural approach explains the patterns of middleman minorities in general and ethnic enterprise in particular on the basis of the groups' cultural traits [p.28]... Structural theories emphasize the social and occupational structure of the host society as more important than the characteristics of a minority group for understanding its concentration in small business and other related middleman occupations [p.31]... The situational approach emphasizes factors related to the immigrant situation of certain minority groups as mainly responsible for their occupational adjustment in trade and service related small business" [p.34].

Regarding these sociological theories of entrepreneurship, the present study may provide elements

for a further evaluation of their degree of pertinence in accounting for the street vending phenomenon in Mexico. Additionally, although the proposed investigation does not intend to identify the personal traits of entrepreneurial street hawkers, the psychological approach to entrepreneurship [Brockhaus and Horwitz 1986; Gartner 1989; Shaver and Scott 1991] may be useful for helping to interpret certain attitudes, values and conducts exhibited by street-vendors.

It is expected that the findings and conclusions reported in the present study could be further related to these two broad streams of literature, which may provide theoretical models required by interpretative studies on street vending.

### **II.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDIES ON STREET VENDING**

For the realization of this study, more than 60 investigations on street trade all over the world were reviewed. Due to the complexity of the topic, this literature review will present the diverse contributions according to major topics. The main themes treated in this literature review are the following:

1. Demographic characteristics of street traders.
2. Family networks in street trade.
3. The male and female street vendor.
4. The independence / subordination of street vendors.
5. The entry into street trade.

6. Major macro and micro analytical approaches explaining entry.
7. Street vendors' job alternatives and willingness to leave their job.
8. The scale of operations.
9. Vendors' economic rationality, risk, and competition.
10. Customers' demand, vendors' skills and entrepreneurial strategies.
11. The economic performance of street traders.
12. Possibilities for capital accumulation and growth.
13. The organization of street vendors.
14. Vendors' perceptions, expectations and aspirations.
15. The debate on street vending.
16. The Government policies.
17. Perspectives and policy recommendations.

#### II.3.1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STREET TRADERS

From a microeconomic perspective, street trading has been characterized as a very-small-scale enterprise operated either by a single self-employed or by several members of the owners' household, with low capital and educational requirements, and highly informal [Escobar 1988, p.100; Picavet 1989, p.203].

Street sellers appear to be a homogeneous group of people since they exhibit some general common features, such as sharing the same occupation, facing similar environmental threats, and accustomed to similar dress, speech and lifestyle. Notwithstanding, high heterogeneity exists within this working group regarding its social and

economic features [Moser 1977, pp.470,471,487; Escobar 1988, p.110; Nattrass 1987, p.866].

#### *WHAT GENDER PREDOMINATES IN STREET TRADE?*

A review of studies in several countries reporting the gender-related propensity to adopt street trade shows a rather mixed picture; where such variability is plausibly explainable by a different combination of cultural, religious, demographic and labor-market-related factors. On the one hand, some investigations have reported that in the following cities/countries/regions, females' participation is less significant or lower than that of males: Madrid, Spain [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.220]; Santiago, Chile [PREALC 1988, p.5]; Cali, Colombia [Bromley 1978a, p.1162]; Indonesia [Bijlmer 1989]; Hong Kong [Smart 1990]; and Samaru, [Yunusa 1988, p.104].

However, in the following cities /countries/ regions females' participation is particularly important or greater than that of males: Madras, India [Trager 1985, p.266]; La Paz, Bolivia [Escobar 1988, p.102]; Peru [Picavet 1989,p.193]; West Africa, non-Hispanic Caribbean societies and parts of mainland Latin America [Mintz 1971, p.248]; and Transkei, South Africa [Nattrass 1987, p.866].

Although studies specifically concerned with market women are relatively scarce, some of those conducted in Asia and Latin America show that women have a very active participation in market trade virtually everywhere, but their numbers are limited in societies where Islamic cultural influences are strong [Tinker 1987, pp.24,26].

Findlay [1990] has shown that, due to cultural constraints, in Islamic societies females have not only a low participation in small-scale retailing but in the labor market in general [p.216].

#### *MIGRANTS PARTICIPATION IN STREET TRADE*

A very significant number of studies have documented that a considerable proportion of street traders are migrants who came to the cities in search of better economic opportunities.<sup>12</sup> Migrants adopt such activity mainly due to its low barriers of entry, their limited education and skills, and the importance of kinship networks linked to this activity. However, two important multi-country studies have witnessed the existence of a significant proportion of city-natives in the activity [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.101,105; Tinker 1987, p.54].

However, not only urban-resident migrants work in street trade. Bijlmer [1989, p.147], in his study on Indonesian traders, distinguishes two types of migrant sellers: 'sedentary' and 'circulatory,' where the former stay more time in the city while the latter visit their villages of origin more frequently. These different types of migration patterns illustrate that people from rural environments may take advantage of the benefits of an intermittent source of income without incurring in the

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<sup>12</sup> See: Armstrong and McGee [1985, p.189]; Bromley [1978a, p.1162]; Oliver-Smith [1990, p.221]; Smart [1990] Lessinger [1985]; Bijlmer [1989, p.147]; Picavet [1989, p.193]; Yunusa [1988, p.105]; Collignon [1984]; Moser [1977, p.479]; Osterling et. al. [1979, p.34]; and Escobar [1988, p.104].

personal and family costs associated with permanent migration.

Moser [1977, pp.479-480] observed that migrants in Bogota, Colombia, adopt street marketing whether as a first job in the city or after trying other low-income occupations, such as manual labor, construction, public works, and domestic services. Regarding migrants' permanence in street trading, the case of traders in Samaru indicates that longer-residence migrants tend to leave the job because of their socio-economic stabilization by finding a more stable job to earn a living [Yunusa 1988, p. 105].

The case of Hong Kong, studied by Smart [1990] is especially illustrative of the role of migrants in hawking, and of the different set of opportunities faced by them and their native counterparts. Smart suggests that "native born residents are not attracted to street hawking because they have greater access to resources and opportunity for socioeconomic mobility than their migrant counterparts" [p.269]. They generally have an extensive network of social/economic support from family and friends, whereas recent Chinese migrants usually lack similar social support in Hong Kong due to the dislocation from their social base in China [p.270]. Hong Kong natives, given the benefit of several forms of social and economic supports from their existing networks, often consider the social and psychological costs in street trade too high as compared to its economic rewards [loc. cit.].



According to Smart [1990 p.271], people who migrated from China to Hong Kong generally have a peasant background, low education, lack of industrial labor skills and limited access to social and economic resources in the host society. For these reasons, they are extremely vulnerable to the marginality of low paying wage employment. They find the higher income potential and greater autonomy in street trading highly attractive --in spite of the significant government harassment in street trade, the long hours of work, the labor intensiveness, the constant struggle to maintain one's spatial position and the many difficulties of running a profitable small business under conditions of high competition and rivalry. Actually, street hawking offers them an opportunity to achieve upward socioeconomic mobility. They may return to wage employment when bad times appear in street hawking but, as long as its economic advantages exceed those of wage employment, they would prefer to remain in this activity, which is the best economic strategy given their limited access to various resources in Hong Kong.

#### *AGE PATTERNS OF STREET TRADERS*

As in the case of gender and migration, it is difficult to identify a common age pattern of street traders. For example, studies in Hong Kong [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.188-189] and in La Paz, Bolivia [Escobar 1988, p. 103], show that hawking is mainly a job for older people, while investigations on street traders in Santiago, Chile [PREALC 1988, p.5], and Samaru [Yunusa 1988, p.104], indicate that vendors are chiefly young people. Besides, a study on mobile traders in Spain

indicates that the age structure is biased towards both older and younger people [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.220], and Bunster's investigation in Lima, Peru [1983, p.95], registered that the rank of age of her interviewees went from 21 to 53 years, indicating a non-negligible dispersion.

Escobar [1988, p.103] explains the older age of vendors as the result of two factors: 1) the long permanence in the occupation of people who entered the job long ago; and 2) the incorporation of other vendors at older ages. The increasing number of young people in street trade is explained by institutional restrictions in obtaining a fixed-stall at established markets, and by the scarcity of job opportunities in the economy.

The existence of an important segment of young people in street trading has been explained, in the case of Spain, by limitations in the demand for labor due to the economic crisis [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.221]. On the other hand, Smart [1990, p. 266] has observed that most entrants into hawking in Hong Kong are able-bodied people, relatively young, with previous job experience.

#### *VENDORS' MARITAL STATUS*

Regarding vendors' marital status, there is a certain consensus that street traders tend to be married and either are heads of family or contribute significantly to the household economy [PREALC 1988, p.5; Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.189; Oliver-Smith 1990, p.221; Smart 1990, p.265; Bunster 1983, p.95; Escobar 1988, p.104].

### *EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF STREET VENDORS*

With the exception of Chilean street traders --who possess an above-average educational level [PREALC 1988, p.7-9]-- the majority of studies report low levels of schooling for street marketers [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.192; McGee and Yeung 1977, p.100; Bromley 1978a, p.1162; Picavet 1989, p.193; Escobar 1988, p.104]. Notwithstanding, Picavet [1989, p.199] observed that younger vendors in Peru are generally more educated, and seek to upgrade their income. They also attempt to save and invest in expansion or improvement of the business, in the construction of their own houses, and in the education of their children. Furthermore, Yunusa [1988, p.104] reports that street marketers in Samaru are mainly very young people who have attended (or are attending) school, while only a marginal proportion of them are illiterate.

### II.3.2. FAMILY NETWORKS IN STREET TRADE

Many researches have indicated that street trade is mainly a family business, although individual self-employment has also been observed. In any case, this occupation has been found to be closely related to several economic, social and labor aspects of the vendor's family and household [McGee 1977, p.265; Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.180; PREALC 1988, p.55; McGee and Yeung 1977, p.85; Oliver-Smith 1990, p.221; Picavet 1989, p.198; Lozano 1983, p.353]. Particularly, it has been reported that there are no fixed boundaries between the proportion of cash used to invest in the stall and

that used to finance current consumption expenditures or family emergency situations [Bunster 1983, p.100]. In fact, household and enterprise finance are so closely linked that they are inseparable, which determines that emergency family expenditures considerably limit capital accumulation at the stall [Tinker and Cohen 1985, p.88].

Additionally, street vending requires a very functional organization of the household --which implies the establishment of authoritarian or consensual implicit contracts among the members [Ben-Porath 1980]-- and the support of generally unpaid labor supplied by family members. The importance of family in job decisions arises from the fact that there is an implicit contract among its members, which "creates a collective identity that affects the transactions of each member with people outside the family" [Ben-Porath 1980, p.3]. Therefore, "it is not jobs *per se* but how jobs combine with other key elements in urban subsistence --e.g., housing, the division of labor within the household and the household's consumption patterns or social networks-- that provide different opportunity sets for people in broadly similar economic positions" [Roberts 1990, p.33].

According to McGee [1973, p.139], traders often come from families with marketing experience, which makes the entry decision easier and provides the necessary training. In contrast, "the average person aware of the risks and of his own inexperience is afraid to compete and hesitates to enter trade" [Dewey 1962 p.39, cited in McGee 1973 p.139].

In her study on Indian retail traders, Lessinger [1985, p.317] has indicated that despite the fact that small-scale trade requires little initial capital, family networks are particularly useful in helping the newcomer to find a selling spot in an established market place, where kin frequently claim the right to introduce a relative.

T'ien [1953, cited in McGee 1973, p.139] describes the social basis of retailing ownership and employment in Kuching, and shows how the links of kinship and dialect are dominant factors in explaining concentration in the sale of particular goods, and in the supply of certain services. Furthermore, Smart [1990, p.266-267] remarks that potential traders received training, information and support from relatives and friends, which makes them fully aware of the costs and rewards in street selling before they actually enter the job.

According to Grompone [1981], street trade uses family work, especially of the spouse and children, of other members of the extended family, and even of countrymen and other individuals with whom the owner has strong personal relationships [p.105]. Osterling et. al. [1979, p.34] explains that, when the stall owner turns to other more lucrative occupation, the incorporation of family work into street trading is an economic rational strategy, if --as it commonly occurs-- the relatives' occupational opportunity cost is lower than that of the owner. Additionally, he considers that, as far as street trading takes advantage of the exploitation of unpaid family work, sellers may charge lower prices than established shops [p.26].

Lozano [1983] in her study on 'flea market' sellers, argues that relatives or acquaintances are frequently included in the trading operations and "the marketing enterprise is physically centered around home, family and friends" [p.353].

Picavet [1989, p.198] found that only a minority of street vendors employ wage laborers in addition to unpaid family workers. Other researchers, however, have reported absence of direct family work at the stall. For example, Nattrass' study on street traders in Transkei [1987, p.867] indicates that a majority of street stalls are one-person enterprises while a few employed one helper. A study of sellers in Cali, Colombia, also reported that the number of assistants is low or nonexistent for a considerable proportion of traders [Bromley 1978a p.1162].

### II.3.3. THE MALE AND FEMALE STREET VENDOR

#### *RELEVANCE OF GENDER*

Informal labor and small entrepreneurship are not only determined by individuals' possession of differential skills but also by some of their traits as race and gender [Tinker 1987, p.34]. Particularly, gender has been recognized as an important variable which permits establishing relevant dissimilarities among street vendors [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.188; Picavet 1989, p.204]. Such differences between male and female street sellers have to do with several interrelated and self-reinforcing factors, such as: responsibilities

within the household, level of education, job opportunities outside street vending, type of products traded, level of earnings, scale of the business, and opportunities for capital accumulation, among others.

There seems to be an important difference in the reasons for entry between males and females. The former tend to come from labor markets that expelled them due to a decrease in the demand for labor, whereas the latter tend to come from the household or from domestic service, because of their need to support their households' income [Escobar 1988, p.103; Bunster B. 1983, p.96], or their need to take up the role of family head [PREALC 1988 p.69]. An extremely dramatic situation is presented when married females do not enjoy economic support from their mates [Nattrass 1987, p.866]. However, female street traders frequently lack a spouse, as Bijlmer [1989, p.146] reports. He found that a significant proportion of Indonesian female sellers (38%) were divorced or widowed (versus 5% of males), and were partially or fully responsible for their families' livelihood.

Due to their economic and non-economic responsibilities in their households, female traders appreciate the flexibility that trading provides them in terms of facilitating the accomplishment of both income-generation and household activities. Female traders generally consider that street vending is more appropriate for a working mother than is wage employment since the former allows them the flexibility necessary to combine income generation with household maintenance tasks. In fact, street marketing partially minimizes the conflicts associated with their dual role as workers and

mothers. [Bunster 1983, p.92,96; Tinker 1987, p.35; Grompone 1981, p.106].

An especially important advantage for women traders is taking care of their youngest offspring while working at the stall --a benefit not provided by wage work-- at the time that their older children help them in current operations [Babb 1987, pp.173,176-177; PREALC 1988, p.55,59; Bunster 1983, p.95]. In fact, female traders depend on their older children's labor since they cannot afford hiring a paid employee. The former defines the household organization and division of labor which generally implies that children permanently shift between home and marketing activities. [Bunster 1983, p.96,97].

Other factors have stimulated the incorporation of females into street marketing, such as its low requirements of start-up capital and skills, and women's scarce job opportunities in the labor markets --due to both discrimination and their low level of education [Escobar 1988, p.118; Grompone 1981, p.106; Tinker 1987, p.35; Babb 1987, p.173; Natrass 1987, p.866].

Moser [1977, p.483-484] in her study on market sellers in Bogota identified female entry by two stages of their life cycle. Almost half of her female interviewees came into the market when over 40 years, that is, towards the end of their working lives; they are in most cases either widowed, deserted or have never married. The remaining sellers entered when much younger, primarily as a result of having to support not only themselves but a number of dependents, since they were deserted by their husbands or forced out of domestic



service. On the other hand, older males were either farm workers who migrated at older ages due to their lack of land ownership and their physical inability to work in rural activities, or natives with long urban work histories who were forced out of wage occupations. Younger and more educated males, in contrast, chose street vending as their best job alternative after trying other occupations. Their scale of operations is higher and they have actual opportunities of capital accumulation and upward economic mobility [Moser 1977, pp.483-484].

*DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE BETWEEN MALES AND FEMALES*

The literature on street trade has analyzed the main gender-related divergences among street traders, and has attested that, in general, females suffer a non-negligible disadvantage with respect to men in street marketing [Evers and Mehmet 1994, p.5; Bunster B. 1983, p.102]. Several studies have uncovered that females generally own trading business whose economic performance is characterized by at least one of the following features: lower value of stock, smaller scale of operations, lesser income, and inferior profitability, than those of males.<sup>13</sup>

The gender effect influences both employment position and the level of remuneration [Portes et al.,

<sup>13</sup> See Babb [1987, p.173]; Bromley [1978a, p.1162]; Bromley [1982, p.73]; Bijlmer [1989,p.146]; Tinker and Cohen [1985, p.87]; PREALC [1988, p.27]; Bunster [1983, p.98]; Escobar [1988, p.115]; and Moser [1977, p.483].

1986, p.739; cited by Tinker 1987, p.34]. Particularly, growth perspectives of female owned stalls is considerably lower and, at best, their capital remains stationary [Moser 1977, p.483-484; Bunster B. 1983, p.100]. Additionally, several studies have found that female marketers are less educated than their male counterparts [Bunster 1983, p.100; Escobar 1988, p.104; PREALC 1988, p.9].

Regarding gender-related product specialization, Natrass [1987, p.867] indicates that in Transkei, South Africa, women dominate the unskilled (speculative) occupations (selling fruit and vegetables), while men figure strongly in the producing sectors. Bromley [1978a, p.1162] and Grompone [1981, p.105] found that female traders tend to deal in food items while the reverse is true for males. Escobar [1988, p.107] observed that females tend to specialize in essential goods while men have a greater participation in non-essential consumer goods. However, Oliver Smith [1990, p.220], in his research on Spanish mobile traders, found no correlation between the type of product sold and the gender or age of the vendor.

Finally, female vendors --who tend to be the powerless market traders-- are frequently harassed by authorities, exploited by their suppliers, and they generally work in isolation with scarce participation in labor unions [Bunster 1983, pp.101,102].

## II.3.4. THE INDEPENDENCE/SUBORDINATION OF STREET VENDORS

*INDEPENDENT SELF-EMPLOYED OR 'DISGUISED' WORKERS?*

An issue widely discussed in the street vending literature is the extent to which they really are independent workers or they are in fact 'disguised' workers dependent on stronger enterprises. This discussion is closely related to the problem of the 'entrepreneurial nature' of the street vendor.

Bromley and Gerry [1979], Scott [1979], and Bromley [1982, p.64] argue that there is a significant proportion of cases of 'disguised wage labor,' sub-contracted labor and other forms of dependent employment among those people who at first glance could be considered 'independent self-employed.'

In Bromley's view [1982, p.64], 'true self-employed' --in contrast to 'dependent workers'-- work on behalf of themselves and their families; they own their means of production, and although they rely on other people to operate, they enjoy considerable freedom to choose suppliers and outlets. Therefore, true self-employed "are dependent upon general socioeconomic conditions and on the supply and demand conditions for their products but they are not dependent upon specific firms for the means to obtain their livelihoods." Particularly, they tend to buy from a variety of suppliers [Bromley 1978a, p.1167].

Within traders, some investigations have uncovered that many of them might be properly considered as 'disguised commission sellers' [Bromley and Gerry 1979;

Babb 1987, p.177]. However, from a research standpoint, identifying 'dependent work' is very difficult in more superficial questionnaire surveys, and only appear in detailed studies on individual street vendors [Bromley 1978a, p.1166].

According to the Colombian experience related by Bromley [1978a], the fact that "almost no wage-workers exist among street traders... (supports) the typical image of the street trader ...(as an) independent, self-employed entrepreneur whose success depends upon his own efforts and ability to attract clientele [p.1165]... (In fact), many street traders are little more than disenfranchised employees of larger enterprises. They work for relatively low and variable remunerations and carry most of the risk in unstable and sometimes illegal activities. The 'employers' avoid any binding obligation to their 'employees', escaping government attempts to regulate employment through social security, job security and minimum wage legislation"[p.1168]. He also estimated that around 35% of all street sellers in Cali, Colombia, are either 'commission sellers' or 'dependent workers,' and that this proportion tends to grow [p.1165].

Interestingly, when a manufacturing company takes in its hands the task of organizing its retailing distribution through street vendors, then it is likely a case of disguised wage working. Furthermore, credit provided by suppliers by means of giving goods in advance may convert street vendors in dependent workers with the burden of a permanent debt, although their situation appears to be entrepreneurial [Grompone 1981, p.102].

It should be pointed out that choosing to become a 'commission seller' or a 'dependent worker' should not be judged as an irrational decision. In fact, in high-risk and low-capital-availability conditions, some individuals may maximize earnings by giving-up 'independence' in exchange for an easier availability of merchandise, credit, a stall, or a good site away from official persecution [Bromley 1978a, p.1167].

The disadvantages of traders with their suppliers, whether vendors are disguised workers or true self employed, may be explained by the establishment of a 'monopsonistic' relationship between these actors. The alternative strategy for dependent workers is to take advantage of their close links with their suppliers to make a better bargain of the terms of their commercial arrangements. For true self-employed, the alternative is to take advantage of both social links and to operate with other alternative sources, as reported by Oliver-Smith [1990, p.226] in the case of itinerant traders in Madrid, Spain.

Regarding the degree of economic independence of street sellers, mixed results have been reported in the literature. The experience of the Indian city of Madras [Lessinger 1985, p.317] indicates the existence of the supply of goods on credit by wholesalers to petty retail traders --one typical form of sellers' dependence. Besides, Bijlmer [1989, p.150] concludes that, according to Bromley and Gerry's criterion [1979], a significant proportion of sellers in his study in Indonesia were not true self employed (41%). Additionally, Yunusa's study on street trading in Samaru [1988, p.107] noticed that 55%

of the subjects were hawking for somebody else, including relatives and non-relatives. Those working for non-relatives were in fact 'commission-sellers.'

However, in Peru, Picavet [1989, p.198] found no evidence of selling on commission or of one proprietor or family having a chain of retailing equipment. Besides, in his study of Dominican *lechugueros* (mobile vegetable sellers), Murphy [1990, p.175] reported that large-scale enterprise domination of such sellers does not occur.

#### II.3.5. THE ENTRY INTO STREET TRADE

One of the most important research problems posed by the street vending phenomenon is that of why this activity has grown and persisted in so many different settings. In fact this question has two different sides, one being what are the 'objective' factors which cause the growth and persistence of the activity, while the other one is why and how individuals decide to adopt such occupation and to remain in it.

Although the two inquiries are in fact mutually determined and hence inseparable, its division is proposed only with analytical purposes, because the former is concerned with 'observed facts' whereas the latter emphasizes individuals' perceptions of such facts and their consequent decision making. It should be recognized that the literature on street trade and self-employment frequently explores both issues simultaneously.

As is expected, within both the 'objective' and 'subjective' approaches, several non-exclusionary and exclusionary explanations have been offered, which are mainly determined by the specific theoretical and ideological position assumed by every researcher. Actually, as Bijlmer [1989] has argued, the complexity and heterogeneity of the informal sector has motivated investigators to 'test' and 'confirm' even strongly contradictory hypotheses.

*INDIVIDUALS' MOTIVATIONS FOR ENTRY: SURVIVAL AND/OR ENTREPRENEURSHIP*

Bromley [1978a p.1161; 1982] indicates that two extreme opposite views of street traders have been offered. The 'negative view' considers the street trader as a 'parasite' and even a potential or actual criminal, or simply views the job as a marginal and totally irrelevant occupation. The positive approach considers him/her as an example of how the poor 'make out' in the cities, and as an entrepreneur that --victim of the shortage of both capital and 'productive' employment opportunities in the city-- adopts a 'coping response' to earn a living.

From the standpoint of individuals' motivations, two broad not necessarily (although sometimes considered as) exclusive explanations have been offered in the literature to account for the emergence, persistence, and growth of street trade in particular, and of informal self-employment in general: first, the individuals' necessity for survival and, second, their desire for owning and managing an independent business. The first

approach implicitly emphasizes individuals' personal and environmental constraints while the latter stresses their initiative and entrepreneurial motivations.

Although some studies emphasize economic survival as the main driving force of entry into street trade [Escobar 1988, p.101], others consider that there is a duality in the motivations to enter street marketing. A study on Hong Kong hawkers [Armstrong and McGee, 1985 p.193] indicates the presence of two types of entrants: former wage workers often displaced from their jobs because of their age and disability, and those who come as entrepreneurs from other forms of employment. Besides, PREALC [1988, p.35] and Lozano [1983, p.359] have identified two types of people entering street selling according to their entry motivations --voluntary and coerced entrants-- where the former are mainly entrepreneurs while the latter are people lacking job opportunities.

Besides, McGee and Yeung [1977, p.95-96] in their high-scale multi-country study of street vendors in Southeast Asia state that hawking appears to act *both* as a 'refuge' occupation which provides entrants with marginal incomes, and as an occupation that provides the opportunity for some people to obtain favorable monetary returns. These authors stress that these two motives are in fact extremes of a continuum in which street traders lie somewhere in between. In their words: "for the enterprising, hawking need not be a 'refuge' occupation. It is, on the contrary, an economic ladder that offers some hope of upward mobility" [p.106].



McGee and Yeung [1977] also link those two types of motivations to vendors' demographic characteristics, hence identifying three broad streams of people entering into street trade: 1) longer established city residents; 2) recent urban migrants of rural background; and 3) city residents with previous experience in urban jobs. The first two groups are poorly educated and adopt street trade due to their lack of opportunities and skills, whereas the latter group are better educated and enter into street selling looking for an economic improvement [p.112].

Whether forced to enter into street trade or freely making such decision, this job not only satisfies vendors' economic necessities but also allows them to enjoy some social and personal advantages not present in wage employment [McGee 1977, pp.268-269]. In addition, Picavet [1989, p.203] asserts that entering street trade is a rational occupational strategy for both disadvantaged people who are survival-seekers, and for more young, dynamic and ambitious people for whom it represents a rational transitional activity.

#### *VENDORS' DECLARED REASONS TO ENTER*

In their study on hawkers in Hong Kong, Armstrong and McGee [1985, pp.191-192] found that the reported frequency of strictly economic reasons to enter hawking<sup>14</sup> was rather limited. Instead, their findings indicate that vendors' motivation were more often a *combination of*

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<sup>14</sup> Such as, 'to be my own boss,' 'to earn better income,' 'can't find another job,' 'do not possess skills for any other job,' and 'do not need much capital.'

*economic, social,<sup>15</sup> and personal motivations.<sup>16</sup>* [Armstrong and McGee 1985, pp.191-192]. Interestingly, they also report that personal factors were more important for older females whereas economic reasons were especially mentioned by younger hawkers [p.192].

According to Lozano's results [1983 pp.348,349,359], voluntary entrants --those who enter the profession looking for increasing their income-- generally declared an intense dissatisfaction either with routine and authority in their previous formal jobs, and expressed a desire to be their own boss. In contrast, involuntary entrants --generally those unemployed-- entered expecting to find the means to support themselves given the lack of formal sector income opportunities. And although they claim to enjoy their job autonomy, their desire to find another occupation is still strong. 20% of her respondents were voluntary entrants whereas the remaining 80% fell into the involuntary entrant category.

Lessinger's [1985, p.317] analysis of Indian petty retail sellers coincides with Armstrong and McGee in that several different non-exclusive factors were mentioned by interviewees to enter the occupation. A non-negligible number of male vendors reported having also formal jobs. Surprisingly, some men reported that they left their former formal job for *the relatively higher income-security of trading;*<sup>17</sup> other stressed their low-skilled or educational condition as also the easiness of the

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<sup>15</sup> Such as 'inheritance,' and 'friends and relatives in the same business.'

<sup>16</sup> Such as 'old age,' 'disability,' and 'poor health.'

<sup>17</sup> 'At least this way you can eat regularly.'

job;<sup>18</sup> some others mentioned personal autonomy.<sup>19</sup> In explaining their preference for a more independent occupation, "traders recalled the unfairness, maltreatment or humiliations they had experienced in their (former) jobs, and they welcomed their present jobs which, if exhausting, at least allowed them to arrange their own decisions and to evade direct personal exploitation" [p.317].

McGee and Yeung [1977] reported that three broad reasons for entry were responded by hawkers in six Southeast Asian cities: "negative reasons such as 'no job,' 'no skills,' 'no capital,' etc.; second, positive reasons such as 'good possibilities for earning income' and 'family inheritance,' etc.; and finally, a broad category of 'others,' which did not fall clearly into the other two groups" [p.101]. Interestingly, they found that with the exception of one city, the majority of traders entered the occupation for negative reasons.

#### *PREVIOUS JOB EXPERIENCE*

Several investigations have indicated that an important amount of street traders come from wage employment in the formal sector. PREALC [1988] study of Chilean traders finds that a significant proportion of them had previously been wage workers (mainly at formal sector enterprises) or economically inactive people, while only a minority were self-employed. Besides, according to McGee's research [1977 pp.268-269] on Hong

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<sup>18</sup> 'Any fool can learn this work.'

<sup>19</sup> 'There's nobody here to yell at me.'

Kong hawkers, one third of them had an occupational history in the formal sector. A similar finding was reported for Indian traders [Lessinger 1985], whereas other studies hint that informal mobile retailing has absorbed many unemployed people [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.224], or job-inexperienced individuals [Nattrass 1987, p.868; Escobar 1988, p.105].

#### II.3.6. MAJOR MACRO AND MICRO ANALYTICAL APPROACHES EXPLAINING ENTRY

In an attempt to classify the many and diverse causal factors of the emergence, persistence and growth of street trade, in the following paragraphs I will present a preliminary broad classification of them. Once again, it should be remembered that some of these explanations are not considered mutually exclusive by academicians using more eclectic, multi-causal models. However, it is also remarkable that other scholars -- those more strongly attached to their particular theoretical approaches-- tend to neglect the validity of rival explanations. Anyway, as Grompone [1981, p.108] points out, whatever the degree of consensus achieved by some interpretations, we still need to advance their development.

##### *THE LIMITED-FORMAL-JOB-OPPORTUNITIES APPROACH*

One explanatory approach of the emergence of street vending which has achieved a high degree of consensus among researchers is the one which states it is caused by limitations in the creation of job opportunities in the

formal sector of the economy. Since higher formal unemployment induces a stronger competition for the available jobs among potential workers, unemployed individuals, and especially those particularly disadvantaged -- low-skilled city natives and migrants, low-labor-experienced women working at the household, the older, and the handicapped-- are obligated to search for economic survival in street trade [Babb 1987, p.173; PREALC 1988, pp.5-7; McGee and Yeung 1977, p.103; Oliver-Smith 1990; p.208; Trager 1985, p.268; Lozano 1983, p.360; Escobar 1988, p.99]. In addition, as far as limitations in the demand for labor in formal labor markets tend to negatively affect real-wage levels, informal urban retailing becomes then a better economic alternative even for people actually having a formal wage job, or those able to get it [Rogerson 1990, p.119; Escobar 1988, p.105].

However, some studies have witnessed phenomena that do not fit in the last argument. An investigation by Benites and Cortés [1990] about small informal traders in Mexico found that a great proportion of the vendors studied decided to become small retailers precisely when the Mexican economy was experiencing the 'oil boom' --a time period when job opportunities could hardly be considered scarce. Additionally, McGee and Yeung's [1977 p.28] huge study in Southeast Asian hawkers rejects the validity of the contrary implication of the unemployment/low-wage argument, since they found that economic growth is not positively related to the decline of street sellers.

Similarly, Smart [1990], in a study on hawkers in Hong Kong discovered that, in contrast with findings in other countries where people are forced into street hawking as a result of unemployment and poverty, in Hong Kong, due to its strong economy, "most people can get some kind of wage employment at any given time. (Therefore), temporary unemployment is seldom a causative factor in people's decision to enter street hawking; rather, it acts as a catalyst to prompt people to consider self-employment as an alternative to wage employment" [266-267].

#### *THE INFORMAL-DEMAND-SIDE APPROACH*

While limitations in demand for manpower in formal labor markets may induce individuals to search for informal self-employment in street trade, it is the existence of a social demand for street-trading services both by final consumers and by wholesale suppliers that supports sellers' economic viability. Therefore, the permanent and even growing demand for their services explain the persistence of street traders [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.198].

Besides, the growth of urban population, fueled by migration, generates a need for expanding the distribution systems in the cities, which in turn stimulates wholesalers to search for cheap distribution channels. The existence of an important segment of customers within the urban population --especially the poor-- strongly concerned with buying goods at low prices, further increases the demand for informal retailing services whose prices tend to be lower than

those of established retailers [Picavet 1989, p.203; McGee and Yeung 1977, p.28; Oliver-Smith 1990, p.208].

When a stronger complementarity exists between the formal and informal sectors --which means that the income elasticity of demand for informal retailing services is high-- economic growth may in fact lead to an expansion of informal sellers; while economic slowdown may cause a reduction in the number of traders. This phenomenon has been observed by Isaac's study on informal-retail sellers in Sierra Leone, Africa [Isaac 1981, p.360]. Trager [1985] further observed that trade and commerce have long been important in Ilesha, Nigeria, but their recent growth has been fueled by the distribution needs derived from the establishment of a formal business --a brewery [pp.276-277].

#### *THE EXCESSIVE/INADEQUATE-STATE-REGULATION APPROACH*

De Soto [1989] has stressed that the existence of an excessive regulation by the state affects the creation and operation of small-scale formal enterprises, hence impelling people to search for informal non-regulated job opportunities as street vending. In addition, Armstrong and McGee [1985, p.198] and associations of private enterprises [CONCANACO 1990] have stated that the inadequacy of government policy designed to reduce the numbers of hawkers and limit their operations may be cited as a factor explaining their persistence.

Roberts [1991] considers that the persistence of informal employment is due to the ineffective nature of government regulation which generates an inadequate state

welfare system, whereas "the growth of such employment is due to the pressures of an urban poverty made worse by the failure of both state and market to provide adequate housing and other urban amenities" [p.117]. Additionally, Roberts [1991] argues that --in the case of Mexico during recent times-- not only do the informally employed lack labor rights but even the formally employed are suffering an erosion of such rights. In such conditions, the relative advantages of informality have changed for the actors involved --particularly, informal jobs have become a convenient alternative for people running a small firm or working in a formal occupation. Therefore, in Robert's words [1991, p.139], "the supply of labor in the urban labor market has ... become a supply heavily oriented to informal work."

#### *THE UPWARD-MOBILITY/AUTONOMY-SEEKING APPROACH*

A third approach has underlined individuals' aspirations for economic independence and social mobility as a relevant motivator of their decision to move into self-employment [Smart 1990]. She states that "it is not unemployment that drives most people into street hawking; rather, it is an active resistance to proletarianization by people whose aspiration for socioeconomic mobility is restricted by their marginal position in the society [p.271]."

Smart [1990] goes directly to the point by asking: "What exactly are the attractions of street hawking relative to low paying employment? What does it offer that justifies the hawkers' committed participation in street hawking despite increasing state intervention and



harassment, the long hours of work, the labor intensiveness, the low social status associated with hawking, and the constant struggle to defend and maintain one's spatial position? The primary attraction is money: street hawking can be highly lucrative, with an income potential higher than that from most industrial and service sector jobs, or even clerical jobs which require a fairly high level of formal education and at least some working knowledge of English. With the exception of a small number of truly marginal, low-income hawking units, most hawkers earn \$2500 to \$3000 per month after deductions for operation and reinvestment costs" [p. 267]. "In addition, self-employment offers a greater degree of autonomy, and in some cases greater security than wage employment" [p.268].

As Gershuny and Pahl [1979, cited by Lozano 1983, p.341] suggest, unemployment may constitute a 'positive benefit' as far as it induces individuals to search for more satisfying informal work opportunities that allow for greater personal autonomy, flexibility of hours and use of personal skills [p.5]. In their view, unemployment permits former wage workers to be freed through self-employment: they are "slipping out of their chains and walking out the system's front door" [p.17]. Therefore, according to this perspective, the informal sector provides private solutions to public problems [Lozano 1983, p.341].

Hernando de Soto [1989] studied informal activities in Peru, especially informal trade, and identified an entrepreneurial spirit in street vendors' activities and strategies, as a response to the state's excessive

bureaucratic barriers and its lack of intervention in providing social welfare. Again, the case of Dominican *lechugueros* [Murphy 1990, pp.168,170] evidences the high value they assign to greater income and independence. The fact that the average *lechuguero* would not leave his present position even for a wage job paying substantially more [p.168] sheds light on the autonomy-seeking nature of their job selection.

#### *THE FAMILY-NETWORK APPROACH*

Kinship and family tradition have been recognized by PREALC [1988, p.35] as an important influencer of entrants, while people lacking such influences were mainly moved by economic necessity. Kin or friends play an important supporting role in the start-up of the activity by providing monetary help and advice, whereas vendors lacking such advantage must recur to their personal savings or to sell some of their already scarce durable goods [p.43,49].

In trying to explain the reasons for an autonomy-seeking behavior in females' job selection, an explanation related to the social organization of the household may be offered [Roberts 1990,1994; Benería 1991; PREALC 1988]. The argument states that the job-selection process is bounded by the individuals' roles within their households. Therefore, the options really considered by the individual are those that are functional to his/her specific role within the household's particular mode of organization. However, those jobs which do not possess such functionality are not 'true alternatives' even if they are really

available. This argument may explain why females tend to favor street trade: its intrinsic flexibility permits them accomplishing their household duties both at home and at the street. In short, females' position in the household generates a particular need for job flexibility which can be satisfied especially by street trading [PREALC 1988, p.59].

#### *THE EASY-ENTRY/LOW-REQUISITES APPROACH*

The fact that a significant number of poor, unskilled and job-inexperienced people enters street marketing indicates that barriers to entry are relatively low. In addition, some other features of the job which make it an attractive option for potential entrants are: no formal or bureaucratic prerequisites exist; it provides economic independence, self-determination and time flexibility; and it permits generating immediate income [PREALC 1988, p.14].

The analysis by Moser [1977] shows that the life cycle is related to entry in street trade. As her analysis makes clear, it is plausible that life-cycle is not a causal factor *per se* but it actually synthesizes a series of particular elements influencing the entry decision, such as age, education, previous job experience, economic responsibilities within the household, job alternatives, and economic aspirations.

#### *MULTI-FACTOR APPROACHES*

An interesting hypotheses linking personal and macroeconomic factors might be established by combining

arguments presented by Armstrong and McGee [1985] and PREALC [1988], to account for both people's entry and permanence in hawking --two phenomena that do not necessarily have identical causes [PREALC 1988, pp.55-56]. On the one hand, limited employment opportunities move disadvantaged people to adopt hawking which then becomes their occupational niche. On the other hand, when the demand for labor increases in formal labor markets they do not qualify for such jobs due to their advanced age and/or low level of education [Armstrong and McGee 1985 p.197]. Moreover, the longer the permanence in street trade, the lower the value of such experience in the eyes of formal employers [PREALC 1988, p.56], which evidences the high level of specificity of the human capital acquired by mastering street vending.

As a consequence of all these mentioned factors, "street sellers...become occupationally stranded, unable to move out of the hawking profession." [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.197]. Furthermore, by the time the demand for labor increases in labor markets, traders probably have already developed a significant pride in their profession and found their job particularly satisfying, which reduces their willingness to leave hawking to take a wage job [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.198; PREALC 1988, pp.57-58].

According to Osterling et. al. [1979, p.25], the existence and development of street trade is closely linked to demographic, labor-market-related factors, the type of industrialization, and the concentration and segmentation of the urban market [Osterling et. al. 1979, p.25].

Finally, it is possible that the growth of street vending is fueled by dissimilar factors in different countries and societies. The economic-survival reasons might be more important in low-growth, poorer countries, while the entrepreneurial, autonomy-seeking motivations may play a more relevant role in high-growth, more developed countries. The cases of Hong Kong [Smart 1990, p.271], and the United States [Spalter-Roth, 1988a; 1988b] may illustrate more clearly the entrepreneurial view, while studies in developing countries are better examples of the economic-survival approach.

A caution is necessary, however, in order to avoid the misperception that unique causal factors can be clearly established for the two groups of countries mentioned. In fact, given individuals' heterogeneity and within-county differentiation, multiple reasons for hawking can be identified in any country. The point here is not one of uniqueness of causal factors but one of their relative importance in different types of economic and social conditions.

#### II.3.7. STREET VENDORS' JOB ALTERNATIVES AND WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE STREET TRADE

##### *TRANSITORY OR PERMANENT JOB*

Although there is a common belief --supported in fact by some studies in development economics [Todaro 1992]-- that jobs in the informal sector are transitory and that migrants tend to move to the formal sector when a job opportunity arises, studies of vendors in Chile,

Colombia, and Hong Kong indicate that street vending seems to be a rather permanent activity and hence it is not a stop-gap measure prior to incorporation into the wage sector [Moser 1977, p.482; PREALC 1988, p.24; Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.191]. However, in Cali, Colombia, the presence of transitory street vendors has been observed. In this case, the number of sellers is highly variable since many people leaves temporarily their formal jobs to take advantage of high-demand periods, such as Christmas [Bromley 1978a, p.1163].

#### *PART-TIME OR FULL-TIME JOB*

Street trade may be adopted as a full-time or as a part-time occupation. In Madras, India, a small but significant number of male traders combine formal sector work with part-time trading [Lessinger 1985, p.317]. In Samaru, slightly more than half of adult hawkers are actually part-time sellers [Yunusa 1988, p.104]. However, in Peru, Picavet [1989, p.194] reports that an important qualitative change has taken place, since street vending has become a full-time permanent job.

#### *HOURS WORKED*

As other informal self-employed, street vendors are not tied to regular hours of work and regular vacations, and their income is very irregular [McGee 1977, p.268]. Besides, there is no clear division between hours of work and personal time which makes it even more difficult for them knowing exactly their compensation rates for their work [Lozano 1983, p.359].

Street traders tend to work more hours than wage workers [Bunster 1983, p.95], partly because they face an intermittent demand throughout the day [PREALC 1988, p.25; McGee and Yeung 1977 p.84], and because they may be helped by relatives who operate the stall when the owner is absent [Armstrong and McGee 1985,p.182-183; Osterling et. al. 1979, p.37]. However seasonal patterns of demand and changing weather conditions introduce a high degree of variability in hours worked [Osterling et.al. 1979, p.38]

Bromley [1982, p.69] has argued that the term 'underemployed' has been improperly used to denominate street workers, since they "do not usually describe themselves as underemployed, but rather stress the long hours (seven days a week) that they have to work to earn a subsistence income" [pp.69-70]. In his opinion, using such a term to describe street workers lowers their job status and implicitly throws the blame for their low income and productivity upon themselves, hence "blaming the poor for being poor" [p.71].

#### *LOW OR NONEXISTENT JOB ALTERNATIVES*

Bromley [1978, p.1165] states that street vendors are frequently considered as not having any other formal job alternative, and that common occupational options of potential entrants are crime and prostitution. Natrass [1987 p. 867] also considers that street sellers are really excluded from the labor market.

According to Oliver-Smith [1990, p.229], many mobile traders in Madrid, Spain, have no other job alternative

and will leave street vending when they find other work. A similar finding was reported by Bunster [1983, p.94] in her research on Peruvian market sellers. Moser [1977, p.485] witnessed that little movement out of street trade exists in the cases of the unproductive labor surplus, the unskilled, the old and the women.

The study by Anthony [1987, p.117] on hawkers in Kuala Lumpur remarks that government prosecution does not keep convicted sellers or those awaiting trial from returning to street trading, showing that the deterrent effects were actually nil.

Low job opportunities and scarce chances of formalization in trading are observed in the case of traders in Samaru, studied by Yunusa [1988, p.105]. He indicates that, "out of 41 respondents, 56% do not know when they will stop hawking, 32% may stop hawking when they get married while 12% may stop hawking as they progress in their formal education.

Nattrass [1987, pp.867-868], in his research on street trading in Transkei, observed that 44% of the subjects in his sample would prefer a full time occupation paying 50 rand per month to their present job, while the remainder would prefer staying at street vending. Among those who would take a steady occupation 88% argued financial reasons whereas 12% declared income-security motivations. Among those who would remain as street sellers, 46% claimed that they were too old to perform a steady job requiring a fair amount of manual labor, whereas 23% said that their present job was easier



probably due to their older age or cripple condition, and 16% provided family reasons.

From this pattern of answers, Natrass [1987] concludes that a majority of traders who would remain in street vending have age or family constraints, while the proportion of those 'really deciding' to stay are rather few. He expresses: "It is likely that only 8% of the total sample really preferred working in the street trading business and were not 'forced' into it in some way or another. This implies that the median income of respondents was well below R50 per month at a time when migrant workers were earning R210 per month while 'formal' sector (especially government workers) were earning considerably more" [p.868].

Escobar [1988, p.106] states that the absence of job opportunities, among other factors, leads to vendor permanence in street trading. Additionally, Lozano [1983, p.350] argues that the longer the permanence in informal selling, the lesser their job alternatives outside commerce. This is explained by high-tenure vendors' reduced 'competitiveness' in the formal labor markets in the eyes of employers, and by the loss of their contacts outside trade. Therefore, at some point they abandon their job-search and become definitive traders. These two arguments may be linked to establish the hypothesis of the existence of a mutually reinforcing relationship between lack of job opportunities and permanence in street selling.

High risk and insecurity associated with street vending move vendors to look for a more stable job

situation [PREALC 1988, pp.57-58] or to attempt the formalization of their business [De Soto 1989]. However, the opportunity cost (in terms of forgone income) of searching for a job may be unacceptable for vendors, given their precarious economic situation. Also, the time and effort required by the search process may be considerably high, especially for low-skilled people in a context of scarcity of job opportunities. For these reasons many of them do not even try searching for a different occupation [PREALC 1988, p.57].

#### *ALTERNATIVE JOB OPPORTUNITIES DO EXIST*

According to the Hong Kong experience, hawkers' low levels of education prevent them entering 'white collar jobs,' but this fact does not preclude them from becoming part of the industrial labor force which traditionally has offered a significant number of job opportunities [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.192]. Other studies note vendors' entrepreneurial orientation or their voluntary incorporation in street trade [Lozano 1983] and recognize the existence of wage job alternatives for them [Spalter-Roth, 1988a; 1988b].

Perceived advantages of street vending may operate for sellers to persist in the job, even in the case that other job opportunities exist. In Hong Kong, the fact that vendors consider independence and working with relatives as a reason for turning to hawking --and, implicitly, as an advantage of street trading over wage employment--, and the considerable pride they show in their profession --particularly with respect to relationships with customers and knowledge of bargaining

procedures-- supports the view that they find the job satisfying [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.198].

The case of Dominican *lechugeros* studied by Murphy [1990, pp.168,170] shows that almost all of them actually have formal job opportunities, and the fact that they make more money in street selling than in minimum-wage job alternatives, explains their permanence in street trade. Furthermore, he points out the importance of independence as a source of job-satisfaction, by stating that the average *lechuguero* would not leave his present position even for a job that pays substantially more.

#### II.3.8. THE SCALE OF OPERATIONS

##### *CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Street occupations are singularized for having a low capital-to-labor-ratio [Bromley 1982, p.61], and the level of capital required for the start-up is actually very low [PREALC 1988, p.48; Picavet 1989, p.203; Natrass 1987, p.867; Escobar 1988, p.107]. The turnover of capital invested tends to be very high because of sellers' limited stock and storage capacity [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.226], and the need to offer an adequately diversified set of products [PREALC 1988, p.48]. According to Osterling et. al. [1979, p.36] high turnover of capital permits reduced risk in operations.

This literature review evidences that important differences exist not only between vendors operating in different settings, but also within traders working in

the same city or location. While 'small-scale' is frequently referred as a common trait, considerable variability exists in the scale of operation [Moser 1977, pp.476-477]. Thus, there are vendors who manage relatively large and well established stalls with a high value of stock and profits, coexisting with marginal vendors with poorly-endowed and improvised stalls with low levels of working capital and earnings [Nattrass 1987, p.866].

Certain street-selling occupations --especially higher-scale mobile trading-- usually require a greater amount of capital than small-scale sedentary street vending, hence constituting a non-neglegible entry barrier. According to Murphy [1990, pp.173-174], becoming a *lechuguero* --who uses a tricycle-- requires an amount of capital that can be prohibitive for many who might wish to adopt this job. In the case of Spanish mobile traders, Oliver-Smith [1990, p.225] reports that "when the massive lay-offs hit industry, many workers invested their severance pay in merchandise which, with their cars, enabled them to join the *raastro* circuit (itinerant market system) as a means of making a living. This fact reinforces the position that *work in the informal sector often requires considerable resources and is not entirely a situation of free entry*" (italics added).

#### *ECONOMIC FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH SCALE OF OPERATIONS*

Four distinguishing features of the street vendors operation have been delineated by McGee and Yeung [1977, p.81]: 1) the types of commodity sold; 2) the type of hawking unit; 3) the scale of operations; and 4) the mode

of operation (family operation or use of wage workers). The type of hawking unit has been usually classified according to their degree of mobility, going from perfectly mobile units to semi-static and static units [pp.82-83].

The value of stock has been reported to be related to the type of hawker installation in such a way that bigger-size, static stalls, tend to have higher value of stock [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.181]. Additionally, a relationship between value of stock and type of product traded has been identified; particularly farm goods and food items require low capital, and are usually operated by females. In contrast, clothes and groceries --usually operated by men-- are among the highest capital endowed businesses [Escobar 1988, p.110]. Correspondingly, more valuable products tend to be sold at higher-scale stalls [Moser 1980, p.370]. Besides, higher stock permits greater sales and better sourcing conditions, as far as it provides the vendor flexibility to buy from the right supplier at the right time [Grompone 1981, p.99]. Finally, Lessinger [1985, p.317] indicates that there is a great degree of flexibility to change the scale of operations in face of temporary reverses --caused by either low demand and sellers' poor financial situation-- without leaving the market place.

#### *DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH SCALE OF OPERATIONS*

Moser [1977, p.482] recognizes the importance of individual factors influencing the level of operation, such as interpersonal relationships and its derived information and contacts. However, she argues that it is

age and sex of each entrant into street trade which determines the level of capital resources available and hence the scale of operation. Moser also identifies that the large-scale trader tends to be male, middle-aged, literate but not highly educated, and a recent migrant. In contrast, the small-scale seller tends to be female, over 50 years old, not currently married, illiterate, and long-term migrant [p.480]. Her analysis suggests that the scale of operations may be understood not only by analyzing the economic features of the stall but also by examining the social characteristics and work histories of the workers.

#### II.3.9. VENDORS' ECONOMIC RATIONALITY, RISK AND COMPETITION

##### *DEBATE ON VENDORS' ECONOMIC RATIONALITY*

The existence, and if so, the type of economic rationality of street vendors has been subject to debate among researchers. On the one hand, Evers and Mehmet [1994, pp.1,4] consider that the small-scale trader is not an optimizer because the objective function is unclear. They argue that many small traders have unclear concepts of such terms as income, cost, and profits, for which any strict 'maximization' or 'minimization' attempt is meaningless. In fact, they suggest that such ignorance directly contributes to increase their rate of failure.

In contrast with this view, Geertz [1992, p.227] considers that basic microeconomic principles apply in the bazaar economy: "sellers seek maximum profit,

consumers maximum utility; price relates supply and demand; and factor proportions reflect factor costs" [p227]. Nevertheless, he recognizes that the principles governing the organization of commercial life cannot be derived from such truisms. His argument coincides largely with Granovetter's view [1992] of both the actors' economic goals and the principles of economic organization as 'socially embedded'.

A similar approach is adopted by Murphy [1990, p.170,175], who states that Dominican *lechugueros* are, and see themselves as, optimizing opportunities, since they have selected the occupation that provides them with the maximum net income. Besides, he asserts that *lechugueros* attempt to maximize profits and minimize costs in their operations. Nevertheless, Murphy emphasizes that sellers' decision making is not that of the formalist or neo-classical schools, as far as they operate within a specific context and choose their economic strategy within structural parameters.

Without explaining precisely the meaning of 'rationality,' several studies consider that street vendors' decision making is 'rational' [Osterling et.al. 1979, p.39]. Gershuny and Pahl [1979 cited by Lozano 1983, p.340], state that it is economically rational for people to allocate more of their time in informal work, as the informal sector becomes less able to provide jobs, income and low price goods. Moser [1977, p.479] also argues that entry into informal trading is a rational choice based on both economic and non-economic factors, where job alternatives are constrained by personal and wider restrictions. She asserts that sellers also make

constrained rational decisions in their choices of what goods they trade, by considering product selling characteristics, supply and demand factors, and related risks and profit margins [pp.474-475]. In her opinion, selling different products is seen as an optimal decision which maximize earnings and spreads risk [p.476].

#### *THE ROLE OF RISK IN STREET TRADE*

In the literature on street trade, two different positions have been stated regarding the risk propensity of sellers. On the one hand, Evers and Mehmet [1994, p.4] perceive them as risk avoiders while PREALC [1988, p.71] extol their proneness to take risks and their 'Schumpeterian spirit.'

Street traders' economic rationality in their management of risk has been remarked by Evers and Mehmet [1994]. They point out that small marketers face several types of risks and uncertainties in carrying out their activities, although such problem has been scarcely attended in the literature on informal sector [p.1].

Inasmuch as formalization is not always a feasible or convenient solution to their risk problem, traders tend to develop a set of strategies that helps them to cope with uncertainty, such as: daily replenishment of stocks, avoidance of long term credit, formalization of relations with government agencies [Evers and Mehmet 1994, p.1], working long hours, indulging in mixed trading, seeking supplementary sources of income, trading in small quantities, and assuming many costs of petty trading themselves [p.4]. Another important risk-



reduction measure is the building and cultivating of social networks which provide them with both valuable market information [Geertz 1992] and financial assistance in emergency situations.

Mendoza [1992] has pointed out that the very fact that street vendors operate informally increases their risks, which compels them to cooperate with each other and to look for longer-term economic relationships among them and with both their suppliers and customers. In his opinion, street vendors take risks but with a rational strategy: in conditions of high uncertainty it is better to establish long term personal relationships that do not lead to short-run profits maximization, but that increase the probability of remaining in business in the long run.

*STREET TRADE IS NOT A 'PERFECT COMPETITION MARKET'*

Although street traders operate in a very competitive environment, this does not mean that their market structure resembles closely to what economists call 'perfect competition' [Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989]. Even though street trading cannot avoid the influences of supply and demand forces, in some regards it may be properly characterized as a semi-oligopolistic sector, and even some of their participants act as true monopolists. On the one hand, traders sometimes practice price collusion in order to avoid 'price wars' [PREALC 1988, p.47] --a conduct typical in oligopolies. On the other hands, the spatial dimension of competition sometimes permits some sellers to become a sole supplier of a certain good or service in a certain area, which facilitates such traders adopting 'monopoly pricing.'

Additionally, competing through product and service diversification --a feature of 'monopolistic-competition' markets-- is very common among street vendors.

According to Bromley [1971, p.125], the market-place in general does not possess the characteristics of what economists name 'perfect competition' --atomistic, open, free and rational. Where 'atomistic' means that there exist a great number of small independent buyers and sellers with no monopolistic power. 'Open' indicates that no barriers exist to enter the markets. 'Free' means that prices are determined only by supply and demand forces. 'Rational' implies that all participants try to maximize profits.

Furthermore, in his analysis of the location behavior of Colombian street traders, Bromley [1978b, p.42] states that although, at first glance, they might be considered to operate under 'perfect competition,' "most street traders operate in a very imperfect market, which is not truly atomistic, open, free, or rational, and in which there is considerable intervention by government and big business" [p.42].

Nakanishi [1990, p.289], in his study of trading in Metro Manila, proposes that the urban informal markets are not (perfectly) competitive but segmented by participants' origin. Such segmentation is based on mutually convenient personal relationships that reduce the risk associated with imperfect information. Furthermore, he considers that the labor market has monopsonistic features.

*DEGREE OF COMPETITION AMONG VENDORS*

Although 'perfect competition' does not seem to exist in street selling, this market structure constitutes an ideal model to which actual street markets more or less 'resemble.' Particularly, the existence of a strong rivalry (which is commonly used as a synonymous for 'competition'), has been widely reported in the literature as a major feature of street markets [Bunster 1983, p.94]. On the other hand, high rivalry and ease of entry tend to negatively affect participants' earnings [Escobar 1988, p.113; Bromley 1978a, p.1167; Bromley 1982, p.61]. Interestingly, among street traders, competition takes place in two main ways: location and price competition [Isaac 1981, p.359].

Although vendors perceive newcomers as a source of stronger competitive pressures, they define their competitors as those vendors close to them selling the same product, and they are not as concerned about traders who do not invade their immediate area of influence [PREALC 1988].

According to Mendoza [1992] there exist a mix of rivalry and cooperation among street vendors. Rivalry is fueled by individual creativity and guarantees good customer service, while cooperation permits coping with both economic and social risks. Economic cooperation among vendors takes two main forms: A) street vendors operating the same line of products share inventories in such a way that when someone needs to sell a product that he does not have in inventory, any other member "lends" the soliciting seller some products from his inventories;

and, B) they tend to establish informal agreements on certain variables as prices or product lines; in general they avoid price competition and they mainly compete through customer service and location, a practice also witnessed by PREALC [1988, p.51].

#### *DEGREE OF COMPETITION BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL RETAILERS*

According to Bromley [1971 p.125-126], the permanent shop has several important advantages over the market stall: 1) greater security for the owner; 2) better facilities for storing and displaying products; and 3) a greater opportunity to sell goods of high value and quality. The customer normally receives extra comfort and better service. Nevertheless, shops require relatively high capital investment and have high operation costs, and therefore, charge higher prices. Markets then tend to be used by lower classes, whereas large shops are patronized by upper class consumers.

An issue abundantly discussed in the literature is the degree of competition, cooperation, and complementarity between street traders and established retailers. Although generally formal businesses decry traders operations, and accuse them as 'unfair competitors,' other enterprises benefited by street marketing support them 'silently.' Lozano [1983] considers that the relationships between 'flea market' sellers and formal sector producers and distributors form a "complex web of competition and interdependence" [p.354].

Notwithstanding their high failure rate and their low expansion, informal retailers are able to compete successfully with modern units, which assures their survival as a group [Tokman 1978, pp.1187,1196]. However, a number of studies in the literature report that street sellers are not strictly competitors of established retailers, as far as the two groups serve different market segments [Isaac 1981, p.359].

#### II.3.10. CUSTOMER DEMAND, AND VENDORS' SKILLS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGIES

##### *CUSTOMERS' BUYING MOTIVATIONS AND DEMAND*

As stated above, the significant growth of street trading in many countries is related to the increasing demand for their services. Household survey data for street foods support this view [Tinker 1987, p.61]. Regarding consumers' motives to buy from informal sellers,<sup>20</sup> an investigation carried out in the United States with 2100 American households [Smith 1985] indicated that "the most frequently reported advantage (from buying from informal sellers) (57%) was lower costs. Better quality was the next most frequently mentioned (12%). The most frequently stated disadvantage, accounting for 45 percent of the reports, was the absence of guarantees and exchange and return privileges. Lack of a guarantee caused household to fear the loss of money if goods were defective or service unsatisfactory. Thirty-

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<sup>20</sup> Although not necessarily street traders.

one percent reported disadvantages concerned questionable or uncertain quality" [p.168].

Oliver-Smith has indicated that in Spanish street markets "although some vendors may offer credit or lower prices to known customers, client loyalty is tenuous, vendor competition is fierce, and price tends to be the deciding factor in any purchase in the *rastro*" [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.224, italics added].

Prices charged by street vendors are generally lower than those offered by established retailers [Osterling et. al. 1979, p.26], due to both the former's lower fixed and variable costs, and the customers' low income [Grompone 1981, pp.100,107]. Prices at street markets tend to be lower for similar goods [Lozano 1983, p.353], and naturally this is true for lower-quality products. However, customers of street markets are generally more concerned with price than with quality given their limited income [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.224]

Still, a research on Hong Kong hawkers [Armstrong and McGee 1985] states that the assertion that low price is the main attraction for buying from them seems debatable, for they are perceived by customers as 'convenience vendors' whose main contribution is to reduce buyers' total costs (price paid plus transportation costs). Therefore, prices charged do not need to be lower than those charged by established retailers for similar goods insofar as *total* cost for the customer is lower than that incurred in buying from alternative suppliers. This view implicitly states that street vendors do not necessarily conform to what

economists describe as 'perfect competition,' but they rather act as 'small monopolies' exploiting their location advantage.

#### *THE ROLE OF INFORMATION*

The relevant role of information in the daily operations in the market place confers a special importance to individual skills in this regards. As Chacko [1985, p.129] states, one of the most relevant non-economic characteristics of the market place is that it serves as a center for dissemination of knowledge. However, as Geertz [1992, p.227] recognizes, participants in street markets lack of knowledge about product quality, prevalent prices, market possibilities and production costs is very high; but as far as this ignorance is a *known ignorance*, one of the main objectives of participants --both buyers and sellers-- is to reduce their own ignorance, to increase it for someone else, or to defend someone against it. Therefore, "the search for information --laborious, uncertain, complex, and irregular-- is the central experience of life in the bazaar, and every aspect of the bazaar economy reflects the fact that the primary problem facing its participants...is not balancing options but finding out what they are" [pp.227-228].

Grompone [1981, p.102] indicates that customers distrust street vendors, at least initially. Yunusa [1988, p.106] also reports the existence of very minimal social contact and degree of confidence between street traders and hawkers. In fact, distrust is the natural

result of asymmetric endowments of information among participants in street trade [Mendoza 1992].

Notwithstanding, it has been posed that clientelization is often the response that participants in street marketing adopt to reduce the cost of search and to cope with the problems of information asymmetry. Clientelization is defined as "the tendency for repetitive purchasers to establish continuing relationships with particular purveyors of them rather than search widely through the market at each occasion of need" [Geertz 1992, p.228]. Clientelization is hence an example of the bazaar paradox: individuals competing to obtain profitable information establish cooperative relationships [p.229].

In contrast with impersonal exchange relationships which are typical in developed economies and markets, in traditional markets where clientelization prevails, the exchanges established by market participants tend to be personalized. That is, the partners' personality, family, history, and religion are important because they permit to be confident that the economic exchange will be accomplished satisfactorily. The riskier the economic and social environment, the greater the necessity for vendors to have additional information about their various partners [Plattner 1989, p.288].

#### *VENDORS' SKILLS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGIES*

According to Bromley [1982, p.62], more than formal education, street workers require other skills learned outside school, such as effective bargaining, quick



mental ability, good memory, manual skills, attractive personality, and physical endurance. Therefore, on the job experience is especially important for the vendors' success.<sup>21</sup> Besides, the multiple potentially threatening relations that street vendors have to manage --with suppliers, authorities, competitors, established retailers and other actors-- make it necessary to possess not only particular personal skills but also strong social networks [Bromley 1978a, p.1168].

Some anthropological studies on street traders have identified that they are in fact entrepreneurs in the sense that their businesses' success depends on their creativity and innovativeness in the multiple decisions they make everyday. Smart [1990, p.264] emphasizes that there is an important difference between being able to enter into street trade --a relatively easy action-- and being able to run a profitable hawking business. According to her, the street trader must have or build adequate connections to gain access to a viable spatial position, commodity supply sources and credit. Besides he/she must be a very skillful and resourceful individual, able to evade state harassment effectively.

Therefore, as she argues in a previous work [1988, p.113], street hawking 'requires not only the conventional wisdom of business management but also the adoption of strategies to cope with government harassment. She considers that some vendors' enterprise features --such as commodity type, working hours, spatial location, and

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<sup>21</sup> See also Lozano [1983, p.353]; and Grompone [1981, p.105].

labor utilization-- are functional to their strategy for coping with government prosecution.

Interestingly, illegal traders have developed a rather simple but effective method to communicate alert messages when police raids are just starting. This mechanism is to scream and whistle, and the vendors quickly leave their zone of operation taking their merchandise with them. This alarm system is very informal and no vigilance responsibilities are assigned to predetermined traders [PREALC 1988, pp.40-41]. This system is perhaps the most simple expression of solidarity among vendors but it is one of the most important ones.

According to Armstrong and McGee [1985], the success of the hawker business, as with other retailing activities, rests upon the capacity of the hawker to attract customers to purchase his/her goods or services. This involves the hawker in a variety of decisions concerning the location of his enterprise, the goods he wishes to purchase and sell, the manner of display, the prices to be asked, and the limits of his overhead payments to keep the business functioning efficiently.

However, as they recognize, almost none of the above decisions "can be made in isolation from the influences of government control, prevailing patterns of market behavior and economic and land use changes within the city, so that, in most cases, the hawker operates his(/her) business within a framework of constraints which he is powerless to control. Within this framework,

however, he can make a number of decisions concerning his enterprise" [pp.184-185].

Street selling requires --as any other business-- the design and implementation of a marketing strategy which includes the definition of the famous 'four Marketing Ps' (price, place, product and promotion) [Kotler 1988; PREALC 1988, p.22,71]. Besides within the business there is also an ample room for creativity and innovation in other important activities such as the building and maintenance of social relationships with authorities, suppliers, customers, peers, relatives, and other people who may provide them with both assistance and valuable information.

The case study presented by Lea Jellinek [1977] makes clear the role that personal skills and abilities count in achieving success in street trade. Her interesting description of the life of a Jakarta street trader permits understanding the need of vendors working in an illegal-trade zone to establish adequate relationships with city authorities to cope with vendors-cleaning policies. It shows also the difficulties of vendors when new but more expensive markets replace old and traditional commerce zones. It illustrates that service quality and administrative skills are highly responsible for the individual vendor economic performance. Additionally, the study makes clear that, in the eyes of the seller, street trade is not only a survival strategy but a source of opportunities to progress. Finally, it shows also that migrants move into this job not only for lacking other job opportunities, but due to their discomfort with the idea of continuing

as a salaried worker, and by their desire to become economically independent and autonomous.

Jones [1988] considers street sellers as "pure entrepreneurs using highly individualized managerial techniques" [p.167]. Whereas street traders do not generally utilize formal bookkeeping, they must be aware of the condition of their operations, including inventory, profit margins and competition [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.226]. In this case, heuristic and informal accounting methods may be adequate if vendors possess enough experience regarding sales patterns and sourcing.

Vendors' product selection is one of their marketing tools. Actually, some street traders shift from one commodity to another according to changes in their resources and external opportunities [Trager 1985, p.276], and some of them combine more than an type of good in order to offer product variety to customers [Yunusa 1988, p.105].

Bargaining is a common feature of street markets, and although it is mainly centered at price, it also involves goods' quantity and quality. Besides, bargaining exemplifies the 'intensive' search for information prevalent in a street market,<sup>22</sup> rather than 'extensive search,' which implies a generally more costly effort to locate additional offers [Geertz 1992, p.230].

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<sup>22</sup> That is, deep exploration of an already received offer.

Street vendors have been successful in adapting to the consumption habits and buying power of their pertinent market segments [Laval 1981]. However, in the case of India, a study by Das and Das [1990] has found that cultural factors such as "the Hindu caste system and values (for example, emphasis on doing one's duty without any expectation of reward), and the joint family system...have played a major role in reducing the customer orientation of Indian retailers" [p.243].

Regarding Mexican street traders' business strategy, Mendoza [1992] has brought out that the very fact that, in principle, street vendors face customer distrust impels them to develop a definite strategy of orienting all of their efforts to create customer satisfaction and confidence. That is, they try to convince the client that buying from them is a fair deal and a good decision.

According to Mendoza [1992] street vendors' customer orientation has several dimensions:

- A) They operate as close as possible to the customer;
- B) They are courteous with the client;
- C) They look to satisfy the exact need expressed by the buyer, even by recurring to another street vendor to get the desired product;
- D) If they do not have the required product, they promise to get it (and they generally accomplish that) some time later;
- E) If they cannot get the desired product, they give the customer the information about where to obtain it;
- F) They show the product to the clients, and permit them to try it; and in some cases they provide informal (but

by and large true) exchange guarantees if the product should be damaged.

G) Prices are generally lower than those of established retailers.

#### *VENDORS' LOCATION STRATEGIES*

Location is one of the main decisions of street vendors, although McGee and Ho [1978, p.117] recognize that research on the spatial aspects of retailing in the cities of developing countries is relatively small.

The location-strategy of traders is defined to both satisfy customer and the former themselves. Therefore, traders select crowded areas with a high flow of pedestrians [Dewar and Watson 1990; Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.178; Bromley 1978b, p.44]. According to PREALC [1988, p.42], sellers also consider their own transportation costs from their homes to their selling point, the intensity of government repressive actions, and the existence of social networks. Oliver-Smith [1990, p.215] observed that mobile traders consider factors of demand, competition, travel costs, and market fees, in their decision to sell in one periodic market or another. Besides, McGee and Ho [1978, pp.130-131] state the economic advantages of mobile hawkers over sedentary sellers, particularly their contact with more customers, which characterizes peddling as a very rational mode of retailing operation.

Bromley [1978b] explains the location decision of street vendors by arguing that street vendors tend to concentrate in areas with high pedestrian densities. He

states that, in general, there are three major determinants on the traders' location decision: 1) the existence of potential customers demand; 2) the existence of mobile and established competitors; and, 3) the regulatory behavior of the authorities. Other influential factors on street marketers' location are: location of suppliers, place of vendors' residence, location of storage places, and the frequency of petty theft and violence in different location [p.43].

#### II.3.11. THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF STREET VENDORS

According to Tinker [1987, p.50], it is not very clear what 'success' means in the case of a street trading enterprise. She wonders if success may be more properly characterized by permanency and sustainability, or by an increase in productivity, profits, size and employment. She also asks why increases in human capital are not generally considered as an element of success, and why expansion in size is generally used as a measure of success while farm enterprises' growth is generally measured through increases in productivity [Tinker 1987, p.50].

Some caveats have been mentioned in the literature on street traders, regarding using their earnings to measure their welfare, and to make comparisons with wage workers. Concerning the first point, McGee and Yeung [1977, pp.83-84] state that vendors' earnings should be treated with caution, particularly in inferring the standard of living of traders, since other sources of income might exist within the household. Regarding the

second issue, they argue that three considerations should be made: first, traders work a higher number of hours than many wage workers; second, their sales and income register seasonal peaks and decreases; third, surveys may underestimate the vendors' income [McGee and Yeung 1977, p.84].

The low level of income generated by street occupations has been mentioned by Bromley [1982, p.61] and by Lessinger [1985, p.318]. Regarding the level of income of street traders as compared with other low-skilled jobs, a rather mixed picture appears and wide variations between countries and within the occupation exist [Tinker 1987, p.59]. On the one hand, some studies indicate that traders' level of income generally compares more than favorably with the income earned by unskilled labor in the wage earning sector [McGee and Yeung 1977, p.16; PREALC 1988; Tinker and Cohen 1985, p.87; Isaac 1981, p.353; and Murphy 1990, p.171]. On the other hand --but not strictly in contradiction with the former view-- other investigations indicate a significant proportion of sellers earning less than minimum or average manual workers [Picavet 1989, p.194; McGee and Yeung 1977, p.110; Natrass 1987, p.867].

Several variables highly related to street vendors' earnings have been indicated in the literature, such as: the number of days they work each month and the prevailing weather [Armstrong and McGee 1985, pp.182-183; and Oliver-Smith 1990, p.219]; the type of product traded, the selected zone of operation, and the intensity of competition [PREALC 1988, pp.22,52; Bromley 1982, p.61; and Lessinger 1985, p.319]; the level of capital



invested in stock, the type of hawking unit, age, education and experience [McGee and Yeung 1977]; gender [PREALC 1988, p.27; and Moser 1977; 1980], and tenure in positive terms [Nakanishi 1990 p.285]. Ethnic, residential and kinship parameters have also been considered important in traders' economic performance [Isaac 1981, p.358].

#### II.3.12. POSSIBILITIES FOR CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND GROWTH

##### *SOURCES OF STARTING CAPITAL AND THE ROLE OF CREDIT*

Several sources of initial capital have been mentioned in the literature but borrowings from relatives and personal savings are common origins, as Yunusa [1988, p.105] and Tinker [1987, p.66] indicate. In fact, the wide availability of low-scale informal credit reduces the need of investing personal capital and facilitates entry [Osterling et. al. 1979, p.36]. As mentioned above, severance payments are also a capital source in the case of former formal workers [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.225]. The absence of formal institutional credit in the start-up stage is also generally recognized [Escobar 1988, p.113].

Regarding the role of credit in the business running operations, Escobar [1988, p.119-120] has reported that lack of formal credit is one of the major limitations faced by street traders to operate and grow. Lack of assets to guarantee loans and high interest rates operate as constraints to vendors' use of formal credit --a

system that is not actually designed to supply them with funds.

*DEBATE IN THE LITERATURE REGARDING GROWTH POSSIBILITIES OF STREET TRADING ENTERPRISES*

The issue of the potential growth of street trading enterprises has been largely debated in the literature, and there is no agreement on the question of whether street traders will expand the scale and size of their businesses over time [McGee and Yeung 1977, p.92]. Several academicians have argued that, as far as the small traders' main objective is to satisfy the economic needs of the household, they barely accumulate capital [Moser 1980]. Therefore, they cannot be properly considered as petty entrepreneurs, and it is unlikely that they will evolve into entrepreneurs [Cook and Diskin 1976, p.272-273, cited in Babb 1987, pp.169-170; Bromley 1978a; Sethuraman 1981]:

McGee and Yeung's results, "indicate no clear-cut pattern of the majority of hawkers experiencing upward mobility through time. Rather, the pattern appears to be one in which a longer established group of hawkers have become encapsulated in a low income niche of foodstuff-selling; whereas, younger better-educated hawkers have moved into more lucrative sectors of non-foodstuff selling. This pattern is, of course, not anti-developmental; indeed it suggests that people well acquainted with cities perceive opportunities that are not available in other sectors of the cities. Thus hawking offers both the possibilities of a refuge

occupation for the poor and of economic progress for others" [McGee and Yeung 1977, p.111].

One very common assertion in the literature is that street vendors are not able to accumulate capital, and hence their enterprises are rather stationary and involutory [Picavet 1989, p.1981; Grompone 1981, p.100; Escobar 1988, p.110]. Although street vendors aspire to becoming a 'boss' there is a strong contradiction between such aspirations and their actual likelihood of occurrence; however, the few 'success stories' create the illusion that any one of them can become an entrepreneur [Nattrass 1987, p.871]. Other studies have reported that in fact only a few street traders accumulate capital and hire paid workers on a regular basis, while the majority faces up to permanent poverty and economic and occupational insecurity. [Lessinger 1985, p.318; 1988, p.162; Bromley 1978a, p.1169; Osterling et. al. 1979, pp.26-27]. Some other researchers have stated that actually downward mobility, insolvency, bankruptcy and proletarianization characterize the evolution of many street vendors [Moser 1977, p.471; Moser 1980, p.378].

Some reasons have been recognized as main limitations to growth of street vendors' businesses [PREALC 1988, pp.50-53]: first, the economic necessities of the household that restrict capital accumulation [see also Tinker and Cohen 1985, p.88]. Second, a physical limitation arises from their illegal situation, since they must be ready to escape from government raids [see also Smart 1988; 1990]. Third, the payment of bribes and fees sets limits on savings. Fourth, the lack of formal

sources of credit and abuses from suppliers increase vendors financial and operational costs. Fifth, the instability of sales and income limits the implementation of expansion plans.

Moser [1980, pp.378,383], in her longitudinal study on Colombian market sellers, argues that their lack of upward mobility may be explained by both individual and general causes. The former are related to life crises (illness and legal problems); life-cycle (health and family problems related to older age); and alternative investments (reinvestment of the enterprise capital in other projects as children's education, ownership of property, or the diversification into other risk-spreading enterprises). The latter are the lack of access to capital, stronger competition from new entrants, and their increasing household expenditures.

According to Bromley [1982, p.70], the urban poor are tied into a vicious circle of low capital, low training, limited remunerative work opportunities, and low incomes, which is accentuated by a diverse set of exploitative relationships, and by the lack of effective organizations. In turn, low income leads to insufficient capital accumulation and hence to limited expansion in the scale of operations [Smart 1988, p.99].

Babb's study on Peruvian market women in Peru suggests that a process of proletarianization of traders has been taking place [Babb 1987, p.176], and a similar phenomenon was observed by Bromley's research on street workers in Cali, Colombia, where he calculated that only 40 to 45% of street workers were 'true self-employed

whereas the remainder were dependent or 'disguised' workers [Bromley 1982, p.65].

Vendors' aspirations that are directed more to obtaining greater security than expanding turnover and income, have also been mentioned as a factor explaining their limited growth [Picavet 1989, p.204]. In her multi-country study on food-street-traders, Tinker [1987, p.67] found that "even enterprises with considerable profit do not seem to want to undertake the sort of problems which arise when a family-run firm grows bigger."

Although limitations of street vending enterprises have been widely recognized, some studies have observed that capital accumulation actually takes place in some specific ways. Grompone [1981, pp.98-99] states that growth of a street marketing enterprise may exist in two ways: first by increasing the value of stock and the size of the stall; second, by installing more same-size stalls in different places. This second possibility is also witnessed by Picavet [1989, p.198] who states that in Peru, although "capital accumulation in street-vending has traditionally been discouraged by the authorities,...one family may have two or three push-carts in the same place or at different locations."

According to Osterling et. al. [1979, pp.27-33], growth in street vending occurs as the individuals accumulate capital and experience, and as family and social networks within the business expand. They identified a 'centripetal tendency' within street trading that impulses mobile, individually-operated, diversified, low-capital, and low-earnings stalls --called *marchantes*--

- to become established, extended-family-run, more integrated, high-capital, and high-earnings stalls -- called *carretas*.

Alternative investments is another avenue for accumulation in street trade. Particularly, as mentioned above, divestiture in the trading enterprise may be associated with the realization of alternative investments, and hence it is not necessarily a symptom of business failure. Among these investment projects we find diversification into other business, property acquisition, and especially funding children's education [Moser 1980]. In fact, Tinker [1985, p.88] reports in her multi-country study on street marketing of foods, that "among vendors able to build up a reserve, the tendency is not to expand the existing enterprise...Rather the trend is for the street food entrepreneur to invest the surplus either by diversifying into other activities, particularly the sale of non-perishables, or in the next generation, i.e. social investment in their children's education... Thus, expansion is not necessarily a business objective. Actually, expansion may mean increased prices or greater spoilage, and so lead to business failure" [p. 88]. In a more recent and even wider-scale study she emphasizes that the most common investment by street food sellers is in the education of children [Tinker 1987, p.68], a similar finding to that reported by Mintz [1971, p.259] in the case of Haitian female sellers.

Yunusa [1988, p.107] argues that in Samaru, street trading involves a capital formation process evidenced by the fact that, as time goes by, the itinerant trader

"tends to graduate to a stationary hawker or even a shop keeper." The tendency for hawkers to become owners of fixed stalls in covered market-places is also reported by Picavet [1989, p.201].

#### *THE ISSUE OF PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY*

Socially, street occupations are generally held in low esteem, and are frequently described by both academics and government officials as 'parasitic,' 'unproductive' and 'inefficient' [Bromley 1982, p.59]. It has been stated that these images determine the low level of income for the workers involved. However, as McGee [1977] has counter-argued, "the income generated by the informal sector may be larger than economists realize" [p.269]. Furthermore, his wide research on hawkers in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong indicates that street traders manage an "extremely efficient system of commodity distribution which provides labor opportunities and cheap goods" [loc. cit.], and a similar situation is also observed in many Third World Cities.

Therefore, using the term 'traditional' --which suggests an absence of dynamism and efficiency-- to characterize street selling is inconsistent with the reality of developing countries, since this occupation absorbs their most abundant factor (labor) and saves their most scarce factor (capital) [McGee and Yeung 1977, p.21]. Further, as Bromley [1982] has argued, street occupations provide clearly essential services -- as evidenced by their growing demand-- whether or not they are termed as productive. Therefore, "so-called unproductive work may be desirable if it contributes to

the welfare of members of society other than the worker, or even if it simply contributes to the welfare of the worker without prejudicing the welfare of others" [p.67].

### II.3.13. THE ORGANIZATION OF STREET VENDORS

#### *THE EMERGENCE OF ASSOCIATIONS OF STREET VENDORS*

In the case of Lima, Peru, [Osterling et. al. 1979, p.27] the street vending system is actually a highly institutionalized and structured activity. Regarding the norms of the occupation, there are clearly established and consensual rules that govern the internal organization of marketing, the selling rights, the ownership and transference of selling points, and the relationships of competition, collaboration and protection. Mr. Nolasco --an important leader of sellers in Peru interviewed by Grompone [1981 p.111]-- denies the existence of any 'Mafia' governing the street trade operations; he argues that there exists a non-conflicting way of location assignment, in which tenure determines the degree of vendor access to better selling locations.

Hostility faced by sellers from different social groups (government, established retailers, and even city residents) has moved them to organize themselves and to form associations and unions to defend their interests. [Picavet 1989, pp.201-202]. Although some cases of existence and even success of traders' associations have been commented in the literature [De Soto 1989; Lessinger 1985, p.311; Escobar 1988, p.117 (in the case of fixed-stalls traders in Bolivia)], some other cases of



inexistence or failure of such unions have been reported [Oliver-Smith 1990, pp.227; Escobar 1988, p.120; Bromley 1978a, p.1167; Lewis 1976].

Mendoza [1992] argues that, in the case of Mexico City, environmental threats move street vendors to develop a type of organizational structure that guarantees quick communication and support among themselves, and also a great deal of flexibility in order to defend against threats or aggression. The resultant organizational structure has two characteristics: it is autocratic since it is commanded by a powerful leader, but it is also like a network since communication and decision making is very flexible when facing a threat from the environment.

Lessinger [1985, pp.311-314], in her case study on Indian informal retailers, states that political mobilization of traders, though difficult, does occur. In her opinion, certain features of street trading may facilitate their political organization and activism: 1) geographical concentration of vendors demands a high degree of cooperation; and 2) ties of kinship and common birthplace also reinforce their mutual cooperation. Additionally, as Picavet [1989, pp.201-203] argues, street vendors actual achievement of their goals --the establishment of their own markets, for example-- depend on their level of organization. He witnessed that, in Peru, traders' associations represent a political force with considerable political weight.

*FAILURES AND LIMITATIONS OF ASSOCIATIONS*

In contrast with the more positive views on the performance of street vendors' organizations, other studies have witnessed failures in the formation and operation of such groups. In a study of market women of Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Barbara Lewis [1976] presents the difficulties that associations of female vendors face in reaching both internal harmony and external success. She argues that some divisive forces affect the growth of vendors' associational ties: 1) high individualism and competition is prevalent in petty trade, 2) unequal access to economic and political resources enhances the competitive dimension among sellers, and 3) ethnic heterogeneity inhibits collective action. Her study concludes that "the marketplace is little conducive to associational innovation, but rather enhances individuation" [p.156].

Lewis' conclusions are shared by Bromley's study [1982, pp.65-66] on Colombian street workers, which argues that trade unions in Cali are generally small, unstable, ineffective, frequently corrupt and/or personalistic, and only a small proportion of the total workforce belongs to an organization .

In another study, Bromley [1978a, p.1168] reports that street vendor unions often enter into conflict with one another because each of them attempt to pressure the authorities to support their own members. Furthermore, trade unions frequently support urban authorities and actually welcome repressive actions against traders. He asserts that unions only act in a cohesive way in 'crisis

situations' when prosecution is excessively high, and their activities are mainly directed to defending the right of vendors to work rather than towards improving their work conditions and level of income [Bromley 1978a, p.1168].

Other researchers have also cast doubts on the existence of solidarity among vendors due to their heterogeneity and their permanent defensive attitude which generates a widespread lack of trust in the rest of the world [PREALC 1988, pp.61-62]. Such lack of solidarity is argued to exist within the urban poor in general. In Bromley's words: "Just as there is little solidarity within the street trading profession, there is little solidarity between street traders and other sectors of the urban poor... 'Proletarian' or 'subproletarian' solidarity against elite interests is little more than a dream" [Bromley 1978a, p.1168]

#### II.3.14. VENDORS' PERCEPTIONS, EXPECTATIONS, AND ASPIRATIONS

Several studies on street workers consider that in the sellers' opinion the job is hard [Tinker 1987, p.60], boring, dangerous, and degrading, although it less exhausting than the heaviest manual occupations [Bromley 1982, p.62]. In contrast, other research observes that most street traders have a strong sense of vocation, and of the value of their occupation [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.190].

The insecurity caused by the threat of government harassment has been reported as one important problem declared by street traders, so they perceive their job as limited in terms of job-security [Tinker 1987, p.64; Picavet 1989, p.200]. Notwithstanding, it has been reported that they tend to develop a feeling of pride in being their own boss, and consider their job as personally challenging and satisfying [Lozano 1983 p.358]. Particularly street traders feel proud of their ability to interact with customers and of their bargaining skills [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.198]. However, although some studies report the coexistence of both feelings of shame and pride in street traders [Grompone 1981, p.110], other studies indicate that they tend to develop a feeling of pride after their initial shame for selling on the streets [PREALC 1988, p.36].

In agreement with studies on ethnic entrepreneurship [Butler and Herring 1991], although street vendors highly prize the advantages of being autonomous, many of them do not want their children to follow in their foot steps. In fact, they urge their children to study or to find a different occupation, knowing that street selling provides them with a rather secure 'protection net' that is available if things go wrong outside.

In a study of traders in Chile, PREALC [1988, p.38] reported that interviewees showed a strong aspiration to become formal, which would permit them to work more peacefully even if it implies operating under the prevalent tax regime. This aspiration may be explained by the existence of significant monetary and non-monetary

costs of illegality, hence casting doubts on their 'unfair' cost advantage argued by established retailers.

Other studies have also confirmed the existence of such 'aspiration-to-stability' through formalization, generally by operating a fixed stall or a petty shop -- which are more stable and less risky enterprises than street selling [Picavet 1989, p.199; Grompone 1985, p.177; De Soto et. al. 1986, p.70]. In fact, in Peru most fixed-stall sellers used to work as street vendors [Picavet 1989, p.201]. Furthermore, it has been argued that hawkers' aspirations of increased stability is even stronger than their desire for expansion of the scale of their businesses [Picavet 1989, p.204].

### II.3.15. THE DEBATE ON STREET VENDING

The pros and cons of street vending and the vendors' principal social and economic contributions have been pointed out by many studies on this phenomenon.<sup>23</sup> The following table synthesizes some of the main arguments in the literature in favor of and against street selling:

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<sup>23</sup> See: PREALC [1988, p.72; McGee and Yeung [1977, pp.20,47,115; Nattrass [1987, pp.868,869]; Bromley [1982, pp.63,74,68; Picavet [1989, pp.204,203,195; Tinker [1987 p.1; Bromley [1978a, pp.1163,1165; Rogerson and Hart [1989, p.31; Collignon 1984; Smart 1990, pp.261-262; Anthony 1987, p.122; Oliver-Smith 1990, pp.226,261,224; Bunster 1983, p.94; Grompone 1981, pp.107-108; Babb 1987, p.178; Armstrong and McGee 1985, pp.186,198; Isaac [1981 p.359; and Murphy 1990, p.174].

NEGATIVE VIEW	POSITIVE VIEW
<p>- Street trade is a traditional activity, reminder of underdevelopment that would disappear in the future society.</p> <p>-Street traders concentrations give the cities a non-aesthetic appearance, which hinders cities in developing countries following the development pattern of 'modern' cities.</p>	<p>- Urban planning in developing countries must be adapted to the social and economic needs of their cities and their residents.</p> <p>- The 'picturesqueness' of cities with street traders may attract tourists.</p>
<p>- Traffic of pedestrians and automobiles is affected.</p>	<p>- Street vending provides advantageous locations for the customers hence reducing transportation time and costs.</p>
<p>- Hygiene problems and lack of sanitary control are caused by garbage accumulation and lack of cleanliness of food sellers.</p>	<p>Street vendors may be supported by the government to improve the sanitary levels of their operations.</p>

<p>- Sellers concentrations cause a reduction in available physical space which stimulates delinquency.</p>	<p>- Trading supports the household economy hence diminishing the propensity to crime and delinquency. - It also provides an 'economic cushion' for fluctuating employment in other sectors. Therefore, it operates as a social safety valve, and contributes to political stability.</p>
<p>- Established retailers are affected by 'unfair competition' from street vendors, who do not pay rents, and other overhead costs.</p>	<p>- Street trade increases the level of competition in the economy hence reducing the formation of oligopolies. In many cases, street traders do not compete with established retailers since both groups supply different market segments.</p>
<p>- Street traders avoid major taxes, and public finances receive only a direct marginal contribution from them.</p>	<p>- Tax collection from formal suppliers of street vendors might be significant. - Street traders must afford 'costs of illegality,' and subsidize the government by paying bribes to city officials.</p>

<p>- Street trade is an exploitative, corrupt, and illegal activity.</p>	<p>- Corruption and immorality is not monopolized by street vending, it also occurs in government and formal business.</p>
<p>- Street trade is a rather inefficient and unproductive distribution system.</p>	<p>- Street trading constitutes an important part of the urban distribution system.</p> <p>- Street trade contributes to general productivity by using labor that otherwise would be unemployed.</p> <p>- Employment creation in street trade requires a minimum amount of capital.</p> <p>- It offers training that can be used in other future entrepreneurial activities.</p> <p>- street trading reduces the distribution costs of manufacturers and wholesalers, hence increasing their profitability</p>
<p>- Customers buying from street traders face risks related to product quality, and personal health and security.</p>	<p>- Street vendors offer goods in convenient quantities at low prices, which contributes to reduce the cost of living of the poor and wage workers.</p>



<p>Street vending does not provide social security to workers.</p>	<p>- Street selling absorbs a great deal of people with scarce formal job opportunities, and disadvantaged individuals (those who are older, lesser educated, unskilled, housewives, or handicapped). Vendors' social networks provide them with support of diverse types.</p>
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#### II.3.16. GOVERNMENT POLICIES

In general, street traders operate in a somewhat illegal way as far as they contravene official regulations in one way or another [Bromley 1978a, p.1164; Natrass 1987, p.867]. As a matter of fact, their adaptability and flexibility --which is beneficial for both vendors and clients-- is a main source of conflict between them and city authorities [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.219]. In fact no city government has permitted vendors to freely operate in any place they want to [McGee and Yeung 1977, p.51], and in most cities they are closely regulated by the municipal authorities [Bromley 1978a, p.1163].

The governments' strategy to deal with street traders has been mainly locational in nature [Bromley 1982, p.72]. Attempts to relocate sellers have not been exempt from severe difficulties due to the fact that

location is one of the traders' most important strategic considerations [PREALC 1988, p.37]. When attempts have been done to move sellers permanently into markets three problems emerge: 1) building design is not adequate to vendors' needs; 2) rents or payments charged for space in markets is too high for sellers, accustomed to low overheads [Bunster 1983, p.93; McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.52-54]; and 3) customer demand is usually lower in markets than on the street, at least for some initial time.

Even though street traders do not pay taxes they have to make a series of payments for their documents [Bromley 1978a, p.1164], and paying bribes to city officials is a permanent and routine activity of street vendors operating in illegal street markets [Bromley 1982, p.72; Lessinger 1985, pp.319-320]. In fact, government harassment has taken several forms: confiscation of goods, fines, and even imprisoning street sellers [Oliver-Smith 1990, p.220; Natrass 1987, p.870-871; Lessinger 1985, p.320].

However, policies with the objective of eliminating street traders have failed because the economic structures of cities are not prepared to accommodate such changes [Armstrong and McGee 1985, pp.198-199], and also because they do not attack the underlying causes of street trade.

Furthermore, hawkers' associations have expressed to the government that their eradication would lead to an increase in crime and social instability [Anthony 1987, p.113]. Other studies have confirmed that raids and

prosecution are a usual although ineffective weapon against street marketers [PREALC 1988, p.38], whose actual effect is to reduce vendors' economic standard of living and not to reduce their number [Lessinger 1985, p.320]. Remarkably, prosecution mainly affects mobile vendors [Osterling et. al. 1979, p.27].

Surprisingly, governments in several countries have recognized the benefits of street trading, relaxed controls and provided it with higher security [Rogerson and Hart 1989, p.41; Yeung 1978, p.153; Smart 1990, pp.261-262; Anthony 1987, p.122]. Some governments do not attempt an eradication policy because street sellers may vote against the party in power [Bromley 1978a, p.1165], which implies that controls on street traders are particularly lax in pre-election periods when repression could be politically embarrassing for those in power. However, controls tend to be stronger after new administrations have taken office [p.1164].

According to Picavet's work on Peruvian street sellers [1989, p.204], relationships between street-vendors and municipal authorities are characterized by a 'love-hate relationship.' Municipal policy is tolerant for social reasons (employment situation; social safety valve), political reasons (the street-vendors' political weight) and economic reasons (cheap distribution system and appreciated fiscal income source). On the other hand, the authorities' behavior is hostile because of pressure from established retailers --claiming generally 'unfair trade'-- and sometimes the general public, but also because street sellers are dysfunctional in the eyes of

city planners' visions of a 'modern city' [Rogerson and Hart 1989, p. 31; Natrass 1987, p.869].

This feeling of ambivalence by city administrators has also been witnessed by McGee and Yeung [1977] who cite a declaration of one official in a Southeast Asian city: "we have both bought from, and fought with, the hawkers of our cities" [p.115].

### II.3.17. PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Whereas there is an impressive degree of consensus on the basic issues and problems related to street selling, there is little agreement as to the policy and programmatic implications of the data [Tinker 1987, p.50]

The classical study by McGee and Yeung [1977] concludes that vendors play a very significant role in the distribution of commodities and must be accepted as a fact of urban life; besides, specific policies designed for hawkers must be considered as a priority by city administrators. They also suggest that in the short term policies for accommodation of street vendors should be implemented; however, in the long term efforts should be directed to integrate them into the retailing system.

Dewar and Watson [1990] studied urban markets in Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangkok, Bombay, Colombo, and Taipei. They suggest that the most effective policy actions regarding hawkers are those "which increase the room to maneuver for small operators by creating additional and better options, rather than those which

attempt to identify and prescribe particular models of behavior" [p.9].

Bromley [1982] found that street-vending in Cali, Colombia is a surviving strategy for the urban poor. His recommendation is to generate work opportunities both outside the street occupations and in the more necessary street occupations, and to improve the general range of income opportunities for urban poor.

In the following lines, a summary of the main recommendations stated in the literature will be presented:

#### *MACROECONOMIC MEASURES*

- A policy regarding street-vending should in fact be part of a national development policy [Picavet 1989, p.205].
- An employment generation policy is required [Grompone 1981, p.111].
- Only economic growth and increased wages will limit the expansion of street vending [Escobar 1988, p.121].
- Only the improvement of social conditions and the creation of alternative jobs will lead to the disappearance of street workers [Bromley 1982, p.75].
- Creation of more employment opportunities to prevent excessive growth of the number of hawkers [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].

*SUPPORT OF STREET VENDING*

- Selective support to increase the income of low-earning street vendors (especially the women and lowest-scale traders) [Escobar 1988, p.120].
- Policies oriented especially to help poor women should be implemented [Bunster 1983, p.102].
- Creation of formal credit opportunities for street sellers [Escobar 1988, p.121; Tinker 1987, p.66; McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].
- Street traders should be aided, 'formalized', and helped to become successful entrepreneurs [Nattrass 1987, p.871].
- Credit, training, and health insurance should be provided to vendors [Tinker and Cohen 1985, p.89].
- "A deliberate policy directed toward helping to elevate the social and economic conditions of hawkers should be formulated" [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].
- Street vendors should be recognized and supported, not harassed [Tinker 1987, p.3].
- Street vending should be legitimized [Tinker and Cohen 1985, p.89].
- 'Humanization' of the job and improvement in working conditions are required [Bromley 1982, p.74].
- It is poverty and not the vendor which should be attacked [Bromley 1982, p.74].
- To provide non-formal training to vendors [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118]

*CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLICY TOWARDS STREET VENDING*

- Policy towards street selling should be simple, limited and differentiated [Picavet 1989, p.205].

- Policy towards street vending should be: regulatory, motivating, flexible and not aggressive, and adapted to traders' modus operandi. [Picavet 1989, p.205].
- "Adoption of more positive policies toward street trading (such) as the following: simplifying rules and regulations, administering them more equitably, providing workplaces and sources of credit and training for workers, and encouraging the formation of 'workers' organizations without co-opting them into a web of governmental paternalism" [Bromley 1982, p.75].

#### *LOCATIONAL MEASURES*

- The establishment of dedicated zones for street trading, taking into account the opinion of the vendors [Grompone 1981, p.108].
- It is necessary to build new markets [Tinker 1987, p.66] and to preserve the old ones [Lessinger 1988, p.161]
- "Expanding the existing public markets as well as planning more small markets that could be provided without much cost. Rentals must be kept at levels hawkers can afford" [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].
- "Imaginative use of open space could be encouraged to facilitate hawking activities. The use of car parks and playgrounds as night markets is an example" [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].
- Designating some streets for hawking purposes by closing them to vehicular traffic. [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp. 116-117-118].
- Opening up temporarily vacant urban lots for hawking. [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp. 116-117-118].

- Assigning hawkers to secondary streets in an orderly manner so as to minimize the conflict of land use. [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].

*ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES*

- Street vendors should be part of the authority concerned with distribution [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.114].
- Existing administrative responsibilities for hawkers, which are often spread over many departments, should be integrated under one unified agency [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].
- A flexible system of control of hawkers should be introduced [McGee and Yeung 1977, pp.116-117-118].
- Current statistics on hawker numbers and other characteristics must be collected and monitored [McGee and Yeung, 1977 pp.116-117-118].



### III. RESEARCH METHODS

#### III.1 RESEARCH METHODS USED IN OTHER STUDIES

Studies on street marketers have adopted two main approaches: first, there are studies based on the analysis of results of large-scale surveys or censuses [Picavet 1989; PREALC 1988; McGee and Yeung 1977; Armstrong and McGee 1985; Bromley 1978a; CONCANACO 1993; de Soto 1986; Bijlmer 1989] whose main advantage is their greater breadth and better representativeness. Second, there are investigations based on small convenience samples usually performed with ethnographic research methods.

The main strength of small-scale ethnographic studies is their deeper analysis of qualitative information, which permits them to reach a high level of internal validity. Their main disadvantage is, however, their limited capacity to generalize to other contexts (i.e. their lower external validity). The following studies belong to the this type (the sample size is indicated in parenthesis): Osterling et. al. [1979] (65); Lozano [1983] (50); Bunster [1983] (21); Yunusa [1988] (46); Moser [1977] (60); and Jones [1988] (16). It is also common in the literature that several studies combine survey data with life histories generated through in depth personal interviews [PREALC 1988, p.2].

Methodological issues have been debated in the literature. On the one hand, Moser [1977] argues that micro-level studies, notwithstanding their limited sample size, can make significant contributions to the understanding of street traders' behavior, and hence constitute an important support for more accurate macro level theoretical definitions [p.470]. On the other hand, studies based on large-scale surveys are strongly criticized by Bromley and Birkbeck [1984, p.185]. They argue that such studies cannot answer the most relevant and interesting questions about why people act and how they operate. Although they recognize that the questionnaire survey is the single most important and widely-used form of social research, they consider it as simply one among other research methods for doing investigation on street occupations which provides mainly low-level descriptive information, and a check of results from other methods.

According to Bromley and Birkbeck's experience [1984, p.185], there are three main limitations of questionnaire survey for doing research on street occupations: 1) Since the street population is very mobile, variable and heterogeneous, it is very difficult to select large representative samples --an important input for survey studies based on the principles of parametric statistics; 2) the questionnaire is a poor medium of contact with people working on the street which permits discovering mainly simple facts --such as demographic information-- but that it is inadequate for exploring complex topics such as reasons to enter the job, relationships with city officials or levels of income; 3) the need for statistical data processing

require the questionnaire to adopt a rigid form and sequence in which preconceptions are frequently embedded. For these reasons Bromley and Birkbeck adopted a more hybrid combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods [p.195].

Bijlmer [1989] recommends a combination of qualitative case-study methodology with quantitative research methods, particularly if the researcher wishes to make more general statements. However, he cautions, "an important prerequisite for the use of quantitative support is adequate delineation of the research domain. This should preferably be based on functional criteria which take into account how the participants operate rather than on a descriptive delineation determined in advance or introduced externally" [pp.142-143].

As far as street vending has a long history and it is a ubiquitous feature of the retailing systems in many countries, it possesses similar broad characteristics and patterns of development all over the world. That is, this activity has a certain degree of 'universality'. However, it also should be emphasized that street selling is country-and-culture-specific [McGee and Yeung, 1977 p.82], and for some scholars [Smart 1990, p.265] traders' heterogeneity makes difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about them.

The research challenge is then how to contribute to the advance of knowledge in this highly heterogeneous and complex field. As mentioned before, a research avenue followed by investigators has been the elaboration of case studies --whether small or large in scale-- and

these contributions have permitted learning about the particularities of the phenomenon in different settings. Notwithstanding, theory building and testing demands an important effort of synthesis proposing and testing 'bounded generalizations,' which, although necessary, are still missing. Therefore, attempts to integrate sets of case studies into general models and macro level studies seem to be required, and might constitute an important avenue for researchers in this field [Tinker 1987].

### **III.2 RESEARCH APPROACH**

This study shares Bromley's view [1978, p.1162] that investigating street trade as a specific informal activity may lead to a more precise and meaningful description of 'informality,' which is generally simply defined in negative terms --i.e. as not formal. Besides, it agrees with Bijlmer [1989, p.157] indication that general concepts such as 'informal sector' or 'petty commodity production' are unmanageable aggregates that should be separated in substantive parts.

This study coincides with several scholars who have recognized the need to study the informal sector and street vending without imposing a previous interpretative framework to the data. Particularly, this study agrees with Tinker [1987, p.3] in cautioning against imposing theoretical constructs on data rather than using data to refine or challenge the theory.

Hence, the present investigation, following Bijlmer's recommendation [1989], will not be highly committed to a particular theory or approach before analyzing the data. The rationale for this research attitude is to avoid, "the tendency to be guided too much by conventional paradigms and too little by social reality... [which might result in] a type of research in which findings from case studies and surveys are generalized to fit the paradigms chosen." [Bijlmer 1989, p.141].

Therefore, my investigation's true nature is *exploratory*. Actually, it attempts to base itself on the methodological concepts of *grounded theory* --that is, the idea that theories might be derived from the research experience and not just tested in research-- which has been conveniently forgotten by researchers on the informal sector [Bromley and Birkbeck 1984, p.185].

### III.3 RESEARCH METHOD

#### III.3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Since a kind of "pre-paradigmatic" state --i.e. a situation in which no dominant paradigm prevails-- seems to reign in the academic fields of street vending, entrepreneurship and informal-sector [Tinker 1987; Smith 1990, Bygrave and Hofer 1989; and VanderWerf and Brush 1989], the present study is intended to contribute to

both *theory testing* and *theory building*.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, on the one hand, the present investigation permits a general comparison of its findings with those reported in the literature, hence discerning to which extent established hypotheses, explanations or models, can account for the facts encountered. On the other hand, the research process itself supplied some unexpected clues that might in turn constitute an alternative or complementary explanation of the phenomena studied.

The present study intends to contribute to a better understanding of the informal sector by providing some contributions regarding one of its important constituents: street vending. Thus, it intends providing a broad analysis of street vending with emphasis on some general and specific research questions.

Like many other studies in street trade, this study adopts an integrative perspective on this topic. For this reason, no clear-cut isolated research *questions* will be posed. Instead, the main interest is in analyzing relevant *issues* related to this activity. However, within every research theme, specific research questions and hypotheses are presented, evaluated and tested. In the following paragraphs the main research problems and questions analyzed by this study are presented:

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<sup>24</sup> As Moser [1980, p.368] argues, evidence on street trade at the micro level may enable conflicting theories to be assessed.

### RESEARCH PROBLEMS

1) The 41-vendor convenience sample studied cannot be considered really representative. This problem is important because it determines the degree of external validity of the conclusions obtained. For this reason, the first issue to be studied is related to the biases present in the selected sample. From the comparison of this sample with data from other samples and even populations of street vendors in Mexico, it will be argued that this sample does not show crucial differences in some regards with respect to other samples or populations of street vendors in Mexico City; but in the cases that such divergences exist they are explainable by specific characteristics of the selected sample.

2) The issue of heterogeneity in street trade is studied. Based on the literature review, it is proposed that although street sellers and their enterprises share certain commonalties, a high degree of heterogeneity exists among them. It is proposed that such high diversity is explained by the fact that the activity possesses certain characteristics that permit people endowed with different types and levels of resources, and who face diverse constraints, to satisfy their particular needs and aspirations. It is also hypothesized that street vending is a multi-purpose activity that serves both as a refuge occupation for some people, and as an entrepreneurial avenue for social and economic mobility for others.

3) The role of the gender dimension within street trade is a topic analyzed in this study. The objective is to

learn the main differences between male and female sellers concerning their personal, social, and economic characteristics and behaviors, and to provide plausible explanations accounting for such divergences. The main general proposition of this study regarding females, which is also stated in the literature, is that they constitute a disadvantaged group within street trading that has particular needs to satisfy, where such conditions in turn influence their businesses' characteristics and behavior.

4) Migrants and native street sellers are studied in order to identify their personal, social and economic features. Profiles for long and short term migrants are identified and interpreted. The common assertions in the literature that street selling is a job well-suited for migrants is examined. The questions of migrants' disadvantaged position within street trading, and their business behavior are reviewed. Additionally, the issue of migrants' entrepreneurial propensity is analyzed.

5) The economic performance of street vendors is examined, and profiles of vendors with high and low earnings vendors are identified and interpreted. In addition, the hypothesis that their earnings are determined by gender, work capacity (age and education), capital invested, and location is tested.

6) The hypothesis referred to in some studies that no wage job opportunities exist for street traders is examined. In contrast, this study asserts that given sellers are a highly heterogeneous group and no generalization can be made regarding their supposed lack



of job opportunities. Particularly, it is hypothesized here that job alternatives do exist for some vendors, especially for those who are younger and more educated.

7) The determinants of the educational level of traders are examined. Some statements in the literature concerning the influence of gender, age and place of birth on sellers' education are evaluated. Particularly, the hypothesis that gender discrimination regarding schooling opportunities exists among vendors in both rural and urban settings is tested.

8) The mutual relationships between the street vending enterprise, the family and the household are studied. This study proposes that, as reported in the literature, family and social networks constitute an important supplier of motivation and support for its members' entry and current operations in street trading. It is further argued that the household organization adapts to support the business operations, and that, at the same time, the vendor's activity responds to the needs of the family and the household.

9) The entry process into the job is analyzed in two ways. On the one hand, the role of social networks as a supplier of motivation, information, and resources at the entry stage is analyzed. On the other hand, the traders' declared reasons for entry are stated and examined. Two propositions in the literature are evaluated: first, economic factors (lack of demand for labor and low wages) are one important determinant of entry; second, other non-economic factors are also important, which imply that in fact multiple entry motivations exist.

10) The willingness of street vendors to leave their job, and the conditions under which they would shift to another occupation --an issue not deeply studied in the literature-- is examined. Based on standard neoclassical economic theory of labor supply, it is hypothesized that: A) street vendors select this occupation under an earnings-maximization strategy; B) sellers' intensity of preference for autonomy determines their willingness to shift to a formal wage job, under similar income conditions; C) vendors' propensity to shift to a formal job is sensitive to the level of wage offered; D) those vendors whose job-choice is sensitive to the level of formal wage are those with a weaker attachment to street trading; and E) the level of salary that would induce them to move to a formal job depends on their opportunity costs (forgone earnings and autonomy).

11) The entrepreneurial aspirations of street traders are evaluated by analyzing vendors' propensity to leave street trade and start a new business under the hypothetical situation of a sudden increase in their monetary wealth. The profiles of both 'conservative' and 'entrepreneurial' traders will be identified and explained.

12) The finding reported in the literature that street traders develop a strong feeling of pride in their job is examined. Furthermore, vendors' perceptions of the riskiness, hardship, and their degree of satisfaction with current earnings are reviewed.

13) Three institutional aspects of street trading not studied in the literature are investigated: first, the

economic and political role of vendors' leaders and associations; second, the profiles of those traders selling in a high-demand, high-risky zone and those selling in a low-demand low-risky zone; and third, the fees or bribes paid by vendors to get a sales permit are examined to identify their determinants --a research question not studied in the literature.

### III.3.2 EVALUATION OF OTHER AVAILABLE INFORMATION

In Mexico, there are several secondary sources of information on street vending. The 1990 Population Census [INEGI 1990] is a very important potential source of information about street vending. Notwithstanding, the high level of aggregation of their tables --and their unavailability in the form of a data base-- limit their usefulness for investigating behavioral aspects of street sellers. In fact, the Census only presents some general data regarding the total number of people working in this activity, and their distribution by gender, state of the country, and weekly hours worked.

The National Survey on the Informal Economy [INEGI 1990], which is a more specialized source than the census, also has some of the same drawbacks. The National Survey on Micro-businesses [INEGI 1994] --an improved version of the National Survey on the Informal Economy-- is the best and most recent source of data on informal activities, especially street vending. It presents estimated figures of the number of street vending enterprises by type of stall, number of workers, reasons for lacking an established stall, type of formal

registration (if such exists), business expectations, etc. Insofar information from this source becomes available in the form of a data base, the study of street vending in Mexico will be considerably furthered.

Another important source of information on street traders is the National Survey of Urban Employment performed by INEGI, which are used in the present investigation to provide a reference framework for the sample studied. Finally, CONCANACO [1993] developed an interesting study presenting a census of street vending stalls for 45 cities in Mexico.

### III.3.3 THE SELECTED RESEARCH METHOD

The interest of this study resides in learning about causal relationships within the street trading phenomenon; however, it considers that simple description is the first step towards analytical endeavors. For this reason a description of the main characteristics is done, at the time that plausible explanations for the facts encountered are offered. In some cases, results from life histories are used to illustrate the arguments; nevertheless, life histories play only a secondary and complementary role in this work.

As will be explained later, the present study follows Bijlmer's suggestion regarding the combination of case study and survey methodologies, in order to overcome

their respective limitations.<sup>25</sup> A case study methodology --using both qualitative and quantitative data and analytical techniques-- was selected given the characteristics of the phenomenon to be studied and the research questions posed. As Yin [1989, p.13] has stated: "In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control of the events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context."

Although the case study methodology has been criticized for providing little base for generalization, it has be argued to the contrary that "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations and universes" [Yin, 1989, p.21]. Additionally, the use of two direct research instruments (questionnaires and informal interviews), a non-negligible number of respondents, and the complementary use of archival sources of information,

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<sup>25</sup> In Bijlmer's words: "In view of the large variety and complicated internal structure of the activities concerned, cross-sectional surveys of households or individual enterprises (which are moreover lifted out of their social context) are inadequate for gaining real insights. Case studies, on the other hand, may yield a great deal of valuable information. But the question is: what does it represent? Though not representative statistically, the findings are nevertheless generalized as soon as they seem to fit plausible assumptions. Just as in the case of theoretical frameworks, I would advocate a *combined approach*. Without qualitative research, which should be both preparatory and supportive, structured methods are bound to yield inconclusive and incomparable information. As long as these combinations are not practiced, the informal sector will remain a 'lucky dip' for its students" [Bijlmer 1989, p.158].

qualify the study as a multiple-case investigation, which partially overcomes the potential limitations of a strict single-case analysis.

Moreover, lack of proper Survey data for investigating the proposed research questions, was another reason supporting the decision of selecting the case study approach. Added reasons for choosing the case study approach are the following: first, street trade is a very complex issue requiring a great deal of direct information *in situ*. Second, there are evident constraints for doing a large-scale study in which sensitive issues are to be treated, given the vendors lack of trust and time for providing reliable information. Third, the need for collecting information from several parties involved --vendors, their leaders and authorities-- made the use of a case study methodology more appropriate.

#### III.3.4 SAMPLE SELECTION

The present study is based on a convenience sample of 41 street vendors located in two areas located near downtown Mexico City (see Charts 2 and 3). One of these areas is in the surroundings of *La Merced* Market, which is a high-demand but forbidden area for street sellers. In this area raids are performed once or twice a day.

*La Merced* market is a commercial zone located to the East of Mexico City's downtown, which has a very long tradition in trading activities since the colonial times. In recent times, it has served as an important trade

center mainly for vegetables and fruits, but also for manufactured goods. At the heart of this zone, there is a major established market that is occupied mainly by former street traders who became established retailers (locatarios) during the 60's. Around the market, there are both established stores and a number of street vendors taking advantage of the intense flow of pedestrians who attend the market for to purchase provisions. Since July 1992, however, the implementation of the *Program for the Improvement of Popular Retailing* has forbidden street trading in this zone, which led to increased harassment against street vendors.

The second area is located near the *Sonora Market*, where street trade is currently permitted but which has the disadvantage of a lower flow of pedestrians than *La Merced Market*. For the purposes of this study, it was important to select vendors from both legal and illegal street trading zones in order to see if relevant differences between traders in each area actually existed.

The *Sonora Market* is located just outside the limits of downtown, which implies that the street vending Act issued in 1992 does not forbid street vending in this area. It is an established market which specializes in the trade of medicinal herbs, and it is significantly smaller than *La Merced Market*.

Sampling was done on a strict convenience basis,<sup>26</sup> and no quotas were used due to the fact that no previous criterion existed regarding 'adequate' proportions of features within the sample. Respondents were chosen in two ways: 1) Some of them were suggested by their leaders; and, 2) the others were selected "on the basis that they appeared likely to respond because they were not particularly busy (nor) obviously hostile" [Bromley and Birkbeck 1984, p.196].

The reason for selecting a convenience sample derives from several facts: 1) the difficulties in getting information from vendors whose leaders are not somehow familiar with the researcher; 2) the difficulties inherent in a random sampling procedure given the lack of information concerning the current distribution of vendors within the area; and, 3) vendors' high degree of geographic instability at the present time, given government efforts to relocate them.

Although case studies focused on one individual seller have been successfully used for doing research in this field [Jellinek 1977], the present study decided to interview 41 street traders and 4 leaders. The rationales for selecting 41 street vendors were the following: a non-neglegible sample size was required to get a properly diversified sample, and to use multivariate statistics. Also, the need for extensive and in depth information from every respondent made necessary the selection of a manageable sample size.

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<sup>26</sup> In fact, the only study on street trade reporting the use of random sampling is the multi-country research on street foods presented by Tinker [1985].



#### III.4 INSTRUMENT DESIGN

Two research instruments were used: 1) a questionnaire applied to 41 street vendors; and, 2) unstructured interviews with 4 vendors' leaders. Both instruments were personally applied by this author. Informal talks with some personal friends who used to work as city officials in *La Merced Area* also provided a good perspective on government perceptions of this issue.<sup>27</sup>

The present study has followed some of the recommendations presented by academic authorities on the subject [Bromley and Birkbeck, 1984 p. 199; Bromley 1978a p. 1162]. First, it combines both qualitative and quantitative research techniques; second, it is directed towards studying a very precise occupational group instead of studying 'the informal sector' in general; and third, a minimum of unsubstantiated preconception was intended.

Regarding the first issue, observation of the street vending phenomenon during my regular visits to the field, and open interviews and informal conversations with vendors, leaders, and former city officials, provided rich qualitative information about this issue. On the other hand the questionnaire for vendors allowed codification of qualitative and quantitative responses to make them adequate for multivariate statistical analysis. Regarding the third point, this author proceeded

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<sup>27</sup> I appreciate the help of Miss Pilar Martinez, Miss Rebeca Ramos, Lic. Ignacio Herrera, and Mr. Alberto Ojeda.

carefully trying to follow the ethnologist's strategy: to go to the field with an open mind but not with an empty head. In fact, this case study research combined both ethnographic and survey methods. The first was necessary to gain vendors' confidence [Isaac 1981, p.372], whereas the latter permitted a deeper systematic analysis of the data.

As stated above, in the case of street vendors, a structured-interview approach was adopted which nevertheless permitted the capture of other relevant incidental information. The questions were always presented orally to vendors and their responses were noted by the author. In fact, although interviews were done according to a pre-determined format, when the respondent provided more information than strictly solicited, it was written to complement the answers in the questionnaire. Both responses to the structured questionnaire and additional spontaneous information permitted compiling vendors' life histories which complemented and enriched the survey data.

Although the limitations of survey questionnaires are greater in the study of illegal practices [Bromley and Birkbeck 1984, p.196], the questions were ordered in such a way that the most sensitive issues come at the end. It was not terribly difficult to get data about such delicate issues as bribes, net income, value of stock, etc., because by the time these questions were asked the respondent felt confidence in the interviewer. In fact, the main obstacles for getting such data were often vendors' calculation problems. Finally, it must be acknowledged that the adopted research strategy --which

emphasized the creation and use of social networks-- was responsible for creating an environment of confidence between the interviewer and the interviewees.

The questionnaire used in the present study was designed using as a reference the one designed by McGee and Yeung in their large-scale investigation on street trading in six Southeast Asian cities [1977].<sup>28</sup> In addition, this questionnaire was also supported by the one designed by INEGI [1992] in its study on informal micro-firms in Mexico.

The design and improvement of the questionnaire (before doing the field pre-test) took from October 1992 to October 1993. In this period the author benefitted from comments and suggestions by a significant number of academicians and colleagues who helped to select and clarify relevant questions; and to define proper wording and scaling to make questions both meaningful for the study purposes, and understandable for street sellers.<sup>29</sup> During the development of the questionnaire, special care was given to the attributes of the questions included in the questionnaire, such as: content, wording, scaling,

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<sup>28</sup> In fact, McGee and Yeung's study [1977] together with Tinker's seven-country investigation [1987] constitute by far the most significant body of research on street vending, and most other studies on this topic are much smaller in scale and significance.

<sup>29</sup> I specially appreciate comments and suggestions by Professor John Sibley Butler, Professor Bryan Roberts, and Professor Rajendra K. Srivastava at the University of Texas at Austin; from Dr. Alvaro de Garay, Dr. Roberto Holanda, Ing. Antonio Maza and Dr. Eduardo Sojo at ITESM; from Dr. Carlos Urzúa and José Romero at El Colegio de México; and from Miss Pilar Martínez at the Coordinación de Abasto, Departamento del Distrito Federal.

sequence, sensitiveness, double checking, and construct validity.

In November 1993 the questionnaire was pre-tested with 5 street vendors. The adjustments required were made immediately after each of these interviews and then tested with the remaining respondents. Actual interviews with street sellers took place between January and March 1994, whereas open interviews with leaders had been done by November 1993.

The final version of the questionnaire for street vendors<sup>30</sup> had 90 questions, organized in 6 sections: I. General information; II. Demographic and socio-economic issues; III. Labor issues; IV. Operative aspects of the enterprise; V. Vendors' opinion about government regulation; and VI. Miscellaneous items. Besides, although the questionnaire was relatively long, the average time of interviewing was 40 minutes.

### **III.5 RESEARCH STRATEGY**

#### **III.5.1 CHALLENGE #1: INFORMANTS' LACK OF TRUST**

Doing research on street traders is extremely arduous. As one of the most experienced scholars in the field has stated: "Its principal characteristics --

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<sup>30</sup> The final version of the questionnaire in both English and Spanish, and a description of the variables created and used in the analysis, are presented in the Appendix.

transience, mobility, the lack of an 'establishment', and the poverty and relatively low level of education of most of its participants-- make research (on street trading) remarkably difficult" [Bromley 1978a, p. 1161].

Related to Bromley's factors, I identified three particular challenges for my research that shaped my research strategy. These challenges are: 1) respondents' lack of trust; 2) interviewees' time constraints; and 3) Informants' perceptions of the actual benefits derived from the study. The first and third problems derive from their illegal or informal situation, whereas the second one is a consequence of the way they operate.

In contrast with Lozano's reported 'affable atmosphere' in flea-market trading [1983], government harassment has made vendors in Mexico City significantly distrustful. In order to face this challenge, several measures were taken to gain the confidence of respondents. The building of a network of acquaintances was the first step.

Following a similar research strategy as that suggested by Bromley and Birkbeck [1984, p.193] from the very beginning of the research, and long before I started the first interviews, I adopted a research approach characterized by building up a network of contacts that helped me to become acquainted with other participants. Particularly, I contacted some close friends of mine who, as former officials in *La Merced* area, introduced me with some of the leaders in this zone. Besides, such friends provided me with confidential information about the street vending phenomenon and the policies adopted by the

government. Such information was highly valuable in order to follow Bromley and Birkbeck's recommendation regarding the need to be very aware of existing enmities and rivalries among participants in street trade [Bromley and Birkbeck 1984, p. 192].

The author's friends introduced him to the following leaders of street vendors in the area of *La Merced*: Mrs. Hipólita Negrete, Mrs. Florentina Santiago, Mrs. María Zurita, Mrs. Silvia Cuevas, Mrs. Irma Cruz, Mr. Juan Mateo, and Mr. Cesar Flores.<sup>31</sup> Given the excellent personal relationships between my friends and these leaders, all of them were glad to help me and permitted this author to talk long hours with them regarding the following issues: 1) the characteristics of their associates; 2) how their associates entered street trade; 3) their associates' perceptions and economic performance; 4) the government policy; and, 5) their roles and functions as leaders. The information obtained from leaders constituted a very valuable start point to get an understanding of the activity and its organization.

Mrs. Florentina Santiago was one of the two leaders who directly helped me to get respondents for my study. Mrs. Santiago's associates operate in the legal-trading, low demand zone of the *Sonora Market*. She charges a weekly fee of 40 new pesos (12.5 dollars) in order to provide the guarantee of a determined place for selling

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<sup>31</sup> I highly appreciate the help from these leaders, their anonymous affiliates, and independent vendors, which without any doubt constituted the most crucial factor in the development of this research.

on the sidewalk. In addition, her organization is affiliated with the official party (PRI), and she has strong relationships with authorities of the Delegación Venustiano Carranza.

I had to visit Mrs. Santiago several times to explain my objectives and gain her confidence, and in fact she provided me with the five initial respondents for the questionnaire pre-test. When I asked her for support to interview their associates, she sent her assistant to ask for their cooperation with my study. Interestingly, when the assistant was giving this message he frequently used expressions such as: 'there is no problem with this guy;' 'his study is not for the authorities;' 'he is just doing his dissertation;' 'he already talked to Florentina,' etc. This curious fact evidenced the importance of lack of trust as a real barrier to doing research in this field, and the formidable help provided by the leader's cooperation.

Mrs. María Zurita helped me to contact some street traders in the illegal, high demand zone around La Merced Market. She is a former street trader that currently sells prepared food in an established stall. Interestingly, she provides protection and shelter to some relatives and friends selling in this zone, but without charging any fee. She also has very strong relationships with city officials and sometimes she intercedes with them to help her kin to recover confiscated goods. She suggested that I interview their kin and gave them instructions to respond my questionnaire.

It is important to mention that even though I enjoyed the leader's support to interview some vendors, this could hardly be considered enough. In fact, in order to guarantee honesty in responses, I had to convince every individual vendor of the fairness of the study's objectives, the confidentiality of information, and the importance of truthfulness for my dissertation.

In order to provide a initial indication of goodwill, I gave a letter of introduction to every individual leader and vendor, in which the objectives of the study were presented. Special emphasis was given in the letter to the issue of confidentiality which was crucial in order to obtain accurate information from street vendors. Interestingly, the effect of the letter on the vendors' will to cooperate was significant, even in those cases of illiterate traders who asked for help to read the message.

In addition, in consonance with Bromley and Birkbeck's approach [1984, p.193], I tried to appear as an interested bystander, anxious to learn but not posing a threat to those involved. In fact, confidence was gained precisely because they perceived me as a true outsider with no personal interest in the business other than learning more about the phenomenon.

I took special care to dress and act informally, since, on the one hand, it was very important not give the impression to sellers that I was carrying out a governmental study --government officials typically dress somewhat formally. On the other hand, it was important to minimize the perceived personal 'distance'



between this author and street sellers in order to gain their confidence and reduce communication barriers. [Bromley and Birkbeck 1984, p.192]

Following Bromley and Birkbeck's recommendation [1984, p.192], I spent time out on the street so as to gain a fuller understanding of the street vending activity and its context, and I bought some of my personal consumption goods from my potential and actual interviewees, especially from those who seemed friendly and talkative. In fact, buying from them had three objectives: first, it served to send informants a message of goodwill; on the other hand, it was an indirect means to partially compensate them for the invaluable attentions they gave to me; and, last but not least, I personally like buying from street vendors.

The results of the strategy to gain vendors' confidence was actually rather successful. In contrast with Bromley and Birkbeck [1984], whose interviewees showed a rather limited level of trust in the study -- their 'respondents generally felt that nothing should be revealed which could not be revealed to the authorities.' [p.199]-- my informants talked about issues that would not be openly discussed with city officials.

As stated above, in order to facilitate respondents' honesty in their answers, the most sensitive questions were located at the final part of the questionnaire. By that moment, I perceived that almost all of the interviewees felt comfortable with, and trusting of, the inquiry. Some facts in particular evidence vendors' trust and sincerity:

- 1) From all the vendors I invited to participate, only a few of them (5) declined definitively my invitation. However some offered to respond at another moment due to their current duties.
- 2) Virtually, none of the respondents refused to answer any question, even those items related to earnings, value of stock, fees (bribes), property of another stall in established markets, their desire to continue operating in the streets, etc.
- 3) Near 90% of them declared that the government has not regulated street vending adequately, and also that authorities are not fair with street traders.
- 4) More than 90% of the vendors accepted to be interviewed again, if necessary.
- 5) Many interviewees explained abundantly their answers, providing narrations of their lives and experiences.

Since several studies in the literature have reported the difficulties in obtaining accurate data on income, and argued that street sellers tend to underestimate their income,<sup>32</sup> I was initially concerned about the reliability of respondents' reported earnings. However, during the interviewing process, I became confident of my respondents' honesty, even considering that the concept of 'earnings' was not clear for some of them.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> See McGee and Yeung [1977]; Armstrong and McGee [1985]; Lozano [1983]; Escobar [1988]; Isaac [1981]; Natrass [1987]; and [McGee 1977].

<sup>33</sup> When vendors were asked about their 'earnings', some of them --especially those poorly educated-- were not familiar with this concept which denotes that they are subsistence-oriented rather than 'profit-oriented.' Therefore an arbitrary but clear definition was provided to them: the monetary surplus after all inventory

Notwithstanding, when I analyzed the data, I observed that vendors' declared minimum salary to shift to a formal job was generally higher than their declared earnings. Therefore, I suspected that the former variable might actually be their true earnings, while declared earnings might have been systematically underestimated. In order to test the earnings-underestimation hypothesis, I computed a new variable defined as the difference between required formal salary and earnings. Afterwards, I calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient between such new variable and a dummy variable indicating the vendors' regard for their job autonomy. The results obtained permitted me to reject the earnings-underestimation hypothesis, and to replace it by a very different one, which was later successfully tested: street vendors' solicited wage to become a formal employee tends to be higher than their current earnings because leaving street selling would impose upon them an opportunity cost in terms of forgone autonomy and independence.<sup>34</sup>

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replacement costs have been covered. Besides, in a few cases I personally help them to compute this variable based on some other indicators such as gross sales, frequency of sourcing, order size and value, and even household budget.

<sup>34</sup> The Pearson correlation coefficient between the fore mentioned variables was +0.46 with a significance level of 0.007. The test of the new hypothesis is presented in chapter IV.

## III.5.2 CHALLENGE #2: INFORMANTS' TIME CONSTRAINTS

The second difficulty in doing my research was respondents' potential time constraints. Since the initial stage of any exchange in street trade is customers' initial interest in the goods offered, street vendors intend to maximize the number of customers that stop to watch their merchandise. This in turn implies that traders are permanently watching pedestrians, and announcing the products' prices and features. Therefore, under such conditions, it was not practical for them nor for me to interview busy vendors.

Based on these considerations, I had to learn how vendors' demand change during the day, in order to visit them at low-demand times. On some occasions, the very same vendors indicated the right time for interviewing, so I had to make repeated visits to get a meeting. I noticed that repeated visits served not only to identify the right time for interviewing, but also constituted a message of interest and goodwill to the vendors that made them become both convinced and morally committed to participate.

I tried to minimize interference with business operations in order to make the trader feel more comfortable. Since I noticed that the attention of the seller was reduced when a customer came near, I invited the respondent to take care of the client, and I waited until the deal was finished or the customer left to resume the interview. This attitude was perceived by traders as a signal of respect and adaptation to their

business, so they responded by keeping up their attention to the interview, once the interruption concluded.

The situation was easier when the vendor had the assistance of a relative in the stall. In these cases, the respondent asked his/her helper to take charge of operations while he responded to the questionnaire.

Finally, another difficulty was related to the need of creating privacy in a public environment. Interviewing people on the street is hard because of the interference of noise, transit of cars and pedestrians, and the arrival of colleagues, customers or suppliers to the respondents' stall. In order to create privacy in such an environment, I carried with me two small portable chairs that facilitated closeness and relative privacy during the interview.

### III.5.3 CHALLENGE #3: INFORMANTS' PERCEPTION OF THE BENEFITS FROM THE STUDY

Vendors are opportunity-seekers interested in learning about customer needs and preferences. Their job has taught them that information is both valuable and tradeable.

A few traders asked me: 'What will I gain by responding to your questions?' What this simple question points out is that my interest in their lives made them conscious that they possessed a valuable good, so their first reaction was to see me as a 'potential customer' and they attempted to 'sell me' their knowledge. Such

reaction was, however, rather rational from their standpoint since providing private information to a non-familiar person implies a risk that should be compensated somehow. Interestingly, their 'pricing strategy' was to let the 'customer' make an initial offer, since they wanted to see if my subjective valuation of their information was greater than their subjective risk-related costs, and then start the bargaining process.

The situation described above taught me that from the standpoint of street sellers, it makes sense 'to sell' information if the researcher does not belong to their social networks in which they mutually 'exchange' help and information. In these cases, however, I tried to avoid the intended 'deal,' and instead I recurred to vendors' solidarity with me and my research. Hence, I frankly asked for their help to accomplish my dissertation, and explained that the benefits for street vendors derived from the study, if any, would be social and not individual.

Particularly, I argued that my the study could make a contribution to the understanding of the vendors' situation, and that such knowledge could help to design and implement better policies to deal with the phenomenon. In this regard, my research attitude was similar to the one adopted by Bromley and Birkbeck [1984 p.193]. Since a few vendors were rather skeptical about the social benefits of the study, I emphasized that such positive effects were actually potential, but that they formed part of the aims of my research.

I decided --in contrast with Bromley and Birkbeck's strategy [1984, p.194]-- to not pay respondents even a modest remuneration. The rationale for this attitude was that my interviews did not negatively affect their sales, since meetings were relatively short (around 40 minutes), and I permitted them to interrupt the interview if any customer appears. Besides, I intentionally did not offer them any particular favor in exchange for information due to ethical considerations: many politicians, city officials and pseudo leaders have exploited street vendors' hope and aspirations by making promises never accomplished.

However, as mentioned above, I bought goods from them after the meeting. Interestingly, since the nature of the interview convinced vendors of the lack of 'private benefits' obtainable from my study, some of them considered it inadequate for me to compensate them by buying goods from their stall. This last observation evidenced the presence of strong ethical rules of behavior within street traders.

### **III.6 DATA ANALYSIS**

The present investigation gathered and used both quantitative and qualitative data. Open interviews, informal conversations, and direct observation were the main source of qualitative information, while the questionnaire provided both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative information was useful to enrich the

analysis and interpretation of quantitative data, and it was particularly important in the process of generation and testing of the research hypothesis.

The questionnaire provided both nominal and metric variables, and some of the former were recoded to generate meaningful dichotomous variables susceptible to statistical treatment. However, the analysis of every individual questionnaire permitted me to build life histories that, in turn, gave me the opportunity to understand the vendors' circumstances and decisions.

The analysis of quantitative data entailed the use of both descriptive univariate statistics, and statistical techniques well-suited for analysis of association, correlation and dependence relationships among two or more variables. The former were especially useful for gaining a better understanding of the characteristics of the sample studied, whereas the latter permitted me to build vendors' profiles, and to explore and test the proposed causal relationships.

The descriptive statistics mostly used in this study, are: mean, rank, frequencies, and percentages. Among the two-variable statistical methods used are the Pearson correlation coefficient, and descriptive two-variable crosstabs. Finally, regarding multivariate statistical methods, multiple regression, logistic regression, principal components factor analysis, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were mostly used.

Since the sample size was rather small (41) and the sample was obtained by a convenience criterion, it is



possible that some of the variables used in statistical analysis do not strictly fulfill the assumptions and requirements necessary for using such methods [Hair, Anderson and Tatham 1987]. However, given the exploratory nature of the study, their application as instruments was considered adequate helping in the task of interpreting the multiple and complex relationships among the considered variables. As a matter of fact, very few investigations on street traders use two-variable correlational methods or multivariate statistical approaches: in general large-scale survey studies use only descriptive statistics whereas small-size studies are mainly performed with ethnographic research methods.

Even considering that the small size and lack of strict representativeness of the selected sample pose limits on the appropriateness of parametric statistical methods, the criteria used for evaluating the use of the proposed models were those conventionally utilized in such methods. Therefore, the significance level for hypothesis testing used generally had a ceiling of 0.10, although some analytically justifiable exceptions were permitted.

Since the main concern of this study is on internal and not external validity, inferential statistical methods are mainly used to support the degree of plausibility of the proposed relationships, and not to argue their capacity to be perfectly generalizable to the population of Mexican street vendors. Therefore, on the one hand, as shown in the following chapter, the validity of the proposed models is mainly supported by analytical considerations, whereas inferential statistical analysis

is used to illustrate the strength of the proposed relationships. On the other hand, the exploratory nature of the study implies that even hypotheses 'successfully tested' are preliminary and hence highly speculative, for their further exploration using better and more complete sampling criteria is necessary.

## IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### IV.1 IDENTIFICATION OF BIASES IN THE SAMPLE

As was stated above, the sample used in this study was selected based on convenience, because of which it is appropriate to compare it with other samples or populations of street vendors, in order to ascertain some of their discrepancies and commonalties. As far as one of the limitations of convenience samples is the lack of representativeness of the relevant population, such comparison may provide a better idea of some of the biases present in the sample studied, which in turn will contribute to set limits on the external validity of the conclusions from the investigation.

Therefore, the study sample will be compared with data from the 1990 Population Census and three samples of street vendors used by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática, INEGI. The first two samples come from the Mexico City results of the National Survey of Urban Employment 1989 <sup>35</sup> [INEGI 1989]. The third one was obtained from the National Survey of Migration Towards Urban Areas 1986 <sup>36</sup> [INEGI 1986].<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano 1989, ENEU 1989 from now on.

<sup>36</sup> Encuesta Nacional de Migración hacia Areas Urbanas 1986, ENMAU 1986 from now on.

<sup>37</sup> The samples selected from ENEU 1989 were determined by using two slightly different criteria to define street vendors: sample A was formed by selecting those individuals from ENEU 1989 who declared that their main

As the table III.1 shows<sup>38</sup>, the 1990 Census and the two samples of INEGI indicate that the proportion of males in street vending is greater than that of females. Particularly, according to the Census, in Mexico D.F. males represent 68% of total street vendors; in sample A the proportion of males is almost 67%, while in sample B it is near 66%. In the case of my convenience sample the proportion of males is almost 59%. Therefore, although males are somewhat underrepresented in my sample the difference can hardly be considered misleading.

As table III.2 indicates, there seems to be an important difference between street traders and the rest of active population in reference to age distribution, since the latter exhibit a higher proportion of young people and a lower participation of old persons than the former. This fact indicates that street trade tends to be a job performed by older people than other occupations. Additionally, table 2 also shows that there seems to exist a fairly similar distribution of vendors for the samples considered according to age groups, so the study sample can be considered as not significantly biased in this regard.

Table III.3 shows the distribution of male and female traders by group of age for two of the INEGI

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occupation was street trade, while sample B was formed by selecting those individuals who whether operated at a stall on the street or had not a stall (mobile traders). Sample C was selected from ENMAU 1986 based on a similar criterion as sample A.

<sup>38</sup> All tables referred in this chapter are in the Appendix.

samples and the study sample. Although my sample differs from the other two in terms of the specific percentages, all of the distributions are somewhat biased towards a lower age in the case of males, and towards a higher age in the case of females.

In the case of the distribution of street vendors by education, table III.4 reveals that street traders tend to be less educated than other workers, but also that my sample is slightly biased toward the most and least educated people. This bias, however, permits doing a better analysis using education as a contrasting variable.

Table III.5 evidences that males tend to be more educated than females, although such result is more pronounced in the case of my sample. This general result may be explained by the fact that males tend to be younger than females (see table III.3), and also by the phenomenon that females' traditional role at their households may limit their access to schooling opportunities.

Regarding the proportion of migrants, Table III.6 points that street trading tends to be an occupation with higher participation of migrants than other jobs. Besides, it indicates that my sample contains a significantly greater proportion of migrants (63%) than the INEGI vendors sample (48%). This difference may be explained by the fact that *La Merced* market constitutes a natural point for getting a first job in the City by recently arrived migrants.

Table III.7 suggests that, within no-vending workers, a sharp divergence in education level exists between migrants and natives, being the latter considerably more educated. In the case of street traders, the INEGI sample and the study sample coincide in pointing out a similar, although less strong contrast.

Table III.8 evidences that the common demographic relationship that exists between age and education, also exists among traders. That is, younger vendors tend to be more educated than old vendors. In this case, my sample distribution resembles quite well the INEGI samples' distributions.

Table III.9 presents the distribution of several groups of working people along four categories of income,<sup>39</sup> measured in times of the minimum wage. The comparison between the different sources shows that the INEGI's samples of vendors tend to have a lower income than the total active people working in Mexico City, hence indicating that street traders can be viewed as lower-than-average income earners. My sample, in contrast, is formed by higher-than-average income earners which might be explained by two reasons: first, they operate near downtown Mexico City, which is considered in general as a higher-than-average demand zone for street selling; particularly, some of our vendors operate in an illegal and definite high demand zone as *La Merced* market. Secondly, as table 10 evidences, the members of my sample tend to work more hours per week than total

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<sup>39</sup> In the case of the studied sample the variable is earnings, that is, gross income less costs of inventory replacement.

active population in Mexico City, and also work more than the street trading population in the city.

The analysis of table III.10 also permits identifying that the population of street traders in Mexico City cluster mainly in the extreme categories of hours worked, which might evidence the existence of irregular, opportunistic or part-time vendors, on the one hand, and intensive-work traders, on the other hand.

Table III.11 presents a cross-tabulation of education by income. In the case of the two INEGI samples no clear positive association can be visually identified between the two variables. In the case of my sample a slight positive relationship can be seen in the table, but this relationship is better established by observing the high Pearson correlation coefficient between age and education in years.<sup>40</sup>

From the previous discussion, it can be concluded that although my sample was selected on a convenience basis, and hence it cannot be considered as representative of the population of street traders in Mexico City, it does not show crucial differences in some regards with respect to other samples or populations of street vendors in Mexico City; and in the cases that such divergences exist they are explainable by specific characteristics of the selected sample.

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<sup>40</sup> The correlation is -0.62 with a significance level of 0.000.

#### IV.2 SAMPLE'S HETEROGENEITY

As it is recognized in the literature, I found that street vendors share some common readily identifiable features: they share the same type of work under similar conditions. They use similar marketing techniques, work long hours, and have similar appearance and speech. However, one of the most salient features of street vendors is their high heterogeneity in many other regards. I found both males and females; old and young people; individuals who have family-tradition in the business and others who don't; migrants and natives -- and within migrants, long-term and short-term ones. I also noticed high diversity in the type of product traded, the value of their stock, their motives of entry, and their expectations and aspirations.

Therefore, as other case studies reported in the literature,<sup>41</sup> our selected sample possessed both homogeneity in some regards and heterogeneity in many others. This combination of commonalties and differences within the sample constituted the first analytical challenge faced by the present study. In fact, one important question was if general patterns of interrelations between vendors' characteristics, attitudes and behaviors could be identified from such a small but highly heterogeneous group.

Interestingly, such patterns emerged from both personal observation and statistical analysis. The

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<sup>41</sup> See the literature review, above.



abundant information required from interviewees permitted me not only getting a description of the whole sample and of some of its important sub-groups, but also to test and establish some relationships between key variables.

### II.3 GENERAL DEMOGRAPHICS

Street vendor demographics is one of the issues most commonly reported by researchers on informal retailing,<sup>42</sup> for it permits us to answer the very simple but important question of who street vendors are. Indeed, learning their main demographic characteristics constitutes the first step to understand in a better way their attitudes, behaviors, decisions and expectations.

Within my sample, a greater proportion of the subjects (59%) are males, which is not an atypical situation in Mexico, although it should be recognized that studies in other countries found the opposite result.<sup>43</sup> The sample average age is near 38 years with a rank that goes from 19 to 68 years. As stated above, street traders tend to be older than other working people; nevertheless, data from my sample show that we can hardly identify street trade with a particular age group, since 32% of the individuals are below 30; 34% of them are between 30 and 45 years, and the remaining 34% are above 45. This result might be explained by arguing

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<sup>42</sup> See the literature review, above.

<sup>43</sup> See the literature review, p.36.

that both old and young people find in self-employment a way to generate income. However, as far as needs, including the economic ones, can have different connotations for individuals in dissimilar circumstances, it emerges the issue of what are the specific needs and aspirations of people at different stages of their life cycle, and why and how street trading satisfies them.

Regarding their migration status, 63% of the individuals in the sample were born outside Mexico City while near 90% live there. This result is consistent with several studies on street traders,<sup>44</sup> which have identified that this job is particularly migrant intensive. It is important to mention that 5 out of 41 vendors in the sample have their permanent residence in other cities which indicates the presence of intermittent movements into the city with trading purposes, a similar finding to that reported by Bijlmer [1989]. This last situation was confirmed by explicit declarations of such traders.

Within permanent migrants, the average length in the city exceeds 18 years, and only 18% of them arrived in the last 5 years, while 59% of them migrated 15 or more years ago. This indicates that migrants in the sample are mainly long-term migrants --a similar result to that reported by the INEGI 1989 national survey on the informal economy [INEGI 1990] and by other investigations in the literature [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.190; McGee and Yeung 1977, p.99].

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<sup>44</sup> Cfr. McGee and Yeung [1977, p.101]. See the literature review, p.37.

Coinciding with other studies on street traders,<sup>45</sup> the sample indicates that regarding marital status, 76% of the individuals have a spouse (considered from now on as "married"), 12.2% are single and 12.2% are widowed or divorced (named as "non-married" from now on). Notwithstanding, these percentages differ significantly from those of the 1990 Census for Mexico City (D.F.), which are 49.5%, 42.4% and 9.1%, respectively [INEGI 1990]. These divergences are explainable by the fact that the Census includes people with an age of 12 or older -- which includes a large proportion of young single people -- while my sample includes only individuals with an age of 19 and older.

#### **IV.4 DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATION**

Even though street traders in Mexico and in many other countries tend to be less educated than other working people<sup>46</sup>, the average level of education in my sample is not so low, although high variability exists. In my sample, the average schooling attendance was near 6 years (equivalent to primary school) with a rank that goes from 0 to 13 years of education; besides, only 4 subjects (almost 10% of the sample) are illiterate. The average education in my sample is not significantly lower than the one observed for the total population older than

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<sup>45</sup> Cfr. Armstrong and McGee 1985 p.189; and PREALC 1988, p.9. See also the literature review, p.40.

<sup>46</sup> See Table III.4 in the Appendix. See also the literature review, p.41.

6 years in Mexico City (7.61) [INEGI 1990], even considering that my sample is biased towards older people. While none of the vendors reported having an undergraduate degree, and some of them completed only short careers (accounting assistant, or secretary), it is remarkable that 36.6% of the individuals had 9 or more years of schooling which indicates at least the presence of a well educated segment of traders. Although the observed level of education may not be considered typical if it is compared with other studies, it is remarkable that PREALC [1988, p.5] discovered that street vendors in Santiago de Chile had a relatively high average level of education (10 years).

Although it has been recognized in the literature that street vendors tend to have a low level of education,<sup>47</sup> it is important to learn if variability in education can be explained by some other variables. The answer to this question is important because it may indicate which factors influence street vendors' job opportunities in the formal sector. Although I did not find any particular study on the determinants of the educational level of street sellers, several individual factors have been reported to be correlated with our variable of interest. For example, some studies and data from Mexico and other countries have indicated that younger, native, and male vendors tend to be more educated and skillful than their older, migrant and female counterparts.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> See the literature review, p.41.

<sup>48</sup> Cfr. PREALC [1988, p.9]. See Tables III.5, III.7, and III.8, in the Appendix. See also the literature review, above.

Therefore, the present study states and tests the hypothesis that a causal relationship exists between these demographic characteristics and the educational level of street traders. In first place it is proposed that, since schooling opportunities are lower in rural than in urban settings, those born in the countryside should exhibit a lower level of education. Secondly, it is proposed that sexual discrimination within the household leads to a decrease in educational opportunities for females.<sup>49</sup> Third, it is suggested that age is a good proxy of the general schooling opportunities in the country, considering a permanent expansion of the public supply of educational services; therefore, since older people faced more limited schooling opportunities than younger individuals, the former's expected educational level should be lower than the latter's.

A preliminary examination of the sample data indicates that males and natives tend to be more educated than females and migrants, respectively. In fact, the difference in schooling years between males (7.1) and females (4.1) is quite significant, while it is more moderate when natives (6.7) and migrants (5.4) are contrasted. Besides, there is a significant negative correlation between age and education.<sup>50</sup> However, since

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<sup>49</sup> The fact that females have less education than males may be related to their traditional role as non-paid labor force at the household which may generate a *de facto* discrimination against them in terms of educational opportunities.

<sup>50</sup> The Pearson correlation coefficient between age and education (in years) is -0.62 with a significance level of 0.000.

within the sample, female vendors tend to be younger than their male counterparts,<sup>51</sup> it was considered adequate to see if the proposed single relationships remained once the influences of the other independent variables were taken into account.

In order to see if each of these factors contributes *independently* to determine the educational level of street traders, a regression analysis was run.<sup>52</sup> The results support the proposed relationship by indicating that the selected variables explain around 48.4% of the variance of education, with a satisfactory level of statistical significance for the whole model and for each of the independent variables.<sup>53</sup> Specifically, the regression analysis confirms that being older, female and migrant leads to a decrease in the expected level of education, and vice versa.

Regarding the aspirations of street vendors about their children's education, it is remarkable that, since vendors have come to realize through their own experience that street trade is a hard, risky and low-income job, a majority of them declared that they would like (have liked) their children attend (have attended) to school, a fact also reported by studies on ethnic entrepreneurship [Butler and Herrings 1991]. Interestingly, those vendors who are in turn descendants of street vendors tend to

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<sup>51</sup> Average ages for females and males was 42.4 and 34.4 years, respectively.

<sup>52</sup> See Table III.12 in the Appendix.

<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, the significance level of the place-of-birth variable was 0.13.

have a higher average level of education (6.76 years) than those who are not (4.95).<sup>54</sup>

Although, as indicated above, younger, male and native street vendors tend to be more educated, it was considered necessary to get a deeper understanding of the importance of gender in explaining education for both the migrant and native groups. Actually, the new hypothesis to be tested is that gender discrimination is more important in rural and than in urban settings, once the influence of age is taken into account.

The rationale for this hypothesis is that since schooling opportunities are scarcer in the countryside, and because rural families tend to have a larger size, such opportunities will be offered mainly to male offspring. However, the higher educational opportunities in the city, and the smaller size of urban families, may permit them to offer education to a higher number of children, whereas the relatively less discriminating 'urban culture' may induce families to offer such opportunities to female offspring. Additionally, differences in the nature of work between urban and rural families may also imply higher limitations for rural female children to study than for their urban counterparts. In fact, since a high proportion of native traders' parents worked in street vending (73%), the flexibility of this activity possibly permitted female

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<sup>54</sup> However --as an ANOVA analysis indicates-- the significance level of the main effect of the parents' occupation variable is not statistically significant (0.155) after controlling by age, whose significant level is 0.000. See table III.13 in the Appendix.

children both attending school and helping at the family stall, whereas the more inflexible and time-consuming rural homework limited female children from attending school.

In order to test the hypothesis that gender discrimination prevails more among migrants than natives, two separate multiple regression analyses were run for each of these groups using age and gender as independent variables. The results for the migrant group show that both age and gender significantly influence the level of education<sup>55</sup>. In the case of the native, age was statistically significant, but gender was not.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, these results support the proposed hypothesis that for females, discrimination regarding schooling opportunities is higher in rural than in urban settlements.

#### **IV.5 THE FAMILY AND THE HOUSEHOLD**

Street trade has been characterized in the literature as a family-related-activity rather than a strictly individual job<sup>57</sup>. In this study the role of the family and the household in street vending is explored,<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> See Table III.14 in the Appendix.

<sup>56</sup> See Table III.15 in the Appendix. In fact, for the native group, the Pearson correlation coefficient between gender and education is low (0.29) and statistically insignificant (0.14).

<sup>57</sup> See the literature review, pp.41-44.

<sup>58</sup> According to Roberts' [1994], "household refers to the basic unit of co-residence and family to a set of



to analyze their influence in the emergence and permanence of street traders, and their relationships with the current operations of the stall.

As indicated by the literature,<sup>59</sup> data from the sample also evidence that labor support from members of the owner's family is important for the daily operation of the business, as shown by the fact that 20 out of 41 traders (49%) have at least one relative working at their stall.

The expansion of street vending within both the narrow and extended family obeys to both tradition-related and operational factors. As stated in the literature,<sup>60</sup> children 'inherit' their occupation from their parents by receiving training at the family stall, and support to start-up their own independent trading activity. Data from this study corroborate these assertions since the proportion of vendors whose parents (at least one of them) used to work as street vendors reaches 51% of the whole sample.<sup>61</sup> This process of 'inheritance' is also confirmed by the fact that 5 out of the 14 oldest vendors (those 45 or older) have at least one children working as autonomous street vendor. Additionally, a more subjective indicator of family tradition is the fact that 8 out of 22 traders (38%)

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normative relationships" [p.10]. However, I will also use the term family in its most common meaning to denote the set of persons with a common ancestry.

<sup>59</sup> See the literature review pp.41-44.

<sup>60</sup> See the literature review pp.41-44.

<sup>61</sup> Cfr. PREALC [1988, p.35].

declared that they would like that (or like) their children to work as street traders.

However, street vending is not only 'inherited' within the vendors' narrow-family, but it also expands through their extended families. This is evidenced by the high average number of vendors' relatives running their own stalls, which is almost 7. Moreover, only 20% of the traders have no relatives working as independent traders.

Although a great majority (93%) of the subjects' former jobs was a non-street-vending-related activity, in many cases family and kin networks linked to street trade existed before traders decided to adopt this job, and such networks constituted a facilitator of entry. Networks and family tradition then operate as a permanent device that can be recovered at any time in the individual's life cycle when he/she has to make a job choice. In fact, some cases were reported in which the person had an initial contact with the activity during his/her childhood, and after some time (even after trying other occupations) he/she adopted it as his/her main job due in part to the long term influence of family tradition and social networks. In fact, in 11 out of 41 cases, the time span between the first street vending experience and the moment in which this occupation was adopted by the individuals as their main job, is greater or equal to 5 years.

However, the expansion of street trading within families is not only a matter of mere tradition. In fact, even in those cases where no important street vending tradition exists in the family, social networks (i.e.

family and friends) provide very important support to street traders at any stage of the business. In fact, either potential entrants, beginners, and established traders, benefit from direct help, financial resources, personal contacts, and information provided by the kin.

The mode of entry into the occupation reveals the important role of social networks. Street sellers tend to enter the business in two basic ways: as owners of their own merchandise or as employees in a running stall. Family plays an important role in the entry into the business as shown by the fact that 53% of the traders received support from parents and relatives to get *their first job* as street traders (either as employee or as an owner).

In the sample, almost 37% of the vendors started as an employee while the remaining ones started as owners. Those who entered as workers generally were sheltered by the stall owner who used to be a relative or friend, who provided the newcomer with the know-how required to be a street seller. Remarkably, from the 15 individuals who started as employees, only 13% of them had no previous kin or friendship relationship with the owner of the stall, which emphasizes the importance of social networks in the incorporation into the activity. By the time these workers decided to start-up their own stall, they either had accumulated some money from their wages or received financial support or credit-in-goods from their kin.

Regarding those vendors who started as independent owners of their stall, 45% of them received borrowings from their kin, which evidences the importance of

economic assistance in their onset. Remarkably, a significant proportion (4 out of 10) of those starting as owners based on their own savings, received some non-financial help to initiate their operations.

For the whole sample, 54% of the vendors obtained funds from other people in order to become owners of their business (merchandise); particularly, near 49% of them borrowed money or merchandise from relatives or other persons. Considering that the required initial investment tends to be relatively low [PREALC 1988, p.14], two conclusions may be obtained: on the one hand, economic self-sufficiency is not indicative of entrants' significant savings; on the other hand, dependence on financial aid for entry evidences the condition of poverty of newcomers.

Additionally, although 46% of the total subjects depended entirely on their own savings, half of them were helped by someone to get their first vendor job, which indicates that economic self-sufficiency, if it exists, is not enough to enter into the business. This last point cast doubts on the common assertion in the literature on the informal sector<sup>62</sup> that none or very low barriers exist for entering into informal self-employment, due to the low level of initial investment required.

The relevance of information in street markets has been emphasized by several researchers.<sup>63</sup> As far as competition for information is one of the factors that

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<sup>62</sup> See McGee [1977].

<sup>63</sup> See the literature review pp.85-86.

increases rivalry among street vendors [Geertz 1992], the existence of trusting relationships, such as those provided by family and friends, help traders to get the information required to enter and remain in the occupation.

Actually, as some personal interviews indicated, social networks provide street traders with valuable information for identifying attractive trading opportunities, particularly regarding places, products or personal contacts to start-up trading activities. Interestingly, a majority of the interviewed vendors reported that they have recommended (or helped) other people --relatives or not-- to enter into the business; in fact, 67% of traders reported that they have recommended (or helped) other persons to enter vending activities, and 46% of them have given such advice to 3 or more persons. Additionally, some leaders of street trading associations reported that their associates frequently help people to enter the business by introducing the applicant to them. The leader then provides the aspirant with the opportunity to operate in a certain place within the former's zone of influence in exchange for a fee.

The economic organization of the household of working people and economic family strategies has been studied in the literature.<sup>64</sup> In fact, some of the phenomena indicated in this section may be considered as expressions of the economic strategies adopted by street vendors' families. However, one issue not treated before

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<sup>64</sup> Cfr. Roberts [1990, 1994].

refers to the sources of income of the traders' families and particularly to the role of the stall owner within the household economy.

Data from this study show that the average number of household members for the subjects in the whole sample was 5.2 whereas the average number of those earning income independently<sup>65</sup> was 2.2, which means that, on average, 42% of the household members earn income in different activities. Additionally, if we consider that almost half of the subjects receive support from their relatives at their stall, we may conclude that vendors' households are formed mostly by working people who contribute to the household economy either independently or as unpaid workers in the family vending business. Furthermore, the existence of relatives working outside the vending stall might indicate the existence of a strategy of diversification in the sources of income, in order to reduce the risks of significant drops in the household income if, as commonly occurs, the vending earnings suffer either a seasonal or permanent decrease.

Interestingly, the households of married vendors have a lower number of persons generating income than non-married vendors' households (1.94 versus 3, respectively). Besides, the ratio of total members of the household to income generating members<sup>66</sup> is higher for

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<sup>65</sup> By independent sources of income I mean those people in the household who receive a pay for their work, and hence they include the owner of the stall, and other members working outside this family business. Besides, they do not include unpaid family workers at the stall.

<sup>66</sup> In order to identify more precisely the differences in the economic obligations within the household between

the former (3.2) than for the latter (1.88). These results indicate that married vendors tend to have a greater economic responsibility within the household than non-married traders. In addition, insofar as a high proportion of vendors in the sample are married (76%), the majority of the sample members can be considered as having a significant economic obligation within their households --whether or not they are family heads. This finding tends to support the idea already expressed by PREALC [1988 p.9] and other studies in the literature<sup>67</sup> which state that street trading is an important contributor to the economy of the vendors' household and that this occupation is not a strictly individualistic business.

#### **IV.6 GENDER-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS**

As stated in the literature review,<sup>68</sup> gender has been recognized as an important variable which permits establishing relevant dissimilarities among street vendors, where such differences have to do with issues as: responsibilities within the household, level of education, job opportunities outside street vending,

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married and non-married vendors, an indicator was designed and calculated for both groups. This indicator is the number of total members of the household divided by the number of income-generating members, including the stall owner. The higher the ratio, the greater the relative economic obligation of the stall owner.

<sup>67</sup> See the literature review, pp.41-44.

<sup>68</sup> See the literature review, pp.44-47.

type of products traded, level of earnings, scale of the business, and opportunities for capital accumulation, among others. These differences permit identification of a different profile for male and female vendors. In the following paragraphs data from the sample will be used to describe and explain such gender profiles.<sup>69</sup>

As mentioned above, in the studied sample, female traders tend to be older than males (42.4 versus 34.4 years old, respectively). Regarding place of birth, no difference was found between males and females; actually, the two groups have a similar proportion of members born out of Mexico City (63% and 65%, respectively). However, the pattern of arrival into the city is different for male and female permanent migrants: half of men migrated alone --which may be indicative of their planned job-search in the city before moving their families-- while women mostly migrated accompanied by other persons, perhaps because they were companions of other relatives looking for a job.

Regarding marital status, almost all male vendors are married (87.5%) while the proportion of female sellers who are married is significantly lower (58.8%). This owes to the fact that among women there are some widows or divorcees, while no men with such marital status were found. On the other hand, females tend to belong to households where more members generate income independently (2.76 persons per household for females versus 1.79 for males). Hence, even if females frequently lack the economic support of a spouse, they however have

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<sup>69</sup> See Table III.16 in the Appendix.



a greater potential support from a household with more people generating income. Interestingly, a large-scale study by INEGI [1994] on informal micro-firms also reported that a significantly higher proportion of females are either widow or divorced.

The forthcoming analysis has the objective of testing the hypothesis presented by some studies in the literature<sup>70</sup> that, within street trade, there is a clear disadvantage of women with respect to men, where this drawback is illustrated by females' low human capital endowments, scarce job opportunities outside street trading, subordinated role within the household, and low economic performance of their enterprises.

Data from the sample confirm the more limited condition of females as labor force. First, as extensively argued above, females (especially those who are migrants) tend to be less educated than males. Second, as already mentioned, both migrant and native women tend to be older than men, which implies that the latter are better endowed for doing hard work. Third, given females' traditional in as providing unremunerated labor to households, they have less paid-job experience than males. As a likely result of all these factors, females' job alternatives tend to be more scarce than in the case of males; and even if such opportunities arise, females' obligations in their households might limit their job choices.

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<sup>70</sup> See the literature review pp.44-47.

According to results from the sample, females have less experience in paid jobs than males: 13 out of 24 males' former jobs (54.2%) were as employees in a non-family/non-street-trading business; in contrast, only 3 out of 17 (17.7% of) females had this type of former job. Moreover, 47% of females used to work at their households doing homework; 17.6% of them worked as home servants, and 17.6% of them worked as employees in street vending stalls.<sup>71</sup> In addition, 53% of males reported that they enjoyed Social Security benefits in their former job as employee while only 14% of females did so.<sup>72</sup>

What these figures indicate is that males participated more actively in the labor market than females before entering into street vending, and that an important proportion of females worked as unpaid homemakers. Additionally, women who used to work as employees tended to do so in the informal sector, while a significant proportion of men previously worked in the formal sector. As far as these results emphasize women's lower job-experience in formal sector, they point to lower formal wage-job opportunities for females.<sup>73</sup>

Furthermore, since they usually lack a paid former job, once women enter street selling, they concentrate in this activity and avoid taking other paid jobs simultaneously. In fact, female sellers have very low

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<sup>71</sup> See Table III.17 in the Appendix.

<sup>72</sup> See Table III.18 in the Appendix.

<sup>73</sup> These results are consistent with the hypothesis stated in the literature that male street traders tend to come from organized labor markets while females mainly come from the household or from informal labor markets. See the literature review, pp.47-48.

current participation in labor markets outside street trading, since only 11.8% of women have another paid job while 41.7% of men do so.<sup>74</sup> Prior to entering street trade, females generally have made a more limited job-search than males: whereas 26.1% of male traders have searched for a different occupation, only 5.9% of females have done so.

These results suggest that females tend to have fewer opportunities than males outside street vending. This assertion is supported by the fact that nearly 53% of female vendors believed that they could not find any job outside street selling, while the percentage for males was only 33%.

Notwithstanding, their relative scarcity of job opportunities is not the only factor explaining women's former and current low participation in labor markets outside street trading. Their traditional obligations in their households may reduce even further their set of feasible jobs. In addition, it is plausible that household members prefer women to fulfill their household responsibilities rather than to search for additional income. As far as females' income is a complement to the unpaid labor they contribute to the household budget, household welfare might actually decrease if they were to take another job.

For both males and females, the most important reason for entry into street trade is of an economic nature, although in the case of males this factor is

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<sup>74</sup> See Table III.19 in the Appendix.

relatively more important than for females. In fact, 70.6% of women entered for economic reasons; 35.3% of them stated preference reasons; 35.3% declared personal limitations; and 35% answered kinship relationships. Interestingly, results for males were 87%, 56.5%, 21.7%, and 21.7%, respectively.<sup>75</sup> These results indicate that economic and preference reasons were more important for males than for females, while the reverse is true for kin relationships, and personal limitations.

Both male and female street vendors have a strong preference for autonomy and independence. This is illustrated by the fact that 73.7% of them declared either to dislike having a boss or to enjoy the self-governing nature of the street vending job. However, this preference is more significant in the case of females (86.7%) than for males (65.2%) which may be either a sign of the former's lesser previous experience in formal jobs; a stronger habituation to freedom due to a greater tenure in the business, or an expression of their households' need of time availability. Women's special preference for autonomy and flexibility has also been reported in the literature.<sup>76</sup> As Babb stated in her study on Peruvian female street traders [1987], "petty commerce frequently offers women the advantage of flexible working and the opportunity to take children along as they work... [p.173] (therefore)...many women entering

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<sup>75</sup> See Table III.16 in the Appendix. The sum of these figures exceeds 100% since non-exclusive answers were accepted. For a more detailed explanation of entry motivations see below, pp.190-192.

<sup>76</sup> See the literature review, pp.44-47.

marketing value the 'independence' it will offer [pp.176-177].

In contrast with males, females tend to enter street trade as owners of their stall and not as employees of a running stall. Women tend to prefer entering into street trade as owners of their stall probably because such status permits them to accomplish their household tasks with more flexibility. Nevertheless, their lack of funds has two additional effects: first, it limits the initial scale of operations in their business; second it makes them rely on borrowed money or merchandise. Hence women become owners of very-low-scale businesses, with high inventory turnover, and with more flexibility to shift to other product lines.

The last assertions are confirmed by data from the sample, which show that a great proportion of women's first contact with street vending was as owners of their stall (82.4%) while in the case of males they entered both as owners (50%) and as employees (50%). In addition, a lower percentage of females depended on own savings to start up their independent business (30.8%) than in the case of males (54.5%).<sup>77</sup>

In concordance with reports from the literature,<sup>78</sup> data from my sample reveal the contrasts between the entry conditions and enterprise features of male and female street sellers. These data reveal the latter's limitations in human and monetary capital endowments, their particular need for autonomy and flexibility, and

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<sup>77</sup> See Table III.16 in the Appendix.

<sup>78</sup> See the literature review, pp.44-48.

their lower economic performance. Particularly, females exhibit a greater capital constraint than males, not only at the start-up of their business (as indicated above), but also in their current operations. As a matter of fact, the average value of current inventory for females is N\$ 797, while it is considerably greater for males (N\$ 3366). Furthermore, the level of monthly earnings in the case of female traders (N\$ 988) is significantly lower than in the case of males (N\$ 1597).

Notwithstanding, it seems that women take advantage of their limitations in capital endowments by investing in high-turnover items which permits them to increase their profitability and also to facilitate quick shifts to other products according to seasonal changes in demand. Therefore, females transform their capital-disadvantage into a flexibility-advantage. Results from the sample indicates that women's earnings to working capital ratio is higher than for men (1.24 versus 0.47, respectively) because women tend to sell less-durable goods which permits a faster turnover of their working capital. In fact, 70.6% of females sell less-durable goods while only 16.7% of males do so. Another advantage of women's less-durable and lower-value stock is the enjoyment of greater flexibility, which permits them to shift to other product lines according to seasonal changes in demand. Interestingly, 58.8% of females change their product lines through the year while only 20.8% of males do so.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> See Table III.16 in the Appendix.

The previous discussion suggests that we witness two different but interrelated compensation mechanisms operating in the case of female street traders, with both acting to facilitate and reproduce their particular economic behavior. On the one hand, women, given their higher individual constraints than males (higher age, lower education, lower working capital, and lower previous job experience) tend to adopt a product-selection strategy which increases their average return on investment to a level even higher than that for men.

On the other hand, as far as female traders tend to belong to households where more members generate income, this fact makes more acceptable for the household members a lower level of earnings by the vendor, given the complementary nature of their earnings. Since the greater the independent sources of income at the household, the lower the risk of a significant and permanent drop in the household's total level of consumption, it is preferable that female members work in street vending regardless of their absolute level of net income. That is, although female vendors do their best to earn as much as possible given their personal and capital limitations, their observed earnings --no matter how low they might be-- might be considered "adequate" by the other members of the household. <sup>80</sup>

The analysis of this sample suggests that the characterization of street vending as a 'refuge occupation' is particularly true in the case of women,

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<sup>80</sup> Grompone [1981] explains the rationality of the incorporation of family work into street trade in terms of its low opportunity cost.

who then might constitute a group of 'disadvantaged within the disadvantaged.' However, it must be recognized that female vendors enter into street trade not only because they lack the individual requirements demanded in formal labor markets (e.e., low age, high education, and job experience), but also because job autonomy and flexibility are important for accomplishing their household duties, including the care of children.

Although female traders might consider street vending as a survival job which provides them with valuable flexibility, other results from the sample indicate that they may be more prone than males to shift to a formal wage job if such a job opportunity presents itself. In fact, 62.5% of females would shift to a wage-job with an identical net income to their current street trading job, and 82% of them would do so if the net income were higher. (The percentages for males are 45.8% and 66.7%, respectively). Furthermore, females are also more willing than males to leave street vending if winning a lottery prize of N\$ 50,000 (around 15,000 US) with a yes-response ratio of 82.4% (54.2% for males).<sup>81</sup> These results may indicate that females feel more unsatisfied with their job than males, and that they would leave it if an opportunity materialized. In support of this argument, it is noteworthy that females tend more than males to feel "less happy" of their job and to feel "less glad" with their earnings.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> See Table III.16 in the Appendix.

<sup>82</sup> See Table III.16 in the Appendix.



Interestingly, these results are opposite those presented by Spalter-Roth [1988b, p.278-279] in her study on street traders in Washington, where a very different type of female seller exists. In contrast with the results presented above, she reports that 60% of her female interviewees had been previously employed in 'pink-collar jobs' (positions traditionally reserved for women); these women had been happy to leave their former jobs because of the greater income and personal autonomy they enjoy in street trading; therefore, those women generally do not want to return to their previous jobs. From our results and those from Spalter-Roth's study, it might be suggested that females' desire to leave street vending depends on their actual job satisfaction which in turn partially depends on their general opportunities and economic performance.

In the aforementioned event of winning a lottery prize, near 63% of all the vendors declared that they would start a new (formal) business. Among them, a majority of women would start-up a formal business within trading (90%) while only 50% of males would do so. This result would support the argument that females have difficulties in shifting to other occupations outside trading due to their higher age, lower education and more limited previous experience in other occupations outside commerce.

#### IV.7 MIGRANTS AND NATIVES

The inclination of migrants to adopt street trading has been extensively reported in the literature.<sup>83</sup> In Mexico street trading is an occupation with higher participation of migrants than other jobs.<sup>84</sup> As mentioned above, the proportion of migrants in the sample is significantly higher than that reported from official sources, mainly due to *La Merced* market's role as a natural point of arrival for migrants searching for a job in Mexico City.

The analysis of the differences between those people born in Mexico City and the remainder (i.e. permanent and transitory migrants) does not permit the identification of a full profile of the two groups. Nevertheless, some illustrative differences are presented in the following paragraphs.<sup>85</sup>

Street vending is primarily an urban occupation, and hence it is understandable that a smaller proportion of migrant sellers (38.5%) had parents who used to work as street vendors, while the reverse is true in the case of traders born in the city (73.3%). The figure for migrants would be even lower except for two reasons: 1) the existence of important rural market systems in Mexico;<sup>86</sup> and, 2) the fact that some migrants came to the city with their parents, and the latter had the opportunity to

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<sup>83</sup> See the literature review, pp.37-39.

<sup>84</sup> See Table III.6 in the Appendix.

<sup>85</sup> See Table III.20 in the Appendix.

<sup>86</sup> See Gormsen [1978].

adopt such job after arrival. Nevertheless, at the present time, the average number of traders' relatives working independently in the street trade is slightly higher for migrants than for natives (7.3 and 6.3 relatives, respectively), which suggests that, once migrants become residents of the city, the development of family networks within the activity is perhaps faster than in the case of natives.

Additionally, it is plausible that migrants had less personal contacts related with street vending at the time they entered into this occupation which is shown by the fact that only 19.2% of them declared that their entry decision was influenced by kin relationships (while the proportion was 42.9% in the case of city natives). This situation could also have influenced the mode of entry among migrants, since almost 77% of them started as stall owners when only 40% of city natives started in such a way.<sup>87</sup> Other indicators of the lesser support received by migrants is the fact that they depended more than natives on personal savings to start their own business (50% of migrants depended on personal savings while 38.5% of natives did so).

The presence of some young, educated and high-capital migrants explains why the average value of inventory of migrants is higher than for natives. However, when the median is calculated for the two samples the results are not so different (N\$1000 for migrants and N\$800 for natives). Regarding the average monthly earnings practically no difference exists between

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<sup>87</sup> The remainder entered as employees.

migrants and natives. Consequently, the average earnings to capital ratio is higher for natives than for migrants (0.79 versus 0.50), which is explained by the fact that a higher proportion of the former (53.3% versus 30.8% in the case of migrants) sells less-durable goods which have a faster turnover.

Besides, whereas migrants tend to sell national goods, natives sell both national and imported goods, which may be an indicator that the former tend to avoid the more complex and risky trading logistics associated with imported goods which require more specialized networks. In fact 60% of natives sell imported (and national) goods while only 11.6% of migrants do so.

Regarding the fees that vendors pay to their leader or to low-level city officials, migrants tend to pay more than non migrants probably due to the fact that the latter have lower bargaining power with city officials asking for bribes, or to their higher value of inventory. However, as will be shown later, long-term migrants tend to pay lower fees than short-term ones, indicating the existence of a learning process that leads to a better bargaining strategy or to the adoption of locational strategies that minimize fees. In this case, however, the higher value of inventory of short term migrants may also explain their higher level of fees.

Regarding job opportunities, around 65% of migrants considered themselves as capable of getting a different occupation, while 47% of natives did so --a surprising result given the common assertion in the literature that

migrants' lack of job opportunities is greater than that of natives.<sup>88</sup>

Although migrants tend more than natives to consider themselves as having alternative job opportunities, the former are slightly more reluctant than the latter to leave street vending for taking a job with identical earnings (52% versus 40%, respectively). However if a higher salary were possible, the proportion of non-shifting vendors decreases to near 27% for both migrant and native groups.

On the other hand, if winning a lottery prize of about \$15,000 US, a greater proportion of migrants (77%) than of natives (47%) would leave street trade. The proportions of those who in this event would start a new business are rather similar (72% and 47% respectively), which might denote a stronger entrepreneurial propensity for migrants. Among those vendors who would start a new business, the proportion of those whose new business would remain within the commerce sector is higher for natives (100%) than for migrants (52.9%) which may be due to the latter's greater experience in diverse economic activities, or their desire to move out of Mexico City if they had a significant amount of capital.

In the following paragraphs a general profile of characteristics and behavior will be presented for permanent migrant vendors according to their length of residence in Mexico City. In general, the results will be

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<sup>88</sup> See the literature review, pp.37-39. Besides, see section IV.9, below.

presented only for longer-term migrants, which implicitly establishes the contrasts with shorter-term migrants; however, in some cases the explicit comparison will be exposed. Moreover, the results should be understood as general patterns and not as clear-cut differences.

Long-term migrants (LTM), that is, those traders who migrated to Mexico City earlier, are generally older than their short-term counterparts (STM), and have a higher tenure in street trade. LTM also have more children and belong to households composed of extended families with a higher number of members, and more of such members are independent contributors of income for the household, which takes into account the fact that LTMs' income plays a more complementary role in the household economy. Moreover, as far as LTM are older and come from a more traditional rural environment, it is understandable that more of them identify themselves as Catholics.

Regarding the conditions surrounding their arrival to the city, LTM generally lacked the advantage of having relatives or friends in the city, and they usually migrated accompanied by other people. In contrast, STM showed an opposite tendency in those aspects. The observation that LTM lacked relatives and friends in the city is explained by the fact that, in conditions of permanent migration flows, the probability of having relatives in the city is higher for more recent migrants.

Additionally, 10 out of 13 migrants who had relatives in the city, and 8 out of 13 of those who had friends in the city, actually received support from them after arrival. This high rate of reliance upon kin

support mainly by STM, evidences that LTM faced an even more hostile environment at their arrival time than their late-arrival counterparts. This explains why STM -- probably knowing that they could recur to the help of such kin in the city, or having more information about how to cope with the urban environment-- decided more frequently to migrate alone.

LTM have longer tenure in street trade and entered into this job at a higher age. In their households some other persons work as street traders, and some of their children are independent vendors themselves. They have recommended or helped more people to enter into the business, and they depended mainly on borrowing to start-up their stall. In addition, they did not entered into street trade due to kinship relationships.

LTM declared more frequently than STM to have suffered economic barriers to becoming an owner of a stall in the new markets built by the *Program for Improvement of Mass Retailing*, and some of them did not qualify for bank credit. Besides diverging from STM, long-term migrants perceive ~~that~~ that they have fewer job opportunities outside street vending and, even if a higher-wage job opportunity arises, they hardly would shift to a formal wage work because they highly prize being their own boss. Moreover, in the case of a sudden increase in their monetary wealth LTM wouldn't leave street trade, and those who would do so, would stay within the commerce sector.

In contrast with STM, long-term migrants tend to consider street trading as a very risky and hard job that

does not permit doing other personal activities; however, they frequently reported to desire that their children follow in their front steps. Finally, they tend to be members of the official political party, PRI.<sup>89</sup>

Regarding the characteristics of their stall, LTM own a lower-value inventory than STM, and tend to have only one occupation, to sell only domestic products, and to work fewer days per week. In addition, LTM are more frequently helped by their spouses at the stall than STM.

Among those migrants with higher-than-average length of residence in the city, a higher proportion of them (89%) operate in the illegal-high-demand zone, while the figure for below-average-length migrants is 62%. This difference might indicate that LTM (older, with higher seniority, and with higher permanence in the city) may find working in the illegal-high-demand zone more attractive than STM do. A plausible hypothesis explaining such a preference is that the 'costs of illegality' are lower for LTM than for STM due to the former's more developed social networks and experience.

#### **IV.8 REASONS FOR ENTRY**

Individuals' declared reasons to enter into street trade were clustered into 4 main determinants: economic,

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<sup>89</sup> Partido Revolucionario Institucional, in power since its foundation in 1929.



preference, kin relationships and personal limitations. The frequencies of response of these non-exclusive reasons are then taken as an indicator of their relative importance to the entry decision. Remarkably, 80% of the vendors argued an economic motivation.<sup>90</sup> Around 48% declared preference for its advantages over previous or alternative jobs.<sup>91</sup> Nearly 28% expressed that kin relationships played a role;<sup>92</sup> and 28% indicated personal limitations as a determinant.<sup>93</sup>

In agreement with a great deal of the literature on the informal sector which argues that limitations in demand for labor and the existence of low wages in the formal sector motivate individuals to search for self-employment opportunities,<sup>94</sup> around 80% of the vendors gave an economic reason for becoming a street vendor. Nevertheless, the analysis at the individual level reveals that other factors play a significant role as important restrictions, qualifiers and facilitators for

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<sup>90</sup> The most common economic reasons argued were: *low income in previous job; loss of previous job; and higher expected income in street trade.*

<sup>91</sup> The most common preference-related reasons argued were: *street trade is more pleasant; it is easier; it has no entry restrictions; it permits having one's own business; and it does not require qualifications; while alternative jobs are harder, or they imply having a boss, or they are less pleasant.*

<sup>92</sup> The most common kin-related reasons argued were: *he/she learned trading by working with relatives or friends; or received support and information from relatives.*

<sup>93</sup> The most common personal-limitation reasons argued were: *no other job facilitates taking care of children; lack of education; an accident precluded from taking any other job; and lack of monetary capital to start-up other type of business.*

<sup>94</sup> Cfr. Babb [1987, p.173; PREALC [1988]. See the literature review, p.57.

such decision. On the one hand, 20% of individuals did not mention an economic consideration, and 78% of the ones who mentioned an economic motive also indicated another type of cause. On the other hand, 63% of the subjects argued more than one reason whether economic or not.

These results reveal the existence of two important phenomena that influence the entry decision: first, that economic considerations constitute the main specific reason to become a street vendor; second, other factors also play a non-trivial role as influential forces to move individuals to take a job in street vending. In particular, preference for street vending is the second factor in importance --which includes both discomfort with a previous job and a positive preconception of the features of street trade. Finally, kin relationships and personal limitations are other motivators for the entry decision.

Therefore, the obtained results tend to support the view expressed by several studies in the literature<sup>95</sup> that multiple motivations move individuals to enter the street trade. Therefore, my results are consistent with Armstrong and McGee's assertion that "the motivations for hawking (are) often a mixture of social, personal and economic motivations" [Armstrong and McGee 1985, p.192].

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<sup>95</sup> See the literature review, pp.53-57.

#### IV.9 JOB ALTERNATIVES

Against the common belief in some literature that street vendors lack job alternatives,<sup>96</sup> almost 59% of the traders in the sample considered that they could find another occupation if they had to leave street vending. Interestingly, those people who perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation tend to be younger, more educated, with fewer children, with lower tenure in the job, migrants, non-descendants of street-vending parents, have high earnings and high value of stock, pay higher fees, and do not value freedom as very important.

The fact that vendors' perceptions of alternative job opportunities are related to their age and educational level makes sense, since these variables are important factors considered by employers in the labor market. The fact that coming from a street-vending parent is negatively related to their perceived job alternatives may be attributed to the fact that descendants of street vendors may have developed trade-specific human and social capital [Becker 1975, Portes and Zhou 1992], which is hardly valuable in other occupations. A similar situation may be experienced by high-tenure traders who might find that having worked as street vendors is not only non-valued by employers, but it may be considered by the latter as a clear disadvantage [PREALC 1988 p.56].

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<sup>96</sup> See the literature review, pp.69-72.

In order to get a better understanding of the vendors' perceptions of their job opportunities a logistic regression analysis was run.<sup>97</sup> The independent variables were a factor score of age and education,<sup>98</sup> and a dummy variable indicating migration status (1 for natives and zero for migrants).

Indeed, as this statistical analysis shows, younger and more educated vendors consider themselves to have job alternatives, while older, less educated traders do not believe they have other job opportunities.

Additionally, migrants tend to have a better self-perception in terms of opportunities in the labor market after controlling for the composite variable age-and-education. At first glance, this result seems to lead to a very different conclusion than that expressed in the literature --that migrants especially adopt street trading due to lack of other job opportunities. Notwithstanding, what this result really indicates is that migrants tend to *perceive* themselves as having job opportunities, not that they *objectively* have such alternatives. This difference in perceptions might be in turn explained by two non-exclusive phenomena: 1) migrants may be more experienced than natives in job-searching and job-trying, hence getting a better sense of

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<sup>97</sup> The dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor considers that he/she has other job opportunities; and 0, otherwise. See Table III.21 in the Appendix.

<sup>98</sup> Principal components factor analysis was used to generate a new variable (called factor score) that is a linear combination of variables age and education. See Table III.22 in the Appendix.

their job opportunities; and, 2) migrants' past job experience might have prepared them to try even the most difficult jobs, and thus to consider a wider set of job options than native vendors.

Remarkably, not all of the vendors would like to leave their trading job to take a formal wage occupation even if net income were identical and if he/she were to enjoy benefits associated to formal employment (Social Security, etc.). In fact, almost 48% of traders would not leave vending under such conditions.

In trying to explain such decision a logistic regression analysis<sup>99</sup> showed that those merchants who would not leave street trade to take a formal job tend to dislike having a boss, and do not consider their current job as very hard. These results demonstrate the importance of job autonomy and flexibility and hardship of work to explain their desire to remain in or to leave street vending.

Interestingly, when the possibility of asking for a 'bid wage' was presented to vendors, the percentage of those who declared their preference of not leaving street trade decreased to 27%, which points out that their job-choice decisions are (potentially) sensitive to wage levels.

Remarkably, a majority (63.4%) of the vendors who declared willingness to shift to a formal wage occupation solicited a higher wage than their current net income;

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<sup>99</sup> See Table III.23 in the Appendix.

whereas 23.3% asked for a net wage identical to current earnings, and only 13.3% required a lower net income. For all the willing-to-shift vendors the average increase over current earnings was 26.6%. This means that, on average, street traders assign a positive monetary value to the non-economic net advantages of street vending over a formal wage job.

From a neoclassical economics standpoint, these figures may indicate that those vendors who solicited an increase in net income confer a higher subjective value to the net non-income-related advantages of street trading over formal wage occupations.<sup>100</sup>

In order to identify the profile of those traders who would leave street vending to take a formal job at their solicited net wage, a logistic regression analysis was run<sup>101</sup> using the next independent variables:

- 1) A composite variable of age, years of education, number of children, seniority in street trade, and self-perception as capable to get another job.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> From the standpoint of the worker, the main advantages of street trading are: autonomy, independence, flexibility, the fact that income depends on effort, following family tradition, and other factors increasing the attractiveness of the job; while its main disadvantages are its risk and hardship. Regarding formal wage occupations, its main advantages are income stability, job security, and more physical comfort; its main disadvantages are lack of autonomy, independence and freedom, but also the lack of possibilities for economic upgrade.

<sup>101</sup> See Tables III.24 and III.25 in the Appendix.

<sup>102</sup> This variable is a factor score obtained through the application of FACTOR ANALYSIS (FSX1051) to the following variables: age, years of education, number of children,

2) A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor declared that economic reasons influenced his/her entry into street trade, and 0 if economic factors were not mentioned.

3) A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor declared that he/she would leave street vending if winning a lottery prize roughly equivalent to 15,500 US Dlls., and 0 if he declared that would remain as street vendor if such event were to occur.

The logistic regression analysis exhibits a fairly high goodness of fit (0.84) and the whole model is statistically significant (0.0005). Besides, it predicts correctly 77.5% of total cases (40).<sup>103</sup>

The above results indicate that the likelihood of being a willing-to-shift vendor tends to be higher for traders who are younger, more educated, with less

seniority in street trade, and self-perception as capable to get another job. The factor loadings for the variables are the following: age in years (0.93), years of education (-0.72), number of children (0.84), seniority in street trade (0.81), and self-perception as capable to get another job (-0.77). Only this one factor was significant, its eigenvalue was 3.35, and the cumulative percentage of total variance explained was 67%. Regarding the factor score interpretation, the higher its value denotes a vendor who tends to be older, less educated, with more children, with higher seniority, and with less perceived job opportunities in other labor markets.

<sup>103</sup> The significance levels for the independent variables (coefficient signs in parentheses) are the following: factor score: 0.075 (-); dummy for economic reasons: 0.05 (+); dummy for shift-if-winning-a-lottery: 0.01 (+); and 0.99 (-) for the constant term.

children, with lower seniority, and who consider themselves as capable of getting a different occupation. Such probability also increases if the vendor entered into the business for economic reasons, and if he/she would leave street trade in the face of a sudden increase of wealth (like winning a lottery). Therefore, speculating a bit, the willing-to-shift trader might be profiled as *more capable, more concerned with the level of economic rewards, and more desirous of leaving street trade*. In contrast, the disagree-to-shift merchant tends to possess the opposite characteristics.

According to neoclassical economic theory, the desired level of income that would induce street sellers to shift to a formal salary occupation should be high enough to compensate him/her for his/her opportunity costs. In this case, I tested the hypothesis that monetary and social/personal opportunity costs are reflected in such required net wage, those vendors who declared intentions to shift to a formal job at a bidding wage were asked to define its monetary value. Afterwards, a multiple regression analysis was run<sup>104</sup> to explain the bidding net wage, using two independent variables:

- 1) The current level of declared net monthly earnings as street vendors.
- 2) A proxy of the intensity of the vendor's preference for job flexibility and autonomy. This variable was computed as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor declared that 'he or she would dislike having a boss' or if he or she declared 'to like street trade due

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<sup>104</sup> See Table III.26 in the Appendix.



to the flexibility, autonomy or freedom it provides'; and 0 otherwise.

The results of the multiple regression analysis show an  $R^2$  of 0.699. Additionally, the signs of the estimates are both positive, as expected, and statistically significant (t-Student statistics of 7.1 and 3.3, respectively). These results point out that the job-shift decisions of street vendors are strongly affected by monetary and social/personal opportunity costs.

The relevance of monetary opportunity costs in the job choice is also evidenced by the fact that respondents tend to maximize their net income by choosing street vending. This assertion is obviously true for those who cannot find a different job (41% of the sample). On the other hand, a majority of those who considered themselves as having job alternatives (59% of the sample) are also likely maximizing their net income, since almost 80% of them believe that they couldn't earn in other job more than in street selling.

Another way to analyze the capacity and desire of vendors to leave their activity was achieved by asking them if they would leave street vending if they won a lottery prize of 50,000 new pesos (around 15,150 Dlls.). The results indicate that 34% of the vendors would not leave their trading businesses while the rest would do so.

A logistic regression analysis<sup>105</sup> indicated that vendors who would leave street vending if they won a lottery prize tend to be female, migrants (permanent or temporary), 'ambitious' --that is, those who would also leave street vending for a higher salary-- and those experiencing problems with authorities.

It is plausible that females and those reporting problems with authorities see in this hypothetical increase of wealth the opportunity to escape from street trade, whereas those who are migrants, and those who are prone to shift to a wage job for a higher salary, probably have entrepreneurial aspirations.

A slightly different question was asked to identify the potential entrepreneurial propensity of street vendors, that is, if they would start another business if they won the aforementioned lottery prize. Interestingly, 89% of the traders who responded that they would leave their current occupation would also start a new business different from street trade, while 92% of those who would remain in street selling wouldn't start a different business. These two clusters of vendors can be labeled as the "entrepreneurial" and the "conservative" groups, respectively.

In order to identify the features of these two groups, a logistic regression analysis was run<sup>106</sup> using the following independent variables:

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<sup>105</sup> See Table III.27 in the Appendix.

<sup>106</sup> See Tables III.28 and III.29 in the Appendix.

1) A factor score of three variables (age, self-perception as capable of getting a different job, and desire of taking a formal job with a higher wage than current earnings).<sup>107</sup>

2) A dummy variable that measures the degree of declared pride in being a street trader (1=more proud, 0=less proud).

3) A dummy variable that measures the degree of perceived risk of street vending (1=more risky, 0=less risky).

The results indicate that the three variables considered (plus a constant) correctly predict 87.5% of total cases, with a goodness of fit of 0.447 and a statistical significance of 0.0011. The analysis of the signs of estimates show the following:

1) Younger and 'more ambitious' vendors, who also have a higher self-perception in terms of opportunities in labor markets are more prone to start-up a different business in the case of a sudden increase in their wealth. In contrast, older and 'less ambitious' vendors, who also have a lower self-perception in terms of opportunities in labor markets, are less prone to start-up a different business. This result shows that street sellers' entrepreneurial propensity may be related to both life-cycle phenomena and to both general and specific human capital endowments.

2) Those people who declared themselves 'less proud' of being a street vendor, and those who perceived this

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<sup>107</sup> The factor analysis resulted in only one factor with an eigenvalue of 1.89 with factor loadings of -0.89, 0.89, and 0.55, respectively, which indicates that the factor is highly representative of the component variables.

activity as 'more risky' tend also to be more prone to start-up a different business. The former result may indicate that subjective emotive factors may influence entrepreneurial decisions, whereas the latter may suggest that (risk-averse) vendors might see in a sudden increase of wealth the opportunity to shift to a less risky business.

As far as almost all of the vendors (96%) who were inclined to start a new business also said they would be disposed to pay taxes on such a new enterprise, formalization can be considered as a potential avenue for future business of street sellers, provided that capital constraints are reduced or eliminated. Additionally, 68% of the vendors who would start a new business would prefer to remain in commercial activities. Presumably, the latter vendors would take advantage of their skills and relationships already acquired in the trade activity.

#### **IV.10 THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF STREET VENDORS**

Street trade is a job which requires certain individual skills, abilities and experience to become a successful business. The job requires not only a great deal of personal effort, but also presupposes the existence of social networks and personal skills to get the right information at the right time. Besides, it demands that the individual use the information acquired to make crucial decisions concerning product line and location.

Street traders generate a gross sales income that is used for daily consumption and for replacing a desired level of inventory. Since sales are variable --showing generally a peak on weekends or on certain specific moments along the year-- vendors have to manage cash flows and transitory credit to finance their daily consumption expenditures. Once the vendor learns the product sales pattern and its variability, and given that only two main categories of expenditures are relevant (consumption and inventory replacement), it is better for him/her using heuristic methods to manage transitory savings and credit than adopting even a simple accounting system, as reported by INEGI's study on the informal economy in Mexico [INEGI 1990].

However, it is possible that some vendors use a very simple accounting system. Although no specific question was asked to vendors regarding the type of accounting used (if any), it is likely that more educated vendors - -who tend to sell more durable goods with a higher value of inventory-- use some type of crude accounting methods.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> In support to this possibility, the observed Pearson correlation coefficient among such variables is significant and had the expected signs. Particularly, the correlation of years of education with value of inventory is 0.44 with a significance level of 0.002; the correlation of years of education with durability of goods (a dummy variable with a value of 1 for more durable goods and 0 for less durable goods) is 0.35 with a significance level of 0.012; besides, the correlation between value of inventory with durability of goods is 0.31 with a significance level of 0.026).

The findings of this study permit identifying a general profile of vendors with varying degrees of economic success, as measured by the monthly level of net earnings. In the following paragraphs such profiles will be presented.

Males also tend to earn more than females, but no significant difference exists between earnings for migrants and natives; however, temporary migrants tend to earn less than permanent migrants and natives. Besides, there is a positive and very strong correlation between earnings and education,<sup>109</sup> which seems to indicate that human capital endowments are an important factor influencing the economic performance of street vendors.

In addition, traders with a higher value of inventory earn a higher absolute level of earnings<sup>110</sup> which is an expected result according to common business experience.

Although street trade is learned from relatives and friends, or it is 'learned by doing and observing', it is possible that formal education enhances other skills and permits vendors to improve their business practices and decision making. A similar role may be played by previous experience in formal jobs, which might provide vendors with a wider perspective of business operations.

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<sup>109</sup> Their Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.45 with a significant level of 0.001.

<sup>110</sup> Their Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.55 with a significant level of 0.000.

Regarding experience in street trade, it also may be considered as an asset that may improve trading operations; but the crucial question is *how important is the marginal contribution of experience to economic performance*, for if the experience effect yields 'diminishing marginal returns' after a short period of time, then permanence in street vending will hardly contribute to improve vendors' economic performance.

In fact, data from the sample indicate that younger vendors with lower seniority in the business and less time of operation at their current location have higher earnings, while older, traditional traders with higher seniority, and those who are descendants of street-vending parents have lower earnings.<sup>111</sup> These results probably indicate that the benefits derived from experience in street trade are weak or easily reached in a relatively short period of time; and also that older, traditional vendors probably face personal and economic limitations that impel them to be more subsistence-oriented rather than profit-oriented.

Insofar older vendors tend to live in households with a higher number of members generating income independently,<sup>112</sup> it is possible that the older vendor's

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<sup>111</sup> It is noticeable that current net earnings are negatively correlated with both seniority in the job (Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.35 with a significance level of 0.13) and with family tradition -- that is if the vendor's parents also worked as street traders-- (Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.30 with a significance level of 0.029).

<sup>112</sup> The Pearson correlation coefficients between age and the number of members of the household generating income

earnings play a more complementary role in his/her household budget. For this reason older vendors might suffer relatively fewer economic pressures, and thus consider acceptable a low-earnings occupation such as street trade.

As stated above, human capital as evidenced in formal education and formal-job experience may be a determinant of traders' economic performance. Data from the sample indicate that vendors with higher earnings are better endowed in terms of general human capital (education and formal-job experience) but they have less experience in street trade than low-income traders.

Insofar high-performance sellers tend to be young and educated, they tend to perceive themselves as having job opportunities in the labor market, and some of them have in fact another paid occupation. Furthermore, some of them declared themselves to be able to earn more income in other jobs than in street trade, but they lacked the required capital to start a new business.

The level of monetary capital invested may contribute to increase the absolute level of earnings, and it probably may increase the impact of human capital. In this case, it is likely that a highly educated vendor, who *additionally* possesses an important level of monetary

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independently is 0.24, with a significance level of 0.063.



capital has a better economic outcome than an identical vendor lacking one or both of these features.<sup>113</sup>

Although high value of inventory is positively related to the absolute level of net income, the earnings to capital ratio decreases as the value of capital increases, implying that vendors with low absolute earnings exhibit a high inventory turnover and a significant profit per unit of capital invested. This relative advantage of low earning vendors is explained by their greater flexibility to shift to other product lines, according to seasonal changes in demand. Therefore, the greater flexibility and capital turnover of low-earning vendors permits them to compensate their capital constraint disadvantage. As stated above, this compensation mechanism is especially clear in the case of female sellers.

Vendors who operate within the illegal-high demand zone obtain superior profits --although they run higher risks-- than traders operating in the legal zone. Besides, those who enjoy greater earnings also pay higher fees, whether in the form of payments to their leaders or as bribes to city officials. This phenomenon may be

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<sup>113</sup> A non-reported multiple regression analysis explaining earnings was run, using education and value of stock as independent variables. The results indicate that the model has a fair goodness of fit ( $R^2=0.35$ ; sample size=41); the signs of the estimates are positive (as expected) and the t statistics are reasonably high: 1.83 and 2.96. This analysis tend to support the hypothesis that *both* physical and human capital positively influence earnings. In fact, this hypothesis is also tested -- although in a more indirect way-- in the regression explaining vendors' earnings presented below (see Table III.30 in the Appendix).

explained by the fact that vendors with greater earnings tend to have a higher value of inventory, and hence face a higher risk since their loss is greater if their stock is confiscated. Additionally, vendors with higher earnings pay higher fees because they tend to have lower tenure and limited family-tradition in the job, which in turn evidences their lack of strong social relationships that could help them to reduce such costs.

Vendors who declared themselves not to have a particular commitment with their suppliers tend to earn more than those who did so. This phenomenon may be an indication that the existence of dependence relationships with suppliers limits the profitability of vendors. Nevertheless, there is another reasonable explanation: that such an informal contract is a risk-avoidance response by low-profit vendors trying to avoid further reductions in their already low level of earnings. It is remarkable, however, that only 5 out of 41 vendors declared being committed with their suppliers which denotes that only a minority of the individuals in the sample can be categorized as what Bromley [1979] and Scott [1979] denote as 'disguised or dependent workers,' or 'non-authentic self employed.'

The type of product sold has been reported in the literature as closely related to the value of inventory.<sup>114</sup> In fact, selling more durable goods generally requires a higher investment in inventories and barely permits shifts to other product lines. In the sample, it was found that higher profits are positively

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<sup>114</sup> See the literature review pp.74-75.

related to the trading of more durable goods, to higher investment in inventory, and with no shifts in product line.<sup>115</sup>

On the other hand, businesses which generate superior net incomes also use a greater number of workers, generally relatives. In the majority of the cases such workers are non-paid relatives although in some few cases they are paid workers. It is possible that the use of workers provide more flexibility to the owner to perform another job whereas their stall remains open generating income. Additionally vendors who have another job tend to be younger, and also tend to have greater earnings, which indicates that younger vendors have a double advantage over older traders: on the one hand they have greater earnings from street vending, on the other hand it is easier for them to find another job hence additionally increasing their total net income.

High-earnings vendors are not generally descendants of street vendors and they more often entered the business via help from other people. They more likely started working in street selling as employees in an already established.

High-earning vendors do not value freedom and flexibility as high as low-income traders. They feel

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<sup>115</sup> The Pearson correlation coefficients of monthly earnings with these variables are: with a dummy with a value of 1 for durable goods (0.24; significance level of 0.068); with the value of stock (0.55; significance level of 0.000); with a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the trader shift to other products (-0.33; significance level of 0.017).

proud of being street vendors but do not want their children to adopt such job. Some of them had the opportunity and the economic resources to buy a stall in public market buildings but they did not want to make such an acquisition. In fact, they have a strong preference for selling on the street.

As stated above, the distribution of street traders in Mexico is biased towards the lowest levels of income.<sup>116</sup> According to information from INEGI [1989] less than 50% of street traders in Mexico City earn an income lower than the minimum wage, and almost 40% of them earn between 1 and 2 times such amount. In contrast, data from the studied sample evidence that the selected vendors constitute a relatively well-rewarded group, since only 12% of them earn less than the minimum wage, while 42% of them have earnings greater than 3 times the minimum wage. On average, gross profits of respondents were 2.9 times the minimum wage.

However, it must be remembered that the regulation of nominal minimum wage by the Mexican Government and the high inflation registered during the 80's, caused a significant drop in the real minimum wage, at the time when a significant proportion of workers earned actually a higher income than the minimum wage. According to the 1990 Population Census [INEGI 1992], only 21% of the total active population in Mexico City earned nominally less or equal than the minimum wage, whereas 79% earned a greater amount. More recent data from the National Survey of Micro-business [INEGI 1994] indicate that in 1992 27%

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<sup>116</sup> See Table III.9 in the Appendix.

of those self-employed (*trabajadores por su cuenta*) and 24% of wage workers (*asalariados*) in informal micro-enterprises earned less or equal than the minimum wage.<sup>117</sup> Given such figures, the minimum wage can hardly be considered as an indicator of the average income of unskilled labor in Mexico.

In an attempt to explain monthly earnings a multiple regression analysis was run<sup>118</sup> using four independent variables:

- 1) A dummy variable of the individuals' opportunities in the labor market which is measured as a dummy with value of 1 if the individual considers him or herself as capable of getting another job, and 0 if not.
- 2) A dummy variable of gender which adopted a value of 1 for males and 0 for females.
- 3) A dummy variable of location with a value of 1 if the vendor operates at the illegal-high demand zone, and 0 if he/she operates at the legal-low demand zone.
- 4) A variable of capital invested, that is, the value of the total inventory own by the trader.

The regression is statistically significant with an  $R^2$  of 0.496 (significant at 0.0000), and the t statistic values for the four independent variables were 2.72, 1.88, 2.64 and 2.36, respectively. These results tend to support the following hypotheses:

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<sup>117</sup> In the case of business owners (*patrones*) those earning one minimum wage or less represented only 4% of such group.

<sup>118</sup> See Table III.30 in the Appendix.

A) Individuals who have job alternatives --an indicator of either or both better human capital endowments and lower age-- tend to earn more.

B) Males tend to earn more than females. Besides the already reported personal and economic advantages of males over females which facilitates males' adoption of high-profits businesses, the latter also tend to have more important economic responsibilities at their household and, therefore, are pressured to generate a higher level of income. In contrast, it is possible that females adopt a more conservative business approach as far as their income is complementary within the household budget.<sup>119</sup>

C) Operating in the illegal-high demand zone increases profits, although it implies a higher risk and additional inconveniences.

D) The higher the capital invested in merchandise, the higher the earnings. However, low capital vendors tend to earn more per monetary unit invested which implies a higher earnings to capital ratio.

#### **IV.11 VENDORS' PERCEPTIONS AND ASPIRATIONS**

Data from the sample permit identification of how street vendors perceive their own job and the role of the government; their reasons for leaving street trade if a

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<sup>119</sup> This argument may be supported by the observation that a greater number of total members per income generating member exist at males' households (3.29) than at females' households (2.24).

same-income wage job were to be available; and their desires with regard the occupation of their children.

Concerning the vendors' perception of their work, 83% of the subjects felt 'proud' of their job, whereas the remainder expressed feeling 'somewhat proud' or 'definitely not proud.' This result is consistent with findings reported in the literature that indicate that street marketers tend to develop a sense of pride in their job [Armstrong and McGee 1985; PREALC 1988].

Street sellers tend to perceive their job as a risky activity, since 73% of them declared it to be a 'risky occupation,' whereas the remainder considered 'somewhat risky' or 'definitely not risky.' The non-negligible proportion of vendors not considering their job as 'risky' might evidence the fact already discussed that experience and social networks tend to reduce both uncertainty and the 'costs of illegality,' hence plausibly reducing the perceived risk of the enterprise.

The flexibility of the job is shown by the fact that 80% of the interviewees responded that this job 'permitted them to carry out other personal or family activities.'

The vendors' desire for their children to enjoy social and economic mobility accounts for their high rate of response that 'they don't want their offspring to work in street vending' (62%). The significant remainder (38%), however, is explained by the strength of family networks and tradition.

The fact that 80% of the individuals declared feeling 'glad' with their current earnings should not be misunderstood. Such an answer is likely an indicator of their income-maximization job-selection strategy, and not a negation of their economic difficulties.

The reasons for leaving or remaining in street vending in the face of a same-income wage job opportunity permits the identification the advantages and disadvantages of the occupation. On the one hand, 8 and 5 out of 20 willing-to-shift individuals declared that their main reasons for such responses were 'the hardships of the job' and 'the insecurity of the job,' respectively. On the other hand, 14 out of 17 unwilling-to-shift respondents expressed that the main reason to remain in the job was 'autonomy.'

Finally, the high rate of adverse opinions regarding the adequacy and fairness of government regulation of street trade (90% and 88%, respectively) are an indicator of the strong negative feelings that the Program for Improvement of Popular Retailing has raised among street traders.

Interestingly, 59% of respondents declared that the government should let them operate freely, while 37% expressed that it should provide adequate support. These latter demands may be related to the fact that street sellers consider that their activity is a fair job which provides a valuable social service: 66% of the sellers considered that their activity was not negative from a societal perspective ('for the country'), while 10%



accepted that damages are caused but that such occupation 'is necessary.'

#### IV.12 INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF STREET TRADING

As stated above, some street vendors pay fees for operating to their leaders or directly to city officials (as bribes). Those vendors paying higher fees tend to be young, migrants, not descendants of street vendors, low-tenured, have other job opportunities, have higher earnings, have another stall, are independent (do not have a leader), have other occupation, and sell durable goods.

A regression analysis run for all the vendors in the sample indicated that together these variables explained around 38% of the variance in fees.<sup>120</sup> Particularly, enjoying the protection of a leader reduces the expected fee; whereas older, high tenured, and low income traders tend to pay lower charges; finally, natives descendants of street vendors also pay less.

These results may indicate that a social and economic rationality exists in the determination of the cost of such informal rights. On the one hand, experience and social networks reduce such costs; particularly, the role of the leader as a cost-reducing factor constitutes an important economic rationale for the existence of such

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<sup>120</sup> See Table III.31, III.32, and III.33 in the Appendix.

institutional agent. On the other hand, it is economically rational that sellers with higher (lower) earnings are willing to pay a higher (lower) level of fees or bribes.<sup>121</sup>

Operating in the illegal zone permits sellers to earn a higher net income but also implies both a greater risk of their merchandise being confiscated by city officials and a higher expected fee (bribe) payment. Thus, it is plausible that location choice depends on the expected profits and operation costs, including the expected loss if their goods are confiscated.

Therefore, it is hypothesized that those vendors selling in the illegal high-demand zone should exhibit a higher level of earnings (net of permission fees and bribes), and should be better endowed with greater experience and social networks that reduce their operating risks. Likewise, those sellers operating in the legal-low demand zone should exhibit a lower level of net earnings, and their experience and social networks should be less significant.

In order to test this hypothesis, a logistic regression analysis was run, which confirms that those traders with higher earnings (net of fees or bribes), and those sellers with higher tenure (a proxy variable for

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<sup>121</sup> Regarding this point, it is plausible that city officials implement a 'price-discrimination' policy, by charging higher bribes to young/high-earnings/low-experienced vendors, and vice versa.

experience and social networks), tend to be located at the illegal zone, and vice versa.<sup>122</sup>

Additionally, the last two hypotheses were tested only for permanent migrants. Particularly, a multiple regression analysis<sup>123</sup> was run to see if, among permanent migrants, those with longer stay and those protected by a leader pay lower fees. The results corroborate that higher fees for vending are paid by those migrants who do not enjoy the protection of a leader, and by those with a shorter duration in the city.

This result may explain why long-term migrants tend to operate in the illegal-high-demand zone, since their bargaining experience and established relationships may permit them to reduce the inherent risks and costs of illegality, at the same time as they enjoy the higher demand of this zone. Moreover, this hypothesis was also supported by a logistic regression analysis that indicates that migrant vendors selling in the illegal-high demand zone tend to be long-term migrants and high net income earners.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> See Table III.34

<sup>123</sup> See Table III.35 in the Appendix.

<sup>124</sup> See Table III.36 in the Appendix.

#### IV.13 A FINAL COMMENT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF STREET VENDING

The politics of street vending is an important issue since street vending requires the use of a public good - the city streets and sidewalks-- for private gain, which in turn generates a potential conflict among diverse groups of interest. The specific way in which this political conflict evolves and eventually reaches an equilibrium depends on the ways street vendors and their leaders relate to political parties and City authorities; on the power and pressure from other groups of interest (especially formal retailers associations and city residents); and on general government policy.

The street vending business involves a permanent risk since vendors' permanence on the streets is more or less uncertain; that is, the political equilibrium is essentially unstable for a number of reasons: changes in pressures from other groups of interest; changes in the city government policy, replacement of City officials; threats from other groups of vendors; threats from internal division, etc.

In Mexico, these factors have prompted street vendors to develop associations in order to get a territory and defend their rights to sell against threats and aggressions from other actors. This has been achieved through the emergence of a leader<sup>125</sup> within every

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<sup>125</sup> A very interesting fact --which might be subject to further research-- is that a majority of leaders are females, although males predominate in street trade.

association. The leader performs several important tasks: 1) to keep the cohesion and discipline of the group regarding both business and political decisions; 2) to negotiate with the city authorities the permission for operating in a certain zone; 3) to solve internal conflicts regarding the limits and location of individual stalls; 4) to decide the admission and expulsion of members; and 5) to constitute the group as a recognized association, frequently through the establishment of links with a political party. In exchange for his/her services, the leader charges a fee to their affiliates, and then pays a part of such income as bribes to city authorities.

Interestingly, the leaders govern through both coercion and consensus. On the one hand, the leader enjoys an almost absolute power and authority over their affiliates: their orders and decisions are rarely discussed. On the other hand, since vendors are free to choose any association, the leader is 'obligated' to actually take care of the welfare of their associates in order to maintain a certain degree of consensus. This is achieved as far as the leaders assure their affiliates a minimally secure, fair and profitable environment.

In a recent study on the political aspects of informal commerce in Mexico City, Cross [1994] provides explanations for the two aforementioned phenomena. First, according to him, the political-administrative apparatus --by forcing street vendors to form or join civil associations as a requisite to sell in the street-- has "granted enormous power to street vendor leaders who in many cases have become urban *caciques*, local political

bosses able to compel their members into activism on behalf of the association, thus overcoming the 'free-rider' problem of social movements" [pp.2-3, italics added].

Second, Cross [1994] considers that "leaders are motivated to expand their areas and constrained to guarantee the rights of their members because the fragmentation of vendors into multiple competing associations provides vendors with the option of simply leaving any association that fails to do so" [p.3].

Therefore, the organizational structure of an association of street vendors generally has two characteristics: it is autocratic since it is commanded by a powerful leader, but it is also like a network with quick communication and mutual support to face environmental threats. As an analogy, it can be said that every association of street sellers constitute a kind of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan commanded by an almost absolute dictator whose mission is to seek the general welfare and avoid the dangers of the 'state of nature'.<sup>126</sup>

In Mexico City, the bargaining power of a group of vendors depends not principally on how many members form it, but mainly on its political weight. The latter may be the result of the group's autonomous power or it may be generated through the links it establishes with the

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<sup>126</sup> According to Cross [1994 p.20], such "authoritarianism within the vendor organizations benefits the organizations as a whole, however, since it allows the leader to manipulate the full financial and political resources of the membership in the search for political linkages."

dominant political party (PRI)<sup>127</sup> and with the city authorities. Therefore, the establishment of street vendors in a territory presupposes the achievement of one or two types of political equilibrium: 1) the group consolidates its own power and imposes its strength by conquering a territory (with or without the support from a political party); or 2) the group makes a political transaction with the PRI and the City authorities to use a territory. In fact, these two types of equilibrium are not perfectly exclusive and the observed one might be a combination of both, or one of them may lead to the other.

Regarding the relationship between the associations of vendors and political parties, it should be noted that the most frequent and effective links has been established with the dominant party (PRI) [Cfr. Cross 1994, p.8], since city authorities generally belong to such party. However, other parties such as the left-oriented PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) also have close relationships with some groups of vendors and their leaders in Mexico City.

Therefore, political rivalry among parties generates a potential demand for political support from social groups as street vendors, hence involving a political

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<sup>127</sup> Interestingly, 39% of the total sample were members of the official party (PRI). It is important to mention that those who are members of the PRI tend to be older, less educated, and have belonged to more associations of vendors. This results might indicate that the penetration of the official party in street trade has decreased as younger and more educated newcomers are not being coopted by this party.

exchange in which the groups of vendors receive support to work in certain areas of the city in return for political support of a political party (mainly the PRI), and of bribes for city officials [Cfr. Cross 1994 p.9].



## V. CONCLUSIONS

The present study, recognizing the diversity in both empirical findings and interpretations in the world literature on street vending, intends to provide evidence for the Mexican case that permits the comparison of our experience with those reported by other researchers. The analysis of my sample permitted me to link the participants' characteristics to their behaviors and strategies, which constitutes an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of how informal enterprises operate.

In the following paragraphs the main findings of the present research will be discussed and some conclusions and policy implications will be presented. Although the main interest is focused on the results from this case study, the discussion will also mention other results and findings in Mexico and other countries.

1) Although sample analyzed in this study is not necessarily representative of the street vending population of Mexico City, the comparison of this sample with others indicate that no crucial differences exist in some regards. In the cases where such divergences emerge they are explained by the special characteristics of the selected sample.

2) On a world-wide basis, street vending has been characterized as a small-scale economic activity with highly heterogeneous participants. In fact, the

literature review evidenced that a high degree of diversity exists not only within the activity itself, but also in the analytical approaches and conclusions presented by the many investigators that have studied this topic. My results confirm the existence of high heterogeneity among street traders since I found both males and females; old and young people; clearly disadvantaged individuals and others who possess job alternatives; richer and poorer sellers; lesser and more educated persons; profit-oriented and survival-oriented traders, etc.

Although the international experience indicates that street vending is not only performed by old, poorly educated, migrants, and other disadvantaged people, it is not debatable that these kinds of people are important participant, in this activity. In fact in many countries, and particularly in Mexico, a non negligible proportion of street vendors is formed by older, lesser educated, and lower skilled individuals who see in street trade the only possible alternative to make a living. The very fact that such people must recur to this hard and risky occupation demonstrates the limitations of social security services in the country. Therefore, working in street vending may be seen as a survival strategy followed by disadvantaged people facing both a state which does not offer them economic and social support, and a formal labor market supplying scarce job opportunities mainly to the most skilled and capable individuals. However, within street selling, we also find younger, more educated vendors with job alternatives who presumably take this job either as a transitional

occupation or as an entrepreneurial avenue for economic mobility.

3) The analysis of gender-related differences among street traders sheds light on many important social, economic and behavioral issues. The general conclusion is that female street traders constitute a 'group of disadvantaged within the disadvantaged.' Several facts support this assertion. First, women tend to be older, less educated, and possess less experience in formal occupations than males, which implies that the former generally have fewer job opportunities outside street vending than the latter. Second, females' traditional household obligations limit their job search and also preclude them from taking a second paid occupation. Third, while males are generally married and heads of family, females tend to be non-married and do not enjoy the direct economic support of a spouse.

More specifically, the analysis of the sample permits me to obtain the following conclusions regarding females' characteristics, behavior and performance: Females' personal and demographic characteristics objectively limit their job opportunities outside street commerce, whereas economic necessity moves them to seek income generating activities. Their subordinated role within the household, which assigns them relatively intransferable responsibilities in homework and care of children, impels them to search for autonomous and flexible jobs mainly through self-employment. Particularly, personal limitations, scarcity of personal economic resources, and the availability or creation of social networks linked to

street trading determines females' entry into this activity.

The common lack of a former employment limits females' savings and starting capital, which in turn determines that the scale of operations of their enterprises be quite small. In turn, capital constraints set limits on the type of goods they can trade, which tend to be cheap and less durable products. Furthermore, the type of good traded and the scale of operation limit their unitary profit margins and their absolute level of earnings, which in turn perpetuates the small scale of the business.

Although the selection of the type of product is mainly the result of capital constraints, female sellers take advantage of their low value of inventory to quickly shift to other product lines, according to seasonal or unexpected changes in consumer demand. In fact, the permanent search for high-demand products and the ease in shifting between different product lines generates a quick inventory turnover. Consequently, although profit margins per unit of product and absolute level of earning tend to be low, high inventory turnover increases the earnings-to-stock ratio. It is plausible that, in the eyes of vendors --whose value of inventory and time of work are actually fixed costs-- this indicator may be a more adequate measure of their enterprises' profitability, for it indicates the capacity of the business to generate net income per monetary unit invested and per unit of time worked.

The low absolute level of net income earned by female vendors is acceptable to them since their actual maximum alternative income (i.e. their opportunity cost) is near zero, given the scarcity of feasible job alternatives. Additionally, such low level of earnings may be actually quite acceptable from the standpoint of the family, as far as female vendors' income plays a complementary role in the household economy.

Finally, the fact that female traders optimize the use of their scarce resources does not imply that they feel satisfied with their job and economic situation. In fact, it is more likely that their disadvantaged position in street trade makes them feel unsatisfied and desirous of a shift to another occupation if such opportunity exists.

4) Both permanent and transitory migrants were formal selling in the streets, indicating that this job may be suitable either for migrants already established in the city, or for permanent residents of the countryside who take it as a temporary job when their regular agricultural tasks are less intense. As in the case of females, migrants --and particularly long-term migrants-- constitute a disadvantaged group within street traders. In contrast with natives, migrants usually lack family tradition in the activity, and receive scarce support from kin to enter the business, which obligates them to depend strongly on self-financing in their start-up. Besides, migrants also pay higher fees than natives for selling, probably due to their lower bargaining power, but also because of their relatively high value of stock.

Notwithstanding their objective limitations, it is plausible that migrants have a stronger potential entrepreneurial propensity than natives given the following facts: first, although being a migrant reduces the vendor's expected educational level and hence limits actual opportunities of access to a better occupation, migrants tend to perceive themselves as capable of working in a different occupation.<sup>128</sup> Second, a significantly high proportion of migrants declared that they would leave street vending and start a new business in the hypothetical event of enjoying a sudden increase in their monetary wealth.

The analysis of differences among permanent migrants according to their length of residence in the city permitted the construction of a profile for both long-term and short-term migrants (LTM and STM, respectively). The general conclusion is that LTM suffer greater personal and economic limitations than STM, although it is possible that such disadvantages have to do not only with their greater length of residence but also with their greater age.

Those migrants who traveled earlier generally lacked social networks in the city at their arrival time, which indicates that they probably faced a more hostile environment than those who traveled later. LTM tend to be older and high-tenured street sellers, and have lesser

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<sup>128</sup> These two facts are not necessarily contradictory because migrants' past job experience in the city may have prepare them to try a wider set of difficult jobs than natives.

job alternatives than STM. Besides, the former assigns a higher value to job autonomy than the latter, and hence they would not leave street trade even if a wage job opportunity should arise. LTM tend to manage smaller-scale stalls, do not sell imported products, and lack another job besides street trade. Nevertheless, probably due to their higher age, experience, and more extensive social networks, LTM tend to pay lower fees for vending.

5) Vendors' economic performance, as measured by their monthly earnings, was found to be likely determined by human capital endowments, work capacity, level of capital invested, and zone of operation; however, it was found to be negatively correlated to job experience. Data from the sample permitted definition of a very consistent profile of high and low performance traders. More successful street sellers tend to be male, younger, more educated, not committed to their suppliers; they also tend to have job opportunities and lower tenure in street selling. Furthermore, they tend to feel more proud of their job, to pay higher fees, to have more workers, to operate in the illegal-high demand zone, to sell more durable goods, and to remain in their current line of business. Finally, they tend to assign a low value to the autonomy and flexibility that street vending provides.<sup>129</sup> These results permit understanding of the major determinants and characteristics associated with street vending economic performance, and provide support to many particular observations reported in the literature;

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<sup>129</sup> The profile of low-performance street traders may be obtained by inverting the features presented for high-performance sellers.

however, they also illustrate some aspects scarcely studied in the literature.

6) Those street vendors who perceive themselves as having job alternatives tend to be young, short-tenured, and educated; they have high earnings and value of stock, pay high fees, and do not assign a high value to job autonomy. These characteristics indicate that street vendors who may find another job are precisely those who have higher earnings and better endowments of human and physical capital (and vice versa). These results suggests the existence of a paradox within street trading: on the one hand, the most successful traders are precisely those who are capable of leaving the job; on the other hand, the most disadvantaged traders are those who are forced to remain in the job.

7) Since education is a relevant variable explaining the availability of job opportunities outside street trade, and hence it is a measure of the degree of potential job mobility, it was important to learn about the factors accounting for differences in the level of education. The analysis of data from the sample supported the hypothesis that differences in educational level may be explained by the trader's gender, place of birth, and age. Therefore, these results permit identifying some of the sources of human capital disadvantages within street traders, which may in turn explain who entered the job, and why they remain in it.

furthermore, the finding that being female influences the educational level negatively in rural but not in urban settings, provides support to the hypothesis that



schooling discrimination exists particularly in rural areas. This assertion leads to the conclusion that older female migrants constitute a especially disadvantaged group within street traders.

8) Economic and cultural factors explain the important role that the family, the household and other social networks play in street trade. First, the immediate family provides non-paid work for the enterprise. Second, family, kin and friends are common sources of credit to start a street vending enterprise. Third, family tradition in street selling constitutes an important factor that influences the individual's preference for the job, but it also contributes to the development of trading skills. Fourth, social networks in general constitute an important source of useful information both to enter the occupation, and to take advantage of trading opportunities.

In fact, collaboration within the household is an important ingredient for the stall operations even if direct work is not provided by the vendor's relatives. Support from the household to the enterprise presupposes that implicit consensual or authoritarian contracts are established among coresidents. The fact that traders' household is economically supported by other members besides the stall owner, probably indicates the existence of a risk-spreading strategy adopted by coresidents in order to stabilize the total income of the household.

9) Although the level of initial capital required to start a street vending stall is relatively low, family and friends play a significant role in the entry process,

by providing the personal contacts required to get a space in the street vending market. The fact that in Mexico City street markets are generally commanded by a leader also enhances the role of social networks in the activity. As far as entry requires that the aspirant must receive the leader's approval, this process is considerably facilitated if the former is introduced to the latter by mutual acquaintances.

Responses to survey questions in the present study indicate that economic factors are the most likely motivations for entering street trade. However, the advantages of street selling over other jobs, kin relationships, and personal limitations, play an important role in the entry decision. Therefore, street vending not only satisfies the economic needs and job preferences of its participants, but also permits taking advantage of their social networks linked to the activity. Additionally it constitutes an occupation well suited for disadvantaged people. Therefore, as far as individual entry is frequently motivated by more than a single reason, it is plausible that an increase in the demand for labor in formal labor markets may be only partially effective to dissuade people from entering the occupation.

10) Independently of their capability to get a different job, vendors' preference for autonomy and their perceptions regarding the difficulty of street trading are significant factors explaining their decision to remain in (leave) such occupation if a hypothetical same-income formal job were offered to them. This result points out the difficulties of economic policies that

consider that the creation of formal low-wage jobs will induce street traders to shift into such occupations.

However, it was found that street traders would be more prone to leave their current job if an 'adequate' salary were offered. These potentially job-mobile vendors tend to be more capable, less tenured, more concerned with economic rewards, and with a stronger will to leave the job. The implications of this result is that there is a segment of street traders that would not take a formal wage job, whatever the salary offered. This finding evidences the limited effects of an economic policy that increases salaries looking for inducing vendors to shift to formal jobs.

Additionally, in accordance with standard neoclassical labor economics, it was found that both monetary and social/personal opportunity costs (current earnings and prize for autonomy, respectively) determine the level of net income that would induce street sellers to shift to a formal wage job.

The results presented above have an extremely important implication from a policy standpoint. First, the most disadvantaged street sellers --older, poorly educated, and high-tenured-- are unlikely to receive employment offers, and, if that happens, they would likely prefer to remain in street trade. Second, those vendors who would be more willing to shift to formal jobs --those who are younger, more educated and with lower seniority-- will hardly leave street trade unless a higher salary were to be offered. Third, the level of salary solicited by those 'job-mobile' traders will surely be too high to the eyes

of employers, for two reasons. On the one hand, since vendors are maximizing earnings by choosing street trading as their job, few formal employers would offer them a similar net income. On the other hand, the wage actually solicited will probably be higher than current earnings for it needs to compensate the vendors for their non-economic opportunity costs.

Therefore, it is not likely that employment-generation and even wage-increase economic policies will cause a significant drop in the number of *already established* street traders. In any case, their main effect would be to reduce the rate of incorporation of younger and more educated newcomers (that is, those having job alternatives), who tend to assign a lower value to job autonomy and flexibility.

11) The importance of capital restrictions in street trade have been thought to limit either the expansion of the stall or the start new ventures. Interestingly, around one third of respondents would not leave street trading and start new enterprises, if they were to receive free capital. This evidences the existence of other factors that retain sellers in their current occupation.

On the one hand, the fact that females and those vendors with problems with authorities would tend to leave their job in the described situation may be interpreted as an indicator of their repressed desire to 'escape' from the risk and hardship of street selling. In the case of females, this assertion is also supported by the fact that those women choosing departure would not necessarily

start a new business. In fact, some females declared that they would allocate such capital in family investments, or as a support for their retirement and return to their homes.

On the other hand, since those vendors who are likely to start a new enterprise are younger, more capable, and ambitious, these characteristics may be considered as determinants of entrepreneurial propensity. Besides, some negative factors as lack of pride and perception of high risk in street selling also influence such a decision. Interestingly, as reported in the literature, a majority of vendors would like to become a formal small retailer.

12) The finding reported in the literature that street traders develop a strong feeling of pride in their job was corroborated. It was also found that vendors perceive their job as a flexible although risky occupation, which provides them with a rather satisfactory level income, where 'satisfactory' is defined in terms of their opportunity costs. Regarding their main motives to remain in street trade or to shift to a wage job with the same income, the main reasons expressed were autonomy in the former case, and hardship and insecurity of the job in the latter situation. Finally, expectable negative opinions were expressed regarding government regulation.

13) Some institutional aspects of street trading not studied in the literature were investigated. First, the fees or bribes paid by vendors to get a sales permit were examined. Experience, social networks and economic performance were found to influence the cost of such informal rights. Second, the profiles identified for

those traders selling in a high-demand high-risk zone, and those selling in a low-demand low risk zone, support the following hypothesis: selection of the illegal (legal) zone is positively (negatively) related to endowments of experience and social networks, and to higher (lower) earnings. Third, the politics of street trade and the economic and political role of vendors' leaders was examined, concluding that the organization of street traders responds to specific social, political and economic rationalities.

Some policy implications emerge as a result of the study. First of all --as experiences in other countries have clearly evidenced-- directed suppression of street trade would be an ineffective and socially disruptive policy. Second, the relevance of monetary and social/individual opportunity costs of moving to another job implies that policies promoting either job creation or real wage increases may be only partially effective in reducing the vendor population. Third, although efforts to relocate street vendors to new established markets --as the program implemented in Downtown Mexico City has done-- constitute a better alternative than open harassment, they tend to benefit a limited number of the better endowed traders. This measure may be relatively ineffective if selling is partially tolerated in the forbidden areas by means of bribes. Fourth, a more adequate policy might include the following complementary measures: A) To promote economic growth to stimulate the demand for labor in other economic sectors; B) To improve labor conditions in the formal sector; C) To selectively facilitate street trade giving preferential treatment to the most disadvantaged traders (those older, less

educated, and females); D) To regulate permits and locations in such a way that the social and private costs of street vending are reduced at the same time that the activity remains minimally attractive.

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## VITA

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## VII. APPENDICES

**VII.1 CHARTS**

Chart 1: Number of Street Vendors in Selected Mexican Cities (1993)





Chart 2: The Federal District of Mexico City by Delegacion





Chart 3: The Selected Zone for the Study



**VII.2 VARIABLES**

## DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

	DESCRIPTION
X1	Number of cases
X2	Name of the vendor's leader
X3	If the vendor is male=1; if the vendor is female=0
X4	Vendor's age (in years)
X5	Vendor's education (in years)
X6	If the vendor was born in Mexico City=1 If the vendor was born out of Mexico City=0
X7	If the vendor has a spouse=1 If the vendor does not have a spouse=0
X8	Number of children of the vendor
X9	If the vendor lives in his/her own house=1 If the vendor does not live in his/her own house=0
X10	Number of the vendor's relatives who work as independent street vendors
X11	If the vendor's parents were street vendors=1 If the vendor's parents were not street vendors=0
X12	Strict definition of tenure in the occupation (number of years operating the current stall)
X13	If the vendor declared that he/she entered street vending because of economic necessity=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X15	If the vendor declared to be capable to get another job=1 If the vendor did not declared so=0
X16	If the vendor would shift to a formal job with the same wage=1 If the vendor would not shift to a formal job with the same wage=0
X17	Level of wage that the vendor would require to shift to a formal job
X18	Vendor's average monthly earnings as street vendor (in N\$)
X19	Value of the vendor's stock (in N\$)
X20	If the vendor would leave street vending in the case of winning a lottery prize=1 If the vendor would not leave street vending in the case of winning a lottery prize=0

X21	If the vendor is affiliated with the official party (PRI)=1 If the vendor is not affiliated with the official party (PRI)=0
X22	Number of vendor's additional stalls
X23	Fee that the vendor pays for getting permission to sell at the street
X24	Number of persons in the household who earn their own income independently
X25	Less strict definition of tenure in the occupation (number of years since the first experience in the job)
X26	If the vendor declared that he/she entered street vending because of preference=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X27	If the vendor would dislike having a boss=1 If the vendor would not dislike having a boss=0
X28	If the vendor declared to like street vending autonomy=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X29	If the vendor declared to dislike having a boss and/or to like autonomy=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X30	Gap (x17 - x18)
X31	If the vendor declared that he/she does not have a leader=1 If the vendor declared that he/she has a leader=0
X33	The vendor's age at which he/she had his/her first street vending experience
x34	Number of interview (in minutes)
X35	If the way of selecting the vendor was by suggestion=0 If the way of selecting the vendor was by researcher's decision=0
X36	Duration of the interview (in minutes)
X37	If the vendor is the owner of the goods=1 If the vendor is not the owner of the goods=0
X44	If the goods sold by the vendor are only domestic=1 If the goods sold by the vendor are both imported and domestic=2 If the goods sold by the vendor are only imported=3

X48	If the vendor arrived at Mexico city alone=1 If the vendor arrived at Mexico city With his/her parents=2 If the vendor arrived at Mexico city With his/her spouse and children=3 If the vendor arrived at Mexico city With a relative=4
X49	If the vendor had relatives in Mexico City at the time of arrival=1 If the vendor did not have relatives in Mexico City at time of arrival time=0
X50	If the vendor received support from his/her relatives when he/she arrived to Mexico City=1 If the vendor did not receive support from his/her relatives when he/she arrived to Mexico City=0
X51	If the vendor had friends in Mexico City when he/she arrived=1 If the vendor had no friends in Mexico City when he/she arrived=0 .
X52	If the vendor received support from his/her friends when he/she arrived to Mexico City=1 If the vendor did not receive support from his/her friends when he/she arrived to Mexico City=0
X54	Number of rooms of the vendor's house
X56	Number of persons living in the household
X57	If the vendor's house has water service=1 If the vendor's house does not have water service=0
X58	If the vendor's house has sawage water=1 If the vendor's house does not have sawage water=0
X59	If the vendor has electricity at his/her house=1 If the vendor does not have electricity at his/her house=0
X60	If the vendor has a bathroom at his/her house=1 If the vendor does not have a bathroom at his/her house=0
X70	Total number of persons that work at the vendor's stall
X71	Number of persons in the household that have their own stall
X72	If the vendor has other occupation=1 If the vendor does not have other occupation=0
X76	The vendor's second current job

X80	If the vendor declared that he/she entered street vending because of kin relations=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X81	If the vendor declared that he/she entered street vending because of personal limitations=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X82	If the vendor has searched for a different job=1 If the vendor has not searched for a different job=0
X86	If the vendor received any help to enter street vending=1 If the vendor did not receive any help to enter street vending=0
X87	Number of persons from whom the vendor received help to enter street vending
X88	If the vendor started as the owner of the stall in his/her first vending job=1 If the vendor started as an employee of the stall in his/her first vending job=0
X89	kind of relationship between the owner of the stall and the vendor, in his/her first job as street vendor
X91	If the vendor was a self-employed before entering street vending=1 If the vendor was not a self-employment before enter street vending=0
X93	Length of time that the vendor worked in his/her former Job
X94	If the former vendor's job was as self-employed=1 If he was an employee=2 If he had other occupation=3
X95	If the vendor had Social Security in his/her former job=1 If the vendor did not have Social Security in his/her formal job=0
X96	Number of former jobs that the vendor has had
X97	The reasons that made the vendor leave his/her former job.
X98	Number of times the vendor has left street vending
X100	If the vendor declared that he/she can earn more in an alternative job=1 If the vendor declared that he/she can not earn more in an alternative job=0
X105	If the vendor would leave street vending for an 'adequate' wage=1 If the vendor would not leave street vending for an 'adequate' wage=0

X108	The vendor's opinion about the damage that street vending causes to the country
X112	The most attractive benefit for the vendor
X113	If the vendor declared that his/her main problem is to deal with authorities=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X114	If the vendor declared that his/her main problem is the level of sales=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X115	If the vendor declared to like social interactions in street vending=1 If the vendor did not declare so=0
X117	If the vendor habitually leaves street vending for a time =1 If the vendor does not habitually leave street vending for a time=0
X119	If the vendor uses to change the type of product that he/she sells=1 If vendor does not use to change the type of product that he/she sells =0
X120	Type of occupation that the vendor would like to perform in the future
X121	If the vendor would prefer his/her children to study=1 If the vendor would not prefer so=0
X123	If the vendor's stall is open everyday=1 If the vendor's stall is not open everyday=0
X124	Number of days that the vendor's stall is open
X125	Number of hours that the vendor's stall is open
X128	Number of the vendor's suppliers
X129	If the vendor feels committed to deal with his/her current suppliers=1 Otherwise=0
X130	The vendor's opinion about the degree of fairness of authorities. Yes (they are fair)=1; No (they are not fair)=2; Do not Know=4
X131	The vendor's opinion about the way the government has managed the street vending problem. Yes (well managed)=1; No (inadequately managed)=2 Somewhat (well managed)=3; Do not know=4
X132	The vendor's opinion about what the government should do with street vending (permit street vending=1, regulate street vending=2, other=3)



X133	If the vendor declared that he/she did not buy a stall because of economic limitations=1 Other reason=0
X135	If the vendor won a lottery prize, then he/she would buy another stall=1 If the vendor won a lottery prize he/she would expand his/her stall=2 None of the opinion above=4
X136	If the vendor won a lottery prize, then he/she would start a new business=1 If the vendor won a lottery prize then he/she would not start a new business =0
X138	If the vendor would consider it necessary to pay taxes in his/her potential new business=1 If the vendor would not consider necessary to pay taxes in his/her potential new business=0
X139	If the vendor has his/her own automobile=1 If the vendor does not have his/her own automobile=0
X140	The car model of the vendor
X142	Numer of associations of vendors that the vendor has belonged
X141	If the vendor is the owner of the stall=1 If the vendor rents the stall=2 If the vendor borrows the stall=3 If the vendor sells on the street=4
X143	If the vendor pays a fee for vending=1 If the vendor does not pay a fee for vending=0
X144	If the vendor pays fees to government officials=1 If the vendor pays fees to a leader=2 If the vendor pays fees to the city treasury=3
X145	If the vendor would accept having other interview=1 If the vendor would not accept having other interview=0
X147	If the vendor's current place of residence is out of Mexico City=0 If the vendor's current place of residence is Mexico City=1
X148	Length of residence in Mexico City (in years)
X149	Vendor's marital status detail
X151	Number of the vendor's children that possess their own street vending stall
X2a	If the vendor operates in a legal and low-demand zone=0 If the vendor operates in an illegal and high-demand zone=1

X38a	If the vendor sells less durable goods=0 If the vendor sells more durable goods=1
X46a	If the vendor is functionally literate=1 If the vendor is not functionally literate=2
X47a	If the vendor is Catholic=1 If the vendor is not Catholic=0
X48a	If the vendor came with other person when he/she emigrated to Mexico City=0 If the vendor came alone when he/she emigrated to Mexico City=1
X85a	If the vendor was helped by someone to get his/her first job as street vendor=1 If nobody helped the vendor=0
X90a	If the vendor became owner of his/her stall with his/her own savings=1 If the vendor did not become owner in that way=0
X104a	Motives why the vendor would shift to a formal job with the same income
X106a	If the vendor feels more pride in being a street vendor=1 If the vendor feels less pride in being a street vendor=0
X107a	If the vendor considers that street vending is (more) risky=1 If the vendor considers that street vending is (less) risky=0
X109a	If the vendor feels more glad with his/her earnings in street vending=1 If the vendor feel less glad with his/her earnings in street vending=0
X110a	If the vendor feels that street vending is harder work=1 If the vendor feels that street vending is less hard work=0
X111a	If the vendor believes that street vending facilitates him/her to do other activities=1 If the vendor believes that street vending does not facilitates him/her to do other activities=0
X122a	If the vendor wishes his/her children to become street vendors=1 If the vendor does not wish his/her children to become street vendors=0
X137a	Number of relatives that work o help the vendor at the stall
X18M2	Vendor's earnings net of fees
3	

**FACTOR SCORES**  
(With the corresponding factor loadings in parentheses)

FS X4X51	X4 (+0.90); X5 (-0.90)
FS X1051	X4 (+0.93); X5 (-0.72); X8 (+0.84); X12 (+0.82) X15 (-0.77)
FS X1361	X4 (-0.89); X15 (+0.89); X105 (+0.55)
FS X231	X72 (-0.65); X4 (+0.84); X12 (+0.84); X18 (- 0.57)
FS X11X61	X11 (+0.82); X6 (+0.82)

## OBSERVED VARIABLE FREQUENCIES

X2 LEADER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
INDEPENDENT	1.0	21	51.2	51.2	51.2
MARÍA ZURITA	2.0	10	24.4	24.4	75.6
FLORENTINA SANTIAGO	3.0	10	24.4	24.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X3 GENDER MALE=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
FEMALE	.0	17	41.5	41.5	41.5
MALE	1.0	24	58.5	58.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X4            AGE IN YEARS

Value Label

Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
19.0	2	4.9	4.9	4.9
20.0	3	7.3	7.3	12.2
21.0	2	4.9	4.9	17.1
23.0	1	2.4	2.4	19.5
24.0	2	4.9	4.9	24.4
25.0	1	2.4	2.4	26.8
28.0	1	2.4	2.4	29.3
29.0	1	2.4	2.4	31.7
30.0	3	7.3	7.3	39.0
31.0	1	2.4	2.4	41.5
32.0	1	2.4	2.4	43.9
33.0	1	2.4	2.4	46.3
34.0	1	2.4	2.4	48.8
35.0	2	4.9	4.9	53.7
36.0	1	2.4	2.4	56.1
37.0	1	2.4	2.4	58.5
39.0	1	2.4	2.4	61.0
42.0	1	2.4	2.4	63.4
43.0	1	2.4	2.4	65.9
46.0	1	2.4	2.4	68.3
48.0	2	4.9	4.9	73.2
49.0	2	4.9	4.9	78.0
52.0	2	4.9	4.9	82.9
54.0	1	2.4	2.4	85.4
57.0	1	2.4	2.4	87.8
60.0	2	4.9	4.9	92.7
66.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
67.0	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
68.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
-----				
TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X5 EDUCATION IN YEARS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	6	14.6	14.6	14.6
	2.0	4	9.8	9.8	24.4
	3.0	1	2.4	2.4	26.8
	4.0	3	7.3	7.3	34.1
	5.0	4	9.8	9.8	43.9
	6.0	7	17.1	17.1	61.0
	8.0	1	2.4	2.4	63.4
	9.0	9	22.0	22.0	85.4
	10.0	3	7.3	7.3	92.7
	11.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	13.0	2	4.9	4.9	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X6 BORN IN THE CITY=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
BORN/OUT M.CITY	.0	26	63.4	63.4	63.4
BORN/MEX.CITY	1.0	15	36.6	36.6	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X7 HAS A SPOUSE=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
WITHOUT SPOUSE	.0	10	24.4	24.4	24.4
WITH SPOUSE	1.0	31	75.6	75.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X8 NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	5	12.2	12.2	12.2
	1.0	6	14.6	14.6	26.8
	2.0	7	17.1	17.1	43.9
	3.0	7	17.1	17.1	61.0
	4.0	4	9.8	9.8	70.7
	6.0	6	14.6	14.6	85.4
	7.0	2	4.9	4.9	90.2
	8.0	2	4.9	4.9	95.1
	9.0	2	4.9	4.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X9            LIVE IN OWN HOUSE=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LIVES/NOT OWN HOUS.	.0	23	56.1	56.1	56.1
LIVES/OWN HOUSE	1.0	18	43.9	43.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

X10            NUMB.RELATIVES IN SV

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	8	19.5	19.5	19.5
	1.0	3	7.3	7.3	26.8
	2.0	5	12.2	12.2	39.0
	3.0	6	14.6	14.6	53.7
	4.0	5	12.2	12.2	65.9
	5.0	1	2.4	2.4	68.3
	7.0	2	4.9	4.9	73.2
	8.0	2	4.9	4.9	78.0
	10.0	4	9.8	9.8	87.8
	15.0	1	2.4	2.4	90.2
	25.0	1	2.4	2.4	92.7
	28.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	30.0	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
	60.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	



## X11 PARENTS WERE S.V.=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PARENTS/NOT S.V.	.0	20	48.8	48.8	48.8
PARENTS WERE S.V.	1.0	21	51.2	51.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X12 STRICT SENIORITY YRS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.2	2	4.9	4.9	4.9
	.3	1	2.4	2.4	7.3
	1.0	1	2.4	2.4	9.8
	2.0	1	2.4	2.4	12.2
	3.0	4	9.8	9.8	22.0
	5.0	5	12.2	12.2	34.1
	6.0	5	12.2	12.2	46.3
	7.0	2	4.9	4.9	51.2
	10.0	2	4.9	4.9	56.1
	11.0	1	2.4	2.4	58.5
	12.0	2	4.9	4.9	63.4
	13.0	1	2.4	2.4	65.9
	15.0	1	2.4	2.4	68.3
	16.0	1	2.4	2.4	70.7
	17.0	1	2.4	2.4	73.2
	18.3	1	2.4	2.4	75.6
	22.0	1	2.4	2.4	78.0
	25.0	3	7.3	7.3	85.4
	30.0	1	2.4	2.4	87.8
	33.0	2	4.9	4.9	92.7
	35.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	37.0	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
	41.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X13 ENTRY:NECESSITY=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ENTRY:N.D.EC.NECESS.	.0	8	19.5	20.0	20.0
REAS.ENTRY:EC.NECESS	1.0	32	78.0	80.0	100.0
		1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X15 CAPABLE OTHER JOB=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT CAPABLE OTHER JO	.0	17	41.5	41.5	41.5
CAPABLE OTHER JOB	1.0	24	58.5	58.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X16 LEAVE SV SAME WAGE=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT LEAVE SV SAME WA	.0	19	46.3	47.5	47.5
LEAVE SV SAME WAGE	1.0	21	51.2	52.5	100.0
	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X17            WAGE TO LEAVE S.V.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	600.0	1	2.4	3.3	3.3
	700.0	1	2.4	3.3	6.7
	857.2	1	2.4	3.3	10.0
	900.0	1	2.4	3.3	13.3
	1000.0	1	2.4	3.3	16.7
	1028.6	1	2.4	3.3	20.0
	1071.5	1	2.4	3.3	23.3
	1178.7	1	2.4	3.3	26.7
	1200.0	2	4.9	6.7	33.3
	1285.8	2	4.9	6.7	40.0
	1393.0	1	2.4	3.3	43.3
	1500.0	2	4.9	6.7	50.0
	1650.0	2	4.9	6.7	56.7
	1714.0	1	2.4	3.3	60.0
	1714.4	2	4.9	6.7	66.7
	1800.0	2	4.9	6.7	73.3
	2143.0	1	2.4	3.3	76.7
	2250.0	1	2.4	3.3	80.0
	2357.3	1	2.4	3.3	83.3
	2400.0	2	4.9	6.7	90.0
	3000.0	1	2.4	3.3	93.3
	4000.0	2	4.9	6.7	100.0
	.	11	26.8	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

X18 EARNINGS IN S.V.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	100.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	214.0	1	2.4	2.4	4.9
	300.0	1	2.4	2.4	7.3
	450.0	2	4.9	4.9	12.2
	500.0	1	2.4	2.4	14.6
	642.9	1	2.4	2.4	17.1
	750.0	1	2.4	2.4	19.5
	771.5	1	2.4	2.4	22.0
	825.0	1	2.4	2.4	24.4
	857.2	2	4.9	4.9	29.3
	900.0	4	9.8	9.8	39.0
	1050.0	1	2.4	2.4	41.5
	1062.1	1	2.4	2.4	43.9
	1071.5	2	4.9	4.9	48.8
	1178.7	1	2.4	2.4	51.2
	1285.8	2	4.9	4.9	56.1
	1300.0	1	2.4	2.4	58.5
	1393.0	1	2.4	2.4	61.0
	1500.0	3	7.3	7.3	68.3
	1500.1	1	2.4	2.4	70.7
	1714.4	1	2.4	2.4	73.2
	2000.0	1	2.4	2.4	75.6
	2061.5	1	2.4	2.4	78.0
	2143.0	3	7.3	7.3	85.4
	2175.0	1	2.4	2.4	87.8
	2357.3	1	2.4	2.4	90.2
	2500.0	1	2.4	2.4	92.7
	2571.6	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	2871.6	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
	3428.8	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X19            VALUE OF INVENTORY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	20.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	35.0	2	4.9	4.9	7.3
	55.0	1	2.4	2.4	9.8
	100.0	1	2.4	2.4	12.2
	200.0	5	12.2	12.2	24.4
	300.0	4	9.8	9.8	34.1
	340.0	1	2.4	2.4	36.6
	400.0	1	2.4	2.4	39.0
	700.0	2	4.9	4.9	43.9
	800.0	2	4.9	4.9	48.8
	1000.0	4	9.8	9.8	58.5
	1500.0	1	2.4	2.4	61.0
	1850.0	1	2.4	2.4	63.4
	2000.0	3	7.3	7.3	70.7
	2500.0	2	4.9	4.9	75.6
	3000.0	1	2.4	2.4	78.0
	4000.0	1	2.4	2.4	80.5
	4500.0	1	2.4	2.4	82.9
	5000.0	2	4.9	4.9	87.8
	5300.0	1	2.4	2.4	90.2
	8000.0	1	2.4	2.4	92.7
	10000.0	2	4.9	4.9	97.6
	15000.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X20 LEAVE SV/LOTTERY=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO LEAVE SV:LOTT.	.0	14	34.1	34.1	34.1
YES LEAVE SV:LOTT	1.0	27	65.9	65.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	
Valid Cases	Missing Cases	0			

## X21 MEMBER OF PRI=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO MEMBER PRI.	.0	25	61.0	61.0	61.0
YES MEMBER PRI	1.0	16	39.0	39.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	
Valid Cases	Missing Cases	0			

## X22 NUMB.ADD.STALLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	33	80.5	80.5	80.5
	1.0	8	19.5	19.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	
Valid Cases	Missing Cases	0			

## X23 FEE FOR PERMISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	12	29.3	29.3	29.3
	17.0	1	2.4	2.4	31.7
	58.9	1	2.4	2.4	34.1
	60.0	4	9.8	9.8	43.9
	64.3	1	2.4	2.4	46.3
	85.7	8	19.5	19.5	65.9
	85.7	1	2.4	2.4	68.3
	128.6	1	2.4	2.4	70.7
	150.0	4	9.8	9.8	80.5
	171.4	1	2.4	2.4	82.9
	214.3	1	2.4	2.4	85.4
	300.0	2	4.9	4.9	90.2
	342.9	1	2.4	2.4	92.7
	385.7	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	600.0	2	4.9	4.9	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases Missing Cases 0

## X24 NU.PERS.INCOM.H/HOLD

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1.0	18	43.9	43.9	43.9
	2.0	11	26.8	26.8	70.7
	3.0	3	7.3	7.3	78.0
	4.0	6	14.6	14.6	92.7
	5.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	6.0	2	4.9	4.9	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases Missing Cases 0

X25 LAX SENIORITY YRS.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.3	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	1.0	2	4.9	4.9	7.3
	2.0	1	2.4	2.4	9.8
	3.0	2	4.9	4.9	14.6
	5.0	3	7.3	7.3	22.0
	6.0	3	7.3	7.3	29.3
	8.0	1	2.4	2.4	31.7
	9.0	1	2.4	2.4	34.1
	10.0	2	4.9	4.9	39.0
	11.0	1	2.4	2.4	41.5
	13.0	1	2.4	2.4	43.9
	15.0	2	4.9	4.9	48.8
	16.0	1	2.4	2.4	51.2
	17.0	1	2.4	2.4	53.7
	18.0	1	2.4	2.4	56.1
	19.0	1	2.4	2.4	58.5
	20.0	2	4.9	4.9	63.4
	22.0	2	4.9	4.9	68.3
	25.0	5	12.2	12.2	80.5
	28.0	1	2.4	2.4	82.9
	30.0	1	2.4	2.4	85.4
	33.0	1	2.4	2.4	87.8
	35.0	1	2.4	2.4	90.2
	37.0	1	2.4	2.4	92.7
	41.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	45.0	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
	52.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	



X26 ENTRY: PREFERENCE=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ENTRY: N.D. PREFER.	.0	21	51.2	52.5	52.5
ENTRY: PREFER.	1.0	19	46.3	47.5	100.0
		1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	
Valid Cases	Missing Cases	1			

X27 WOULD DISLIKE BOSS=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO DISLIKE BOSS	.0	21	51.2	51.2	51.2
DISLIKE BOSS	1.0	20	48.8	48.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	
Valid Cases	Missing Cases	0			

X28 LIKES S.V. AUTONOMY=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N.D. LIKES SV AUT.	.0	20	48.8	54.1	54.1
LIKES SV AUTONOMY	1.0	17	41.5	45.9	100.0
	.	4	9.8	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

X29 LIKES FREED=1 X27/28

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N.D.LIKES FREED.	.0	10	24.4	26.3	26.3
DEC.LIKES FREEDOM	1.0	28	68.3	73.7	100.0
		3	7.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases            Missing Cases            3

X30 GAP REQ.WAGE-EARNING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	-1143.00	1	2.4	3.3	3.3
	-471.60	1	2.4	3.3	6.7
	-50.00	1	2.4	3.3	10.0
	-33.50	1	2.4	3.3	13.3
	.00	7	17.1	23.3	36.7
	188.50	1	2.4	3.3	40.0
	300.00	2	4.9	6.7	46.7
	321.50	1	2.4	3.3	50.0
	386.00	1	2.4	3.3	53.3
	400.00	1	2.4	3.3	56.7
	428.60	2	4.9	6.7	63.3
	450.00	1	2.4	3.3	66.7
	500.00	1	2.4	3.3	70.0
	514.30	1	2.4	3.3	73.3
	664.00	1	2.4	3.3	76.7
	700.00	1	2.4	3.3	80.0
	750.00	2	4.9	6.7	86.7
	900.00	1	2.4	3.3	90.0
	1200.00	1	2.4	3.3	93.3
	1428.40	1	2.4	3.3	96.7
	1857.00	1	2.4	3.3	100.0
		11	26.8	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X31 HAS NO LEADER=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
HAS LEADER	.000	20	48.8	48.8	48.8
HAS NO LEADER	1.000	21	51.2	51.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

X33 AGE 1/4SV EXPERIENCE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	5.000	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	6.000	1	2.4	2.4	4.9
	7.000	2	4.9	4.9	9.8
	8.000	2	4.9	4.9	14.6
	11.000	1	2.4	2.4	17.1
	12.000	1	2.4	2.4	19.5
	13.000	1	2.4	2.4	22.0
	14.000	4	9.8	9.8	31.7
	15.000	2	4.9	4.9	36.6
	16.000	1	2.4	2.4	39.0
	18.000	3	7.3	7.3	46.3
	19.000	2	4.9	4.9	51.2
	20.000	2	4.9	4.9	56.1
	23.000	3	7.3	7.3	63.4
	24.000	1	2.4	2.4	65.9
	25.000	1	2.4	2.4	68.3
	26.000	1	2.4	2.4	70.7
	27.000	4	9.8	9.8	80.5
	27.700	1	2.4	2.4	82.9
	31.000	2	4.9	4.9	87.8
	33.000	1	2.4	2.4	90.2
	34.000	1	2.4	2.4	92.7
	38.000	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	41.000	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
	43.000	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X34 NUMBER OF INTERVIEW

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	2.0	1	2.4	2.4	4.9
	3.0	1	2.4	2.4	7.3
	4.0	1	2.4	2.4	9.8
	5.0	1	2.4	2.4	12.2
	6.0	1	2.4	2.4	14.6
	7.0	1	2.4	2.4	17.1
	8.0	1	2.4	2.4	19.5
	9.0	1	2.4	2.4	22.0
	10.0	1	2.4	2.4	24.4
	11.0	1	2.4	2.4	26.8
	12.0	1	2.4	2.4	29.3
	13.0	1	2.4	2.4	31.7
	14.0	1	2.4	2.4	34.1
	15.0	1	2.4	2.4	36.6
	16.0	1	2.4	2.4	39.0
	17.0	1	2.4	2.4	41.5
	18.0	1	2.4	2.4	43.9
	19.0	1	2.4	2.4	46.3
	20.0	1	2.4	2.4	48.8
	21.0	1	2.4	2.4	51.2
	22.0	1	2.4	2.4	53.7
	23.0	1	2.4	2.4	56.1
	24.0	1	2.4	2.4	58.5
	25.0	1	2.4	2.4	61.0
	26.0	1	2.4	2.4	63.4
	27.0	1	2.4	2.4	65.9
	28.0	1	2.4	2.4	68.3
	29.0	1	2.4	2.4	70.7
	30.0	1	2.4	2.4	73.2
	31.0	1	2.4	2.4	75.6
	32.0	1	2.4	2.4	78.0
	33.0	1	2.4	2.4	80.5
	34.0	1	2.4	2.4	82.9
	41.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X35 WAY SELECTING VENDOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
BY SUGGESTION	.0	15	36.6	36.6	36.6
BY RESEARCHER	1.0	26	63.4	63.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X36 DURATION INTERVIEW

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	25.0	2	4.9	5.4	5.4
	26.0	3	7.3	8.1	13.5
	30.0	1	2.4	2.7	16.2
	34.0	1	2.4	2.7	18.9
	35.0	8	19.5	21.6	40.5
	37.0	1	2.4	2.7	43.2
	38.0	1	2.4	2.7	45.9
	39.0	1	2.4	2.7	48.6
	40.0	6	14.6	16.2	64.9
	41.0	1	2.4	2.7	67.6
	45.0	2	4.9	5.4	73.0
	46.0	1	2.4	2.7	75.7
	50.0	5	12.2	13.5	89.2
	51.0	1	2.4	2.7	91.9
	55.0	2	4.9	5.4	97.3
	58.0	1	2.4	2.7	100.0
	.	4	9.8	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X36 DURATION INTERVIEW

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	25.0	2	4.9	5.4	5.4
	26.0	3	7.3	8.1	13.5
	30.0	1	2.4	2.7	16.2
	34.0	1	2.4	2.7	18.9
	35.0	8	19.5	21.6	40.5
	37.0	1	2.4	2.7	43.2
	38.0	1	2.4	2.7	45.9
	39.0	1	2.4	2.7	48.6
	40.0	6	14.6	16.2	64.9
	41.0	1	2.4	2.7	67.6
	45.0	2	4.9	5.4	73.0
	46.0	1	2.4	2.7	75.7
	50.0	5	12.2	13.5	89.2
	51.0	1	2.4	2.7	91.9
	55.0	2	4.9	5.4	97.3
	58.0	1	2.4	2.7	100.0
	.	4	9.8	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X37 OWNER OF GOODS=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1.0	41	100.0	100.0	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X44           DOMEST./IMPORT.GOODS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ONLY DOM.	1.0	29	70.7	70.7	70.7
IMP.& DOM.	2.0	8	19.5	19.5	90.2
ONLY IMP.	3.0	4	9.8	9.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X48           WITH WHO CAME T/CITY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALONE	1.0	7	17.1	31.8	31.8
W/PARENTS	2.0	4	9.8	18.2	50.0
W/WIFE & CH.	3.0	5	12.2	22.7	72.7
W/O.REL.	4.0	6	14.6	27.3	100.0
.		19	46.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X49           RELATIVES IN CITY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	9	22.0	40.9	40.9
YES	1.0	13	31.7	59.1	100.0
.		19	46.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X50 SUPP./RELATIVES/CITY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	3	7.3	23.1	23.1
YES	1.0	10	24.4	76.9	100.0
	.	28	68.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X51 FRIENDS IN THE CITY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	9	22.0	40.9	40.9
YES	1.0	13	31.7	59.1	100.0
	.	19	46.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X52 SUPP./FRIENDS/CITY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	5	12.2	38.5	38.5
YES	1.0	8	19.5	61.5	100.0
	.	28	68.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	



## X54 NUMB.ROOMS OF HOUSE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	2.0	7	17.1	17.1	19.5
	3.0	9	22.0	22.0	41.5
	4.0	7	17.1	17.1	58.5
	5.0	10	24.4	24.4	82.9
	6.0	4	9.8	9.8	92.7
	7.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	8.0	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
	12.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X56 NUM.PERSON/HOUSEHOLD

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1.0	3	7.3	7.5	7.5
	2.0	1	2.4	2.5	10.0
	3.0	7	17.1	17.5	27.5
	4.0	11	26.8	27.5	55.0
	5.0	5	12.2	12.5	67.5
	6.0	5	12.2	12.5	80.0
	7.0	1	2.4	2.5	82.5
	8.0	3	7.3	7.5	90.0
	11.0	1	2.4	2.5	92.5
	12.0	1	2.4	2.5	95.0
	15.0	2	4.9	5.0	100.0
		1	2.4	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X57 WATER SERVICE/HOUSE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	3	7.3	7.3	7.3
YES	1.0	38	92.7	92.7	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X58 SEWAGE WATER/HOUSE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	5	12.2	12.2	12.2
YES	1.0	36	87.8	87.8	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X59 ELECTRICITY AT HOUSE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
YES	1.0	40	97.6	97.6	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X60 BATHROOM AT HOUSE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
YES	1.0	40	97.6	97.6	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X70 AT STALL:TOT.WORKERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1.0	18	43.9	43.9	43.9
	2.0	20	48.8	48.8	92.7
	3.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	4.0	2	4.9	4.9	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

X71 PRS.HOME OTHER STALL

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	31	75.6	75.6	75.6
	1.0	4	9.8	9.8	85.4
	2.0	5	12.2	12.2	97.6
	3.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

X72 OTHER OCCUPATIONS?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	29	70.7	70.7	70.7
YES	1.0	12	29.3	29.3	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

X76 2¼CURR.SPECIFIC JOB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N. TRADE N. FAM. EMPLOY	3.0	1	2.4	8.3	8.3
FARM FAM. EMPLOY.	4.0	3	7.3	25.0	33.3
FAM. N. TR. N. FARM EMPL	7.0	1	2.4	8.3	41.7
N. SV SELF-EMP.	9.0	6	14.6	50.0	91.7
STUDENT	10.0	1	2.4	8.3	100.0
	.	29	70.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X80 ENTRY:KIN RELATIONS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N.D.KIN REL.	.0	29	70.7	72.5	72.5
ENTRY:KIN REL.	1.0	11	26.8	27.5	100.0
	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X81 ENTRY:PERSONAL LIMIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N.D.PERS.LIM.	.0	29	70.7	72.5	72.5
ENTRY:PERS.LIM.	1.0	11	26.8	27.5	100.0
	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X82 SEARCHED A DIFF.JOB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	33	80.5	82.5	82.5
YES	1.0	7	17.1	17.5	100.0
	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X86 YOU REC/ENTRY S.V.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	13	31.7	33.3	33.3
YES	1.0	26	63.4	66.7	100.0
	.	2	4.9	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X87 N. PERS. YOU REC. ENTRY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	15	36.6	36.6	36.6
	1.0	3	7.3	7.3	43.9
	2.0	5	12.2	12.2	56.1
	3.0	5	12.2	12.2	68.3
	4.0	3	7.3	7.3	75.6
	5.0	4	9.8	9.8	85.4
	8.0	1	2.4	2.4	87.8
	10.0	4	9.8	9.8	97.6
	20.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X88 START/OWNER-EMPLOYEE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
EMPLOYEE	.0	15	36.6	36.6	36.6
OWNER	1.0	26	63.4	63.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X89 LINKS W/OWNER 1½SV

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PARENTS	1.0	6	14.6	40.0	40.0
RELATIVES	2.0	5	12.2	33.3	73.3
FRIENDS	5.0	2	4.9	13.3	86.7
NONE	6.0	2	4.9	13.3	100.0
	.	26	63.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X91 SELF-EMPLOY.BEF.SV

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	35	85.4	85.4	85.4
YES	1.0	6	14.6	14.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X93 TIME WORKED FORM.JOB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.5	1	2.4	4.0	4.0
	.6	1	2.4	4.0	8.0
	1.0	5	12.2	20.0	28.0
	2.0	2	4.9	8.0	36.0
	2.5	1	2.4	4.0	40.0
	3.0	4	9.8	16.0	56.0
	5.0	1	2.4	4.0	60.0
	7.0	1	2.4	4.0	64.0
	8.0	1	2.4	4.0	68.0
	10.0	2	4.9	8.0	76.0
	11.0	1	2.4	4.0	80.0
	12.0	1	2.4	4.0	84.0
	14.0	1	2.4	4.0	88.0
	15.0	1	2.4	4.0	92.0
	16.0	1	2.4	4.0	96.0
	25.0	1	2.4	4.0	100.0
		16	39.0	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X94 FORMER JOB:TYPE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
OWN BUS.	1.0	2	4.9	4.9	4.9
EMPLOYEE	2.0	26	63.4	63.4	68.3
OTHER	3.0	13	31.7	31.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X95 SOC. SECUR. FRMR. JOB?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	13	31.7	59.1	59.1
YES	1.0	9	22.0	40.9	100.0
.	.	19	46.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X96 NUM. EMPLOY. FRMR. JOB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1-2 EMPS.	1.0	2	4.9	10.5	10.5
3-5 EMPS.	2.0	7	17.1	36.8	47.4
5-10 EMPS.	3.0	1	2.4	5.3	52.6
MORE THAN 10	4.0	9	22.0	47.4	100.0
.	.	22	53.7	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X97 WHY LEFT FRMR. JOB?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
FIRED	1.0	3	7.3	15.0	15.0
QUIT	2.0	6	14.6	30.0	45.0
QUIT/L. WAGE	3.0	5	12.2	25.0	70.0
ACCIDENT	5.0	2	4.9	10.0	80.0
CARE CHILDREN	6.0	2	4.9	10.0	90.0
.	.	2	4.9	10.0	100.0
.	.	21	51.2	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X98           TIMES HAVE LEFT S.V.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	34	82.9	87.2	87.2
	1.0	2	4.9	5.1	92.3
	2.0	2	4.9	5.1	97.4
	15.0	1	2.4	2.6	100.0
	.	2	4.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X100           CAN EARN MORE AL.JOB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	19	46.3	79.2	79.2
YES	1.0	5	12.2	20.8	100.0
	.	17	41.5	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X105           LEAVE SV HIGHR.WAGE?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	11	26.8	26.8	26.8
YES	1.0	30	73.2	73.2	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	



## X108 S.V.DAMAGES COUNTRY?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1.0	5	12.2	12.2	12.2
NO	2.0	27	65.9	65.9	78.0
SOMEWHAT	3.0	1	2.4	2.4	80.5
DONT KNOW	4.0	4	9.8	9.8	90.2
YES BUT NECESS	6.0	4	9.8	9.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X112 BENEFITS YOU'D WISH

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SOCIAL SECURITY	1.0	14	34.1	35.9	35.9
AGUINALDO	2.0	2	4.9	5.1	41.0
B.RETIRE.	3.0	7	17.1	17.9	59.0
INFONAVIT	4.0	8	19.5	20.5	79.5
NONE	6.0	3	7.3	7.7	87.2
BORROW.	8.0	5	12.2	12.8	100.0
.		2	4.9	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X113 MAIN PROBLEM:W/AUTHO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	14	34.1	34.1	34.1
YES	1.0	27	65.9	65.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X114 MAIN PROBLEM:SALES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	31	75.6	75.6	75.6
YES	1.0	10	24.4	24.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X115 LIKES SV S.INTERACT.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N.D.	.0	30	73.2	81.1	81.1
YES	1.0	7	17.1	18.9	100.0
	.	4	9.8	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X117 LEAVE TEMPORARLY SV?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	30	73.2	75.0	75.0
YES	1.0	10	24.4	25.0	100.0
	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X119 CHANGE TYPE PRODUCT?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	26	63.4	63.4	63.4
YES	1.0	15	36.6	36.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X120 PREFERD.FUTURE OCCUP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
TRADE	1.0	24	58.5	61.5	61.5
N.TRADE SELF-EMP.	2.0	6	14.6	15.4	76.9
PROF.SELF-EMP.	3.0	1	2.4	2.6	79.5
EMPLOYEE	4.0	1	2.4	2.6	82.1
HOUSEHOLD	5.0	5	12.2	12.8	94.9
OTHER	6.0	1	2.4	2.6	97.4
RETIREM.	9.0	1	2.4	2.6	100.0
.	.	2	4.9	MISSING	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X121 PREF.OC.FOR CHILDREN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N.D.STUDY	.0	9	22.0	22.0	22.0
STUDY	1.0	32	78.0	78.0	100.0
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X123 . DAYS STALL IS OPEN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT EVERYDAY	.0	9	22.0	22.0	22.0
EVERYDAY	1.0	32	78.0	78.0	100.0
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X124 NUM.DAYS/WEEK OPEN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	5.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	6.0	7	17.1	17.1	19.5
	7.0	33	80.5	80.5	100.0
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X125 NUM.HOURS/DAY OPEN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	3.0	1	2.4	2.6	2.6
	5.0	3	7.3	7.7	10.3
	5.5	1	2.4	2.6	12.8
	6.0	3	7.3	7.7	20.5
	7.0	4	9.8	10.3	30.8
	8.0	9	22.0	23.1	53.8
	9.0	6	14.6	15.4	69.2
	10.0	7	17.1	17.9	87.2
	11.0	2	4.9	5.1	92.3
	12.0	2	4.9	5.1	97.4
	13.5	1	2.4	2.6	100.0
	.	2	4.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X128 NUMBER OF SUPPLIERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MORE THAN 2 S.	1.0	20	48.8	48.8	48.8
	2.0	8	19.5	19.5	68.3
	3.0	7	17.1	17.1	85.4
	4.0	6	14.6	14.6	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X129 COMMITT.W/SUPPLIERS?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	35	85.4	87.5	87.5
YES	1.0	5	12.2	12.5	100.0
	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X130      AUTHORITY FAIR W/SV?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1.0	4	9.8	9.8	9.8
NO	2.0	36	87.8	87.8	97.6
DONT KNOW	4.0	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X131      GOV. MANAGE WELL SV?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
NO	2.0	37	90.2	90.2	92.7
SOMEWHAT	3.0	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
DONT KNOW	4.0	2	4.9	4.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X132      WHAT GOV. SHOULD DO/SV

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PERMIT SV	1.0	24	58.5	58.5	58.5
REGULATE SV	2.0	2	4.9	4.9	63.4
OTHER	3.0	15	36.6	36.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X133      WHY DIDN'T BUY STALL

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
OTHER	.0	13	31.7	34.2	34.2
L.MONEY/H.PRICE/L.CR	1.0	25	61.0	65.8	100.0
	.	3	7.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X135 LOTTER:AQUIRE/EXPAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
OTHER STALLS	1.0	3	7.3	21.4	21.4
EXPAND C.S.	2.0	9	22.0	64.3	85.7
NONE	4.0	2	4.9	14.3	100.0
.	.	27	65.9	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X136 LOTTER:START NEW BUS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	15	36.6	37.5	37.5
YES	1.0	25	61.0	62.5	100.0
.	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X138 LOT:NECESS.PAY TAXES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	1	2.4	4.2	4.2
YES	1.0	23	56.1	95.8	100.0
.	.	17	41.5	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X139 HAVE OWN AUTOMOBILE?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	34	82.9	85.0	85.0
YES	1.0	6	14.6	15.0	100.0
.	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X140 MODEL OF YOUR AUTOM.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	2.0	1	2.4	14.3	14.3
	1967.0	1	2.4	14.3	28.6
	1976.0	2	4.9	28.6	57.1
	1980.0	1	2.4	14.3	71.4
	1981.0	1	2.4	14.3	85.7
	1982.0	1	2.4	14.3	100.0
	.	34	82.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X141 PROPERTY OF STALL

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
OWN	1.0	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
RENTED	2.0	1	2.4	2.4	4.9
BORROWED	3.0	1	2.4	2.4	7.3
AT STREET	4.0	38	92.7	92.7	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X142 HOW MANY S.V. ASSOC.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	13	31.7	33.3	33.3
	1.0	11	26.8	28.2	61.5
	2.0	7	17.1	17.9	79.5
	3.0	5	12.2	12.8	92.3
	4.0	1	2.4	2.6	94.9
	5.0	2	4.9	5.1	100.0
	.	2	4.9	MISSING	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X143 PAY FEES FOR VENDING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	12	29.3	29.3	29.3
YES	1.0	29	70.7	70.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X144 WHO DO YOU PAY FEES?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
GOV.OFFIC.	1.0	16	39.0	55.2	55.2
LEADER	2.0	11	26.8	37.9	93.1
CITY TREASURY	3.0	2	4.9	6.9	100.0
.		12	29.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X145 ACCEPT OTHER INTERV.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO	.0	3	7.3	8.3	8.3
YES	1.0	33	80.5	91.7	100.0
.		5	12.2	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	



## X147 PLACE YOU CURR.LIVE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LIVES OUT MEX.CITY	.0	5	12.2	12.2	12.2
LIVES IN MEX.CITY	1.0	36	87.8	87.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X148 YRS.SINCE MIGRATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1.0	1	2.4	4.5	4.5
	5.0	3	7.3	13.6	18.2
	7.0	1	2.4	4.5	22.7
	8.0	1	2.4	4.5	27.3
	9.0	1	2.4	4.5	31.8
	10.0	1	2.4	4.5	36.4
	11.0	1	2.4	4.5	40.9
	15.0	1	2.4	4.5	45.5
	16.0	3	7.3	13.6	59.1
	22.0	1	2.4	4.5	63.6
	24.0	1	2.4	4.5	68.2
	25.0	1	2.4	4.5	72.7
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X149 MARITAL STAT.DETAIL.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MARRIED	1.0	24	58.5	58.5	58.5
N.M.W/SPOUSE	2.0	7	17.1	17.1	75.6
SINGLE	4.0	5	12.2	12.2	87.8
DIVORCED	5.0	2	4.9	4.9	92.7
WIDOW	6.0	3	7.3	7.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

## X151 N.CHILD.ARE INDEP.SV

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.0	34	82.9	87.2	87.2
	2.0	2	4.9	5.1	92.3
	3.0	1	2.4	2.6	94.9
	4.0	1	2.4	2.6	97.4
	5.0	1	2.4	2.6	100.0
		2	4.9	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X2A ZONE:ILL./HIGH.DEM=1

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LEGAL/LOW DEM.	.00	10	24.4	24.4	24.4
ILLEGAL/HIGH DEM.	1.00	31	75.6	75.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X38A TYPE GOOD:DURABILITY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS DURABLE	.00	16	39.0	39.0	39.0
MORE DURABLE	1.00	25	61.0	61.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X46A FULL LITERACY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
F.LITERACY	1.00	37	90.2	90.2	90.2
	2.00	4	9.8	9.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X47A RELIGION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO CATHOLIC	.00	10	24.4	24.4	24.4
CATHOLIC	1.00	31	75.6	75.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X85A WHO HELPED 1~~4~~SV JOB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOBODY	.00	14	34.1	35.0	35.0
SOMEONE	1.00	26	63.4	65.0	100.0
	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X48A WITH WHO CAME T/CITY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
W/OTH.PERS.	.00	15	36.6	68.2	68.2
ALONE	1.00	7	17.1	31.8	100.0
	.	19	46.3	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X85A WHO HELPED 1½SV JOB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOBODY	.00	14	34.1	35.0	35.0
SOMEONE	1.00	26	63.4	65.0	100.0
.	.	1	2.4	MISSING	
		-----	-----		
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X90A FUNDS BECOME OWNER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.00	19	46.3	54.3	54.3
OWN SAV.	1.00	16	39.0	45.7	100.0
.	.	6	14.6	MISSING	
		-----	-----		
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X104A WHY LEAV.SV SAME WAG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Y.HARD WORK	1.00	8	19.5	21.6	21.6
Y.LOW INCOME	2.00	1	2.4	2.7	24.3
Y.SECURITY	3.00	5	12.2	13.5	37.8
Y/H.W./L.I/S.	4.00	5	12.2	13.5	51.4
Y.OTHER REAS.	5.00	1	2.4	2.7	54.1
N.AUTONOMY	6.00	14	34.1	37.8	91.9
N/AUT./SKILL	7.00	1	2.4	2.7	94.6
N.SKILLS	8.00	1	2.4	2.7	97.3
N.OTHER REAS.	9.00	1	2.4	2.7	100.0
.	.	4	9.8	MISSING	
		-----	-----		
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X106A PROUD OF BEING SV?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS PROUD	.00	7	17.1	17.1	17.1
MORE PROUD	1.00	34	82.9	82.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X107A RISKY S.V.JOB?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS RISKY	.00	11	26.8	26.8	26.8
MORE RISKY	1.00	30	73.2	73.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X109A GLAD WITH SV EARNIN?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS GLAD	.00	8	19.5	19.5	19.5
MORE GLAD	1.00	33	80.5	80.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X110A IS HARD WORK SV?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS HARD	.00	23	56.1	56.1	56.1
MORE HARD	1.00	18	43.9	43.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X111A SV POSS.OTH.ACTIVIT?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS FLEX.	.00	8	19.5	19.5	19.5
MORE FLEX.	1.00	33	80.5	80.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

X137A LOTT:WHAT BUS.START

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO S.E. IN TRADE	.00	8	19.5	33.3	33.3
S.E. IN TRADE	1.00	16	39.0	66.7	100.0
		17	41.5	MISSING	
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		41	100.0	100.0	

## X18M23 EARNINGS LESS FEES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	100.00	1	2.4	2.4	2.4
	154.00	1	2.4	2.4	4.9
	300.00	1	2.4	2.4	7.3
	385.70	1	2.4	2.4	9.8
	390.00	1	2.4	2.4	12.2
	440.00	1	2.4	2.4	14.6
	557.18	1	2.4	2.4	17.1
	557.20	1	2.4	2.4	19.5
	685.80	2	4.9	4.9	24.4
	691.10	1	2.4	2.4	26.8
	750.00	1	2.4	2.4	29.3
	765.00	1	2.4	2.4	31.7
	814.30	2	4.9	4.9	36.6
	857.20	2	4.9	4.9	41.5
	900.00	1	2.4	2.4	43.9
	976.40	1	2.4	2.4	46.3
	985.80	1	2.4	2.4	48.8
	1050.00	1	2.4	2.4	51.2
	1093.00	1	2.4	2.4	53.7
	1114.40	1	2.4	2.4	56.1
	1128.56	1	2.4	2.4	58.5
	1200.00	1	2.4	2.4	61.0
	1285.80	1	2.4	2.4	63.4
	1307.30	1	2.4	2.4	65.9
	1414.30	1	2.4	2.4	68.3
	1483.10	1	2.4	2.4	70.7
	1500.00	1	2.4	2.4	73.2
	1993.00	2	4.9	4.9	78.0
	2000.00	1	2.4	2.4	80.5
	2014.40	1	2.4	2.4	82.9
	2061.50	1	2.4	2.4	85.4
	2175.00	1	2.4	2.4	87.8
	2207.30	1	2.4	2.4	90.2
	2500.00	1	2.4	2.4	92.7
	2528.70	1	2.4	2.4	95.1
	2571.60	1	2.4	2.4	97.6
	3043.06	1	2.4	2.4	100.0
	TOTAL	41	100.0	100.0	

**VII.3 TABLES**



**TABLE III.1 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION  
STREET VENDORS BY GENDER**

<b>GENDER:</b>	<b>Males</b>	<b>Females</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>n</b>
<b>1990 Census (Country) 1/</b>	74.3	25.7	100	505,960
<b>1990 Census (D.F.) 2/</b>	68.4	31.6	100	95,002
<b>INEGI: Sample A 3/</b>	66.8	33.2	100	241
<b>INEGI: Sample B 4/</b>	65.9	34.1	100	346
<b>Current Sample 5/</b>	58.5	41.5	100	41

1/ Street vendors in Mexico as a country. Source: INEGI, XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 1990.

2/ Street vendors in the Federal District of Mexico City. Same source as indicated in note 1.

3/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, 1989.

4/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 3.

5/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.2 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS BY AGE

AGE IN YEARS:	Less than 30	Between 30 and 4	Greater than 49	Total	n
INEGI: Sample D 1/ (non-street-traders)	44.9	41.6	13.6	100	5,348
INEGI: Sample C 2/ (street-traders)	33.5	42.8	23.7	100	173
INEGI: Sample A 3/	35.3	37.9	26.9	100	241
INEGI: Sample B 4/	35.0	38.4	26.6	100	346
Current Sample 5/	31.7	46.3	22.0	100	41

1/ Those people whose main occupation was not street vending. Source: INEGI. ENMAU-Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano. 1986.

2/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Same source as indicated in note 1.

3/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano. 1989.

4/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 3.

5/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.3 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS (GENDER BY AGE)

AGE IN YEARS:		Less than 30	Between 30 and 49	Greater than 49	Total	n
<i>Male</i>	INEGI: Sample A 1/	36.0	37.9	26.1	100	161
	INEGI: Sample B 2/	37.7	37.7	24.6	100	228
	Current Sample 3/	37.5	50.0	12.5	100	24
<i>Female</i>	INEGI: Sample A 1/	33.8	37.5	28.8	100	80
	INEGI: Sample B 2/	29.7	39.8	30.5	100	118
	Current Sample 3/	23.5	41.2	35.3	100	17

- 1/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, 1989.
- 2/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 3.
- 3/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

**TABLA III.4 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS BY YEARS OF EDUCATION**

<b>EDUCATION IN YEARS:</b>	<b>Less than 5</b>	<b>Equal to 5</b>	<b>Greater than 6</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>n</b>
<b>INEGI: Sample D 1/ (non-street-traders)</b>	17.4	21.4	61.2	100	5,349
<b>INEGI: Sample C 2/ (street-traders)</b>	40.5	29.5	30.1	100	173
<b>INEGI: Sample A 3/</b>	39.0	24.5	36.5	100	241
<b>INEGI: Sample B 4/</b>	38.7	24.6	36.7	100	346
<b>Current Sample 5/</b>	43.9	17.1	39.0	100	41

- 1/ Those people whose main occupation was not street vending. Source: INEGI. ENMAU-Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano. 1986.
- 2/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Same source as indicated in note 1.
- 3/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo
- 4/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 3.
- 5/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.5 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET TRADERS.  
GENDER BY YEARS OF EDUCATION

EDUCATION IN YEARS:		Less than 6	Equal to 6	Greater than 6	Total	n
<i>Male</i>	INEGI: Sample A 1/	32.9	27.3	39.8	100	161
	INEGI: Sample B 2/	32.9	25.0	42.1	100	228
	Current Sample 3/	25.0	25.0	50.0	100	24
<i>Female</i>	INEGI: Sample A 1/	51.3	18.8	30.0	100	80
	INEGI: Sample B 2/	50.0	23.7	26.3	100	118
	Current Sample 3/	70.6	05.9	23.5	100	17

1/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, 1989.

2/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 3.

3/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.6 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS BY PLACE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH:	Native	Migrants	Total	n
INEGI: Sample D 1/ (non-street-vendors)	60.8	39.2	100	5349
INEGI: Sample C 2/ (street-vendors)	51.5	48.6	100	173
Current Sample 3/	36.6	63.4	100	41

- 1/ Those people whose main occupation was not street vending. Source: INEGI. ENMAU-Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, 1986.
- 2/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending . Same source as indicated in note 1.
- 3/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.7 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS  
(PLACE OF BIRTH BY YEARS OF EDUCATION)

EDUCATION IN YEARS:		Less than 5	Equal to 5	Greater than 5	Total	n
INEGI: Sample D 1/ (non-street-vendors)	Natives	08.4	18.6	73.0	100	3250
	Migrants	31.3	25.8	42.9	100	2099
INEGI: Sample C 2/ (street-vendors)	Natives	24.7	33.7	41.6	100	89
	Migrants	57.1	25.0	17.9	100	84
Current Sample 3/	Natives	20.0	26.7	53.3	100	15
	Migrants	57.7	11.5	30.8	100	26

- 1/ Those people whose main occupation was not street vending. Source: INEGI.  
ENMAU- Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano. 1986.
- 2/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Same source as indicated  
in note 1.
- 3/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.8 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS  
(AGE BY YEARS OF EDUCATION)

EDUCATION IN YEARS		Less than 6	Equal to 6	Greater than 6	Total	n
AGE: less than 30	INEGI : Sample A 1/	15.3	21.2	63.5	100	85
	INEGI: Sample B 2/	17.4	18.2	64.5	100	121
	Current Sample 3/	30.8	7.7	61.5	100	13
between 30 and 49	INEGI : Sample A 1/	30.8	7.7	61.5	100	91
	INEGI: Sample B 2/	31.6	34.6	33.8	100	133
	Current Sample 3/	36.8	26.3	36.9	100	19
greater than 50	INEGI : Sample A 1/	81.5	15.4	3.1	100	65
	INEGI: Sample B 2/	77.2	18.5	4.4	100	92
	Current Sample 3/	77.8	11.1	11.1	100	9

1/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, 1989.

2/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 1.

3/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.



TABLE III.9 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS, BY INCOME 1/

CURRENT INCOME: (in times of minimum wage)	Less or Greater than		Greater than		Non registered	Total	n
	equal than 1	3 and less or equal 2	2 and less or equal 3	Greater than 3			
<b>Total Active Population (D.F.) 2/</b>	20.7	39.7	15.4	21.1	3.0	100	2,884,807
<b>Total Active Population in Commerce (D.F.) 3/</b>	24.6	36.6	14.7	20.8	3.2	100	494,797
<b>INEGI: Sample A 4/</b>	48.9	39.3	05.5	05.9	0.5	100	219
<b>INEGI: Sample B 5/</b>	44.5	38.2	07.5	08.8	0.9	100	319
<b>Current Sample 6/</b>	12.2	26.8	19.5	41.5	0.0	100	41

1/ Income is expressed in times of minimum wage. In the case of the study sample the figures correspond to gross earnings.

2/ Total active population in the Federal District of Mexico City. Source: INEGI. XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 1990.

3/ Active population in the commerce sector in the Federal District of Mexico City. Same source as indicated in note 2.

4/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, 1989.

5/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 4.

6/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.10 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS, BY WEEKLY HOURS WORKED

WEEKLY HOURS WORKED:		Less than 3	From 33 to 40	From 41 to 48	Greater than 48	Non egistere	n
<b>Total Active</b>							
Population 1990	1/	15.6	34.7	24.3	23.6	1.9	2,884,807
Street Vendors	2/	25.1	21.1	19.3	29.3	1.7	95,002
Current Sample	3/	10.3	20.5	28.5	41.0	0.0	39

1/ Total active population in the Federal District of Mexico City. Source: INEGI. XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 1990.

2/ Active population employed in street trading in the Federal District of Mexico City. Same Source as indicated in note 1.

3/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.11 PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STREET VENDORS. EDUCATION BY INCOME

CURRENT INCOME: (in times of Minimum Wage)		Less or Greater than Greater than					Non registered	Total	n
		equal than 1	1 and less or equal 2	2 and less or equal 3	Greater than 3	Greater than 3			
<i>less than 6</i>	INEGI : Sample A	60.5	32.1	4.9	01.2	01.2	100	81	
	INEGI: Sample B 2	50.8	34.2	7.5	06.7	0.8	100	120	
	Current Sample 3/	22.2	33.3	22.2	22.3	0.0	100	18	
<i>equal 6</i>	INEGI : Sample A	33.9	53.6	3.6	08.9	0.0	100	56	
	INEGI: Sample B 2	36.6	47.6	6.1	09.8	0.0	100	82	
	Current Sample 3/	14.3	14.3	28.6	42.9	0.0	100	7	
<i>greater than 6</i>	INEGI : Sample A	47.6	36.6	7.3	08.5	0.0	100	82	
	INEGI: Sample B 2	43.6	35.9	8.6	10.3	1.7	100	117	
	Current Sample 3/	0.0	25.0	12.5	62.5	0.0	100	16	

1/ Those people whose main occupation was street vending. Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, 1989.

2/ Those people working at the street or visiting customers. Same source as indicated in note 1.

3/ Convenience sample analyzed in this study.

TABLE III.12

MULTIPLE REGRESSION: EDUCATION EXPLAINED BY AGE; PLACE OF BIRTH; AND GENDER

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number  
 1.. X6 BORN IN THE CITY=1  
 2.. X3 GENDER MALE=1  
 3.. X4 AGE IN YEARS

Multiple R .69587  
 R Square .48423  
 Adjusted R Square .44242  
 Standard Error 2.79493

## Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	3	271.36010	90.45337
Residual	37	289.03014	7.81163

F = 11.57933      Signif F = .0000

\* \* \* \* M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1      Dependent Variable.. X5 EDUCATION IN YEARS

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
X6	1.40642	.90686	.18324	1.551	.1294
X3	1.89787	.91678	.25291	2.070	.0455
X4	-.14342	.03113	-.56281	-4.607	.0000
(Constant)	9.69550	1.50829		6.428	.0000

TABLE III.13

ANOVA: EDUCATION BY PARENT'S OCCUPATION, CONTROLLING BY  
AGE

\* \* \* A N A L Y S I S O F V A R I A N C E \* \* \*

X5 EDUCATION IN YEARS  
BY X11 PARENTS WERE S.V.=1  
WITH X4 AGE IN YEARS

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Signif of F
Covariates	217.565	1	217.565	25.449	.000
X4	217.565	1	217.565	25.449	.000
Main Effects	17.956	1	17.956	2.100	.155
X11	17.956	1	17.956	2.100	.155
Explained	235.522	2	117.761	13.775	.000
Residual	324.868	38	8.549		
Total	560.390	40	14.010		

TABLE III.14

MULTIPLE REGRESSION: EDUCATION EXPLAINED BY GENDER, AND  
AGE (FOR THE MIGRANT GROUP)

\*\*\*\*\* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \*\*\*\*\*

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. X5 EDUCATION IN YEARS

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1.. X3 GENDER MALE=1  
2.. X4 AGE IN YEARS

Multiple R .63438  
R Square .40243  
Adjusted R Square .35047  
Standard Error 3.08433

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	147.35280	73.67640
Residual	23	218.80105	9.51309

F = 7.74474 Signif F = .0027

\*\*\*\*\* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \*\*\*\*\*

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. X5 EDUCATION IN YEARS

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
X3	2.82455	1.24982	.37185	2.260	.0336
X4	-.12168	.04503	-.44467	-2.702	.0127
(Constant)	8.34161	2.06344		4.043	.0005

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

TABLE III.15

MULTIPLE REGRESSION: EDUCATION EXPLAINED BY GENDER, AND  
AGE (FOR THE NATIVE GROUP)

\* \* \* \* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X5    EDUCATION IN YEARS

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1..    X3            GENDER MALE=1  
2..    X4            AGE IN YEARS

Multiple R            .84185  
R Square              .70872  
Adjusted R Square    .66017  
Standard Error        2.07239

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	125.39566	62.69783
Residual	12	51.53768	4.29481

F =            14.59852            Signif F = .0006

\* \* \* \* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X5    EDUCATION IN YEARS

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
X3	.04556	1.16210	6.4981E-03	.039	.9694
X4	-.18273	.03608	-.83961	-5.065	.0003
(Constant)	13.72273	1.83064		7.496	.0000

End Block Number    1    All requested variables entered.

TABLE III. 16

## COMPARISON BETWEEN MALE AND FEMALE STREET SELLERS

VARIABLE	WHOLE SAMPLE	MALE	FEMALE
NUMBER OF CASES (X1)	41	24	17
PERCENTAGE OF CASES	100%	59%	41%
<b>I. DEMOGRAPHICS</b>			
I.1 AVERAGE AGE (X4)	37.9	34.8	42.4
I.2 PERCENTAGE OF LITERATE PEOPLE (X46A)	90.2	100.0	76.5
I.3 AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION (X5)	5.9	7.1	4.12
I.4 PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE BORN IN MEXICO CITY (X6)	36.6	37.5	35.3
I.5 PERCENT. OF VENDORS RESIDING IN MEX. CITY (X147)	87.8	87.5	88.2
I.6 PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WHO CAME ALONE TO THE CITY (X48A)	31.8	50.0	10.0
I.7 PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WITH A SPOUSE (X7)	75.6	87.5	58.8
I.8 AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN (X8)	3.4	2.9	4.18
I.9 AVERAGE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS AT THE HOUSEHOLD (X56)	5.2	4.9	5.8
I.10 AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS AT THE HOUSEHOLD WITH OWN INCOME (X24)	2.2	1.8	2.8
<b>II. LABOR HISTORY</b>			
II.1 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO CURRENTLY HAVE ANOTHER OCCUPATION (X72)	29.3	41.7	11.8
II.2 AVERAGE YEARS OF STRICT SENIORITY (X12)	12.8	9.8	17.1
II.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VENDING FOR ECONOMIC REASONS (X13)	80.0	87.0	70.6
II.4 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VENDING FOR PREFERENCE REASONS (X26)	47.5	56.5	35.3
II.5 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VENDING FOR KIN RELATIONSHIPS (X80)	27.5	21.7	35.3
II.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VEND. FOR PERSONAL LIMITATIONS (X81)	27.5	21.7	35.3



<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>WHOLE SAMPLE</b>	<b>MALE</b>	<b>FEMALE</b>
II.7 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO STARTED AS OWNERS OF THEIR STALL (X88)	63.4	50.0	82.4
II.8 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO STARTED-UP THEIR STALL WITH OWN SAVINGS (X90A)	45.7	54.5	50.0
II.9 AVERAGE AGE AT WHICH THE FIRST S.V. EXPERIENCE OCCURRED (X33)	20.5	21.6	19.0
II.10 AVERAGE GAP BETWEEN THE FIRST S.V. EXPERIENCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR OWN PERMANENT STALL (IN YEARS) (X32)	4.6	3.5	6.2
<b>III. KIN RELATIONSHIPS</b>			
III.1 AVERAGE NUMB.OF RELATIVES IN STREET VENDING (X10)	6.9	7.8	5.7
III.2 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHOSE PARENTS ALSO WORKED AS STREET VENDORS (X11)	51.2	50.0	52.9
<b>IV. BUSINESS OPERATIONS</b>			
IV.1 AVERAGE MONTHLY EARNINGS. IN N\$ (X18)	1345.0	1596.8	988.3
IV.2 AVERAGE VALUE OF INVENTORY IN N\$ (X19)	2300.0	3366.0	797.1
IV.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS OPERATING IN THE ILLEGAL-HIGH-DEMAND ZONE (X2A)	75.6	70.8	82.4
IV.4 AVERAGE MONTHLY FEE FOR PERMISSION (X23)	116.9	139.6	85.0
IV.5 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO SHIFT TO OTHER PRODUCT LINES (X119)	36.6	20.8	58.8
IV.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO SELL LESS-DURABLE-GOODS (X38A)	39.0	16.7	70.6
IV.7 AVERAGE NUMBER OF WORKERS AT THE STALL (X70)	1.7	1.7	1.7
IV.8 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO SELL IMPORTED GOODS (X44A)	29.3	37.5	17.6
<b>V. JOB ALTERNATIVES</b>			
V.1 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO HAVE SEARCHED FOR A DIFFERENT JOB (X82)	17.5	26.1	5.9
V.2 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED THAT THEY COULDN'T FIND ANOTHER JOB (X15)	41.5	33.3	52.9

VARIABLE	WHOLE SAMPLE	MALE	FEMALE
V.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO WOULDN'T TAKE A WAGE-JOB WITH IDENTICAL NET INCOME (X16)	47.5	54.2	37.5
V.4 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO WOULDN'T TAKE A WAGE-JOB AT ANY INCOME (X105)	26.8	33.3	17.6
V.5 AVERAGE WAGE REQUIRED TO TAKE A FORMAL JOB AS EMPLOYEE (X17)	1709.8	1888.0	1506.1
V.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO WOULD LEAVE STREET VENDING IF WINNING A LOTTERY (X20)	65.9	54.2	82.4
V.7 PERCENT.OF VENDORS WHO WOULD ST NEW BUSINESS IF WINNING A LOTTERY (X136)	62.5	60.9	64.7
V.8 PERCENT.OF VENDORS WHO WOULD START-UP A TRADE BUSINESS (X137A)	66.7	50.0	90.0
V.9 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO HAVE ADDITIONAL JOBS (X72)	29.3	41.7	11.8
<b>VI. OPTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS</b>			
VI.1 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED TO DISLIKE HAVING A BOSS, OR TO LIKE AUTONOMY IN STREET VENDING (X29)	73.7	65.2	86.7
VI.2 PERCENT. OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED TO BE "MORE PROUD" OF BEING A STREET VENDOR (X106A)	82.9	95.8	64.7
VI.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO CONSIDERED TO STREET VENDING AS "MORE RISKY" (X107A)	73.2	83.3	58.8
VI.4 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED TO BE "MORE GLAD" WITH CURRENT EARNINGS (X109A)	80.5	91.7	64.7
VI.5 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARE THAT THEY PREFER THEIR CHILDREN TO STUDY (X121)	78.0	70.8	88.2
VI.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARE THEY WANT THEIR CHILDREN TO BE STREET VENDORS (X122A)	38.1	21.4	71.4
VI.7 PERCENT.OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED THAT THEIR MAIN PROBLEM WAS LOW SALES (X114)	24.4	16.7	35.3

TABLE III.17

## CROSSTAB: FORMER JOB BY GENDER

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Crosstabulation: X153 FORMER SPECIFIC JOB  
By X3 GENDER MALE=1

X3->	Count	FEMALE	MALE	Row Total
	Row Pct			
	Col Pct	.0	1.0	
X153				
1.0	3			3
EMPLOY.SV STALL	100.0			7.3
	17.6			
2.0	1	3		4
EMP.NON SV TRADE	25.0	75.0		9.8
	5.9	12.5		
3.0	2	10		12
EMP.N.TR.N.FAM B	16.7	83.3		29.3
	11.8	41.7		
Column	17	24		41
(Continued) Total	41.5	58.5		100.0

X3->	Count	FEMALE	MALE	Row Total
	Row Pct			
	Col Pct	.0	1.0	
X153				
4.0	2			2
FARM FAM.EMPLOY.	100.0			4.9
	8.3			
6.0	3			3
HOME SERVANT	100.0			7.3
	17.6			
7.0	1	1		1
EMP.FAM.N.TR/FAR		100.0		2.4
		4.2		
Column	17	24		41
(Continued) Total	41.5	58.5		100.0

Crosstabulation: X153 FORMER SPECIFIC JOB  
By X3 GENDER MALE=1

	Count	FEMALE	MALE	Row Total
X1->	Row Pct			
	Col Pct	.0	1.0	
X153				
	8.0	8		8
HOUSEHOLD		100.0		19.5
		47.1		
	9.0		3	3
N.SV SELF EMP:			100.0	7.3
			12.5	
	10.0		2	2
ONLY STUDENT			100.0	4.9
			8.3	
Column		17	24	41
(Continued) Total		41.5	58.5	100.0

Crosstabulation: X153 FORMER SPECIFIC JOB  
By X3 GENDER MALE=1

	Count	FEMALE	MALE	Row Total
X3->	Row Pct			
	Col Pct	.0	1.0	
X153				
	11.0		2	2
STUD./FAM.WORK.			100.0	4.9
			8.3	
	12.0		1	1
UNEMPLOYED			100.0	2.4
			4.2	
Column		17	24	41
Total		41.5	58.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 0

TABLE III.18

CROSSTAB: AVAILABILITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN FORMER JOB  
BY GENDER

CROSSTABS X95 BY X3.

\*\*\*\*\* Given WORKSPACE allows for 5028 Cells with  
2 Dimensions for CROSSTAB problem \*\*\*\*\*-----  
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Crosstabulation: X95 SOC.SECUR.FRMR.JOB?  
By X3 GENDER MALE=1

X3->	Count	FEMALE	MALE	Row Total
X95	.0	6	7	13
NO	.	1	8	9
YES	1.0	7	15	22
Column Total		31.8	68.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 19

TABLE III.19

## CROSSTAB: SECOND CURRENT JOB BY GENDER

CROSSTABS X76 BY X3.

\*\*\*\*\* Given WORKSPACE allows for 5028 Cells with  
2 Dimensions for CROSSTAB problem \*\*\*\*\*

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Crosstabulation: X76 2.CURR.SPECIFIC JOB  
By X3 GENDER MALE=1

X3->	Count	FEMALE	MALE	Row Total
X76		.0	1.0	
3.0			1	1
N. TRADE N. FAM. EM				8.3
4.0			3	3
FARM FAM. EMPLOY.				25.0
7.0			1	1
FAM. N. TR. N. FARM				8.3
9.0	2	4		6
N. SV SELF-EMP.				50.0
Column	2	10		12
(Continued) Total	16.7	83.3		100.0

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Crosstabulation: X76 2.CURR.SPECIFIC JOB  
By X3 GENDER MALE=1

X3->	Count	FEMALE	MALE	Row Total
X76		.0	1.0	
10.0			1	1
STUDENT				8.3
Column	2	10		12
Total	16.7	83.3		100.0

Number of Missing Observations = 29

TABLE III. 20

## COMPARISON BETWEEN NATIVE AND MIGRANT STREET SELLERS

VARIABLE	WHOLE SAMPLE	BORN IN MEXICO CITY	BORN OUT OF MEX. CITY
NUMBER OF CASES (X1)	41	15	26
PERCENTAGE OF CASES	100%	37%	63%
AVERAGE NUMBER OF YERS SINCE MIGRATION (X148)	-----	-----	18.36
<b>I. DEMOGRAPHICS</b>			
I.1 PERCENTAGE OF MALE VENDORS (X3)	58.5	60.0	57.7
I.2 AVERAGE AGE (X4)	37.9	38.4	37.7
I.3 PERCENTAGE OF LITERATE PEOPLE (X46A)	90.2	93.3	88.5
I.4 AVERAGE YEARS OF EDUCATION (X5)	5.9	6.7	5.4
I.5 PERCENT. OF VENDORS RESIDING IN MEX. CITY (X147)	87.8	93.3	84.6
I.6 PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WHO CAME ALONE TO THE CITY (X48A)	31.8	-----	31.8
I.7 PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WITH A SPOUSE (X7)	75.6	73.3	76.9
I.8 AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN (X8)	3.4	3.0	3.7
I.9 AVERAGE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS AT THE HOUSEHOLD (X56)	5.2	4.2	5.8
I.10 AVERAGE NUM. OF PERSONS AT THEIR HOUSEHOLD WITH OWN INCOME (X24)	2.2	1.8	2.4
<b>II. LABOR HISTORY</b>			
II.1 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO CURRENTLY HAVE ANOTHER OCCUPATION (X72)	29.3	13.3	38.5
II.2 AVERAGE YEARS OF STRICT SENIORITY (X12)	12.8	12.9	12.8
II.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VENDING FOR ECONOMIC REASONS (X13)	80.0	78.6	80.8
II.4 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VENDING FOR PREFERENCE REASONS (X26)	47.5	42.9	50.0
II.5 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VENDING FOR KIN RELATIONSHIPS (X80)	27.5	42.9	19.2

<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>WHOLE SAMPLE</b>	<b>BORN IN MEXICO CITY</b>	<b>BORN OUT OF MEX. CITY</b>
II.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO ADOPTED STREET VEND.FOR PERSONAL LIMITATIONS (X81)	27.5	50.0	15.4
II.7 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO STARTED AS OWNERS OF THEIR STALL (X88)	63.4	40.0	76.9
II.8 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO STARTED-UP THEIR STALL WITH OWN SAVINGS (X90A)	45.7	38.5	50.0
II.9 AVERAGE AGE AT WHICH THE FIRST STREET VENDING EXPERIENCE OCCURRED (X33)	20.5	17.7	22.1
II.10 AVERAGE GAP BETWEEN THE FIRST S.V. EXPERIENCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR OWN PERMANENT STALL (IN YEARS) (X32)	4.6	7.8	2.7
<b>III. KIN RELATIONSHIPS</b>			
III.1 AVERAGE NUMB.OF RELATIVES IN STREET VENDING (X10)	6.9	6.3	7.3
III.2 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHOSE PARENTS ALSO WORKED AS STREET VENDORS (X11)	51.2	73.3	38.5
<b>IV. BUSINESS OPERATIONS</b>			
IV.1 AVERAGE MONTHLY EARNINGS. IN N\$ (X18)	1345.0	1359.0	1336.3
IV.2 AVERAGE VALUE OF INVENTORY IN N\$ (X19)	2300.0	1711.0	2641.4
IV.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS OPERATING IN THE ILLEGAL-HIGH-DEMAND ZONE (X2A)	75.6	73.3	76.9
IV.4 AVERAGE MONTHLY FEE FOR PERMISSION (X23)	116.9	65.7	146.5
IV.5 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO SHIFT TO OTHER PRODUCT LINES (X119)	36.6	40.0	34.6
IV.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO SELL LESS-DURABLE-GOODS (X38A)	39.0	53.3	30.8
IV.7 AVERAGE NUMBER OF WORKERS AT THE STALL (X70)	1.7	1.7	1.7
IV.8 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO SELL IMPORTED GOODS (X44A)	29.3	60.0	11.5
<b>V. JOB ALTERNATIVES</b>			
V.1 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO HAVE SEARCHED FOR A DIFFERENT JOB (X82)	17.5	14.3	19.2



<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>WHOLE SAMPLE</b>	<b>BORN IN MEXICO CITY</b>	<b>BORN OUT OF MEX. CITY</b>
V.2 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED THAT THEY COULDN'T FIND ANOTHER JOB (X15)	41.5	53.3	34.6
V.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO WOULDN'T TAKE A WAGE-JOB WITH IDENTICAL NET INCOME (X16)	47.5	40.0	52.0
V.4 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO WOULDN'T TAKE A WAGE-JOB AT ANY INCOME (X105)	26.8	26.7	26.9
V.5 AVERAGE WAGE REQUIRED TO TAKE A FORMAL JOB AS EMPLOYEE (X17)	1709.8	1858.5	1623.7
V.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO WOULD LEAVE STREET VENDING IF WINNING A LOTTERY (X20)	65.9	46.7	76.9
V.7 PERCENT. OF VENDORS WHO WOULD START-UP A NEW BUSINESS IF WINNING A LOTTERY (X136)	62.5	46.7	72.0
V.8 PERCENT. OF VENDORS WHO WOULD START-UP A TRADE BUSINESS (X137A)	66.7	100.0	52.9
<b>VI. OPTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS</b>			
VI.1 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED TO DISLIKE HAVING A BOSS, OR TO LIKE AUTONOMY IN STREET VENDING (X29)	73.7	71.4	75.0
VI.2 PERCENT. OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED TO BE "MORE PROUD" OF BEING A STREET VENDOR (X106A)	82.9	86.7	80.8
VI.3 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO CONSIDERED TO STREET VENDING AS "MORE RISKY" (X107A)	73.2	66.7	76.9
VI.4 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED TO BE "MORE GLAD" WITH CURRENT EARNINGS (X109A)	80.5	86.7	76.9
VI.5 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED THAT THEY PREFER THEIR CHILDREN TO STUDY (X121)	78.0	93.3	69.2
VI.6 PERCENTAGE OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED THEY WANT THEIR CHILDREN TO BE STREET VENDORS (X122A)	38.1	12.5	53.8
VI.7 PERCENT. OF VENDORS WHO DECLARED THAT THEIR MAIN PROBLEM WAS LOW SALES (X114)	24.4	6.7	34.6

TABLE III.21

LOGISTIC REGRESSION: PERCEIVED EXISTENCE OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES (YES=1, NO=0=), EXPLAINED BY A FACTOR SCORE (AGE/EDUCATION); AND PLACE OF BIRTH

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES X15 WITH FSX4X51 X6/METHOD ENTER.

-----  
 Page 43 SPSS/PC+  
 Total number of cases: 41 (Unweighted)  
 Number of selected cases: 41  
 Number of unselected cases: 0  
  
 Number of selected cases: 41  
 Number rejected because of missing data: 0  
 Number of cases included in the analysis: 41

Dependent Variable Encoding:

Original Value	Internal Value
.0	0
1.0	1

-----  
 Page 44 SPSS/PC+  
 Dependent Variable.. X15 CAPABLE OTHER JOB=1

Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function

-2 Log Likelihood 55.637072

\* Constant is included in the model.

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number  
 1.. FSX4X51 FACTOR SCORE X4 X5  
 X6 BORN IN THE CITY=1

Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
-2 Log Likelihood	34.170	38	.6472
Model Chi-Square	21.467	2	.0000
Improvement	21.467	2	.0000
Goodness of Fit	.40.909	38	.3440

Page 45  
 Classification Table for X15

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		Predicted		Percent Correct
		NOT CAPABLE N	OTHECAPABLE C	
Observed				
NOT CAPABLE OTHE	N	12	5	70.59%
CAPABLE OTHER JO	C	2	22	91.67%
Overall				82.93%

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
FSX4X51	-2.1489	.6776	10.0576	1	.0015	-.3806	.1166
X6	-2.0197	1.0551	3.6647	1	.0556	-.1730	.1327
Constant	1.1720	.5861	3.9981	1	.0456		

- - - - F A C T O R   A N A L Y S I S   - - - -

Analysis Number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values

Extraction 1 for Analysis 1, Principal-Components Analysis (PC)

Initial Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X4	1.00000	*	1	1.62309	81.2	81.2
X5	1.00000	*	2	.37691	18.8	100.0

PC Extracted 1 factors.

Factor Matrix:

	FACTOR 1
X4	.90086
X5	-.90086

Final Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X4	.81154	*	1	1.62309	81.2	81.2
X5	.81154	*				

Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.

WARNING 11310

FACTOR CANNOT ROTATE A ONE-FACTOR SOLUTION.

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: AGE AND EDUCATION

TABLE III.22

TABLE III.23

LOGISTIC REGRESSION: THE VENDOR WOULD SHIFT TO A SAME-INCOME FORMAL JOB (YES=1, NO=0), EXPLAINED BY THEIR DISLIKE OF HAVING BOSS (YES=1, NO=0); AND HOW HARD PERCEIVE THEIR JOB (HARDER=1, LESS HARD=0)

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES X16 WITH X27 X110A /METHOD ENTER.

```

-----
Page 49                               SPSS/PC+
Total number of cases:                41 (Unweighted)
Number of selected cases:             41
Number of unselected cases:           0

Number of selected cases:              41
Number rejected because of missing data: 1
Number of cases included in the analysis: 40

```

Dependent Variable Encoding:

Original Value	Internal Value
.0	0
1.0	1

```

-----
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Dependent Variable..  X16             LEAVE SV SAME WAGE=1

```

Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function

-2 Log Likelihood 55.351733

\* Constant is included in the model.

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1..	X27	WOULD DISLIKE BOSS=1
	X110A	IS HARD WORK SV?

Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
-2 Log Likelihood	42.098	37	.2597
Model Chi-Square	13.253	2	.0013
Improvement	13.253	2	.0013
Goodness of Fit	39.720	37	.3498

		Predicted		Percent Correct
		NOT LEAVE SV SAM N	LEAVE SV SAME WA L	
Observed				
NOT LEAVE SV SAM	N	14	5	73.68%
LEAVE SV SAME WA	L	5	16	76.19%
Overall				75.00%

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
X27	-2.3247	.7856	8.7578	1	.0031	-.3494	.0978
X110A	1.2861	.7923	2.6351	1	.1045	.1071	3.6185
Constant	.6594	.5827	1.2806	1	.2578		

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: AGE, EDUCATION,  
 NUMBER OF CHILDREN, TENURE, AND PERCEPTION OF JOB  
 OPPORTUNITIES

TABLE III.24

- - - - FACTOR ANALYSIS - - - -

Analysis Number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values

Extraction 1 for Analysis 1, Principal-Components Analysis (PC)

Initial Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X4	1.00000	*	1	3.34720	66.9	66.9
X5	1.00000	*	2	.64509	12.9	79.8
X8	1.00000	*	3	.45793	9.2	89.0
X12	1.00000	*	4	.38416	7.7	96.7
X15	1.00000	*	5	.16562	3.3	100.0

FACTOR 1

X4	.93300
X5	-.72038
X8	.83814
X12	.81523
X15	-.76857

Final Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X4	.87049	*	1	3.34720	66.9	66.9
X5	.51894	*				
X8	.70247	*				
X12	.66460	*				
X15	.59070	*				

TABLE III.25

LOGISTIC REGRESSION: THE VENDOR WOULD SHIFT TO A FORMAL JOB WITH AN "ADEQUATE" INCOME (YES=1, NO=0); EXPLAINED BY A FACTOR SCORE (AGE/EDUCATION/NUMBER OF CHILDREN/TENURE/PERCEPTION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES); IF THEIR ENTRY DECISION WAS MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC NECESSITY (YES=1, NO=0); AND IF THEY WOULD LEAVE STREET TRADE IF WINNING A LOTTERY PRIZE (YES=1, NO=0)

Page 59 SPSS/PC+  
 Total number of cases: 41 (Unweighted)  
 Number of selected cases: 41  
 Number of unselected cases: 0

Number of selected cases: 41  
 Number rejected because of missing data: 1  
 Number of cases included in the analysis: 40

## Dependent Variable Encoding:

Original Value	Internal Value
.0	0
1.0	1

-----  
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 Dependent Variable.. X105 LEAVE SV HIGHR.WAGE?

Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function

-2 Log Likelihood 47.053502

\* Constant is included in the model.

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number  
 1.. FSX1051 F.S.X4 X5 X8 X12 X15  
 X13 ENTRY:NECESSITY=1  
 X20 LEAVE SV/LOTTERY=1

Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
-2 Log Likelihood	29.287	36	.7783
Model Chi-Square	17.766	3	.0005
Improvement	17.766	3	.0005
Goodness of Fit	27.558	36	.8426



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## Classification Table for X105

		Predicted		Percent Correct
		NO	YES	
Observed		N	Y	
NO	N	6	5	54.55%
YES	Y	4	25	86.21%
Overall				77.50%

## ----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
FSX1051	-.9867	.5543	3.1682	1	.0751	-.1576	.3728
X13	2.1936	1.1384	3.7131	1	.0540	.1908	8.9673
X20	2.6325	1.0249	6.5971	1	.0102	.3126	13.9087
Constant	-1.9127	1.1609	2.7148	1	.0994		

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This procedure was completed at 12:53:09

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TABLE III.26

MULTIPLE REGRESSION: LEVEL OF WAGE REQUIRED TO SHIFT TO A FORMAL JOB, EXPLAINED BY THEIR LIKE FOR AUTONOMY (HIGH=1, LOW=0); AND CURRENT EARNINGS

REGRESSION VARIABLES X17 X18 X29/DEPENDENT X17/METHOD ENTER.

\* \* \* \* M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N \* \* \* \*

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X17    WAGE TO LEAVE S.V.

Beginning Block Number 1.    Method:    Enter

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X17    WAGE TO LEAVE S.V.

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1..    X29    LIKES FREED=1 X27/28  
2..    X18    EARNINGS IN S.V.

Multiple R                    .83624  
R Square                      .69930  
Adjusted R Square            .67424  
Standard Error               486.57917

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	13214118.01758	6607059.00879
Residual	24	5682222.88316	236759.28680

F =            27.90623            Signif F =    .0000

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
X29	911.10900	276.52010	.51340	3.295	.0030
X18	1.36175	.19156	1.10766	7.109	.0000
(Constant)	-774.66590	428.76757		-1.807	.0834

End Block Number 1    All requested variables entered.

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This procedure was completed at 12:56:36

TABLE III.27

LOGISTIC REGRESSION: THE VENDOR WOULD LEAVE STREET TRADE  
IF WINNING A LOTTERY PRIZE (YES=1, NO =0), EXPLAINED BY  
GENDER (MALE=1, FEMALE=0); PLACE OF BIRTH (NATIVE=1,  
MIGRANT=0); AND, IF THE VENDOR WOULD SHIFT TO A FORMAL  
JOB WITH AN "ADEQUATE" INCOME (YES=1, NO=0)

Dependent Variable.. X20 LEAVE SV/LOTTERY=1  
Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function  
-2 Log Likelihood 52.644113  
\* Constant is included in the model.

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number  
1.. X3 GENDER MALE=1  
X6 BORN IN THE CITY=1  
X105 LEAVE SV HIGHR.WAGE?  
X113 MAIN PROBLEM:W/AUTHO

Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because  
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
-2 Log Likelihood	30.381	36	.7325
Model Chi-Square	22.263	4	.0002
Improvement	22.263	4	.0002
Goodness of Fit	38.287	36	.3660

Classification Table for X20

		Predicted		Percent Correct
		NO LEAVE SV:LOTTYES	LEAVE SV:LOT	
Observed		N	Y	
	NO LEAVE SV:LOTT	N	12	2
YES LEAVE SV:LOT	Y	6	21	77.78%
Overall				80.49%

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
X3	-2.5525	1.2832	3.9569	1	.0467	-.1928	.0779
X6	-3.0647	1.3057	5.5097	1	.0189	-.2582	.0467
X105	3.6125	1.3531	7.1281	1	.0076	.3121	37.0582
X113	2.5651	1.3707	3.5022	1	.0613	.1689	13.0023
Constant	-.5870	1.1841	.2458	1	.6200		

TABLE III.28

LOGISTIC REGRESSION: THE VENDOR WOULD START A NEW BUSINESS IF WINNING A LOTTERY PRIZE (YES=1, NO=0); EXPLAINED BY A FACTOR SCORE (AGE/PERCEPTION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES/THE VENDOR WOULD SHIFT TO A FORMAL JOB WITH AN "ADEQUATE" INCOME); THE DEGREE OF PRIDE OF BEING A STREET VENDOR (HIGHER=1, LOWER=0); AND THE DEGREE OF PERCEIVED RISK IN STREET VENDING (HIGHER=1, LOWER=0)

Dependent Variable.. X136 LOTTER:START NEW BUS  
 Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function  
 -2 Log Likelihood 52.925059  
 \* Constant is included in the model.

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number  
 1.. FSX1361 F.S.X4 X15 X105  
 X106A PROUD OF BEING SV?  
 X107A RISKY S.V.JOB?

Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
-2 Log Likelihood	36.839	36	.4299
Model Chi-Square	16.086	3	.0011
Improvement	16.086	3	.0011
Goodness of Fit	36.457	36	.4474

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Classification Table for X136

		Predicted		Percent Correct
		NO	YES	
Observed		N	Y	
NO	N	12	3	80.00†
YES	Y	2	23	92.00†
Overall				87.50†

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
FSX1361	1.4285	.5156	7.6748	1	.0056	.3274	4.1724
X106A	-2.6534	1.4110	3.5363	1	.0600	-.1704	.0704
X107A	2.0969	1.0150	4.2679	1	.0388	.2070	8.1405
Constant	1.3307	1.2903	1.0636	1	.3024		

-----  
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This procedure was completed at 13:08:14

-----  
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TABLE III.29

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: AGE, PERCEPTION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES (YES=1, NO=0); AND IF THE VENDOR WOULD SHIFT TO A FORMAL JOB WITH AN "ADEQUATE" INCOME (YES=1, NO=0)

----- FACTOR ANALYSIS -----

Analysis Number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values

Extraction 1 for Analysis 1, Principal-Components Analysis (PC)

Initial Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X4	1.00000	*	1	1.89315	63.1	63.1
X15	1.00000	*	2	.82973	27.7	90.8
X105	1.00000	*	3	.27712	9.2	100.0

PC Extracted 1 factors.

Factor Matrix:

	FACTOR 1
X4	-.89273
X15	.89051
X105	.55061

-----  
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----- FACTOR ANALYSIS -----

Final Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X4	.79696	*	1	1.89315	63.1	63.1
X15	.79301	*				
X105	.30318	*				

TABLE III.30

**MULTIPLE REGRESSION: CURRENT EARNINGS EXPLAINED BY THE VALUE OF STOCK; ZONE OF OPERATION (ILLEGAL HIGH-DEMAND ZONE=1, LEGAL LOW-DEMAND ZONE=0); PERCEPTION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES (YES=1, NO=0); AND GENDER (MALE=1, FEMALE=0)**

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\* \* \* \* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X18    EARNINGS IN S.V.

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1..	X19	VALUE OF INVENTORY
2..	X2A	ZONE:ILL./HIGH.DEM=1
3..	X15	CAPABLE OTHER JOB=1
4..	X3	GENDER MALE=1

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\* \* \* \* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X18    EARNINGS IN S.V.

Multiple R	.70438
R Square	.49615
Adjusted R Square	.44017
Standard Error	574.93212

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	4	11717862.64465	2929465.66116
Residual	36	11899689.77096	330546.93808

F =            8.86248            Signif F = .0000



-----  
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\* \* \* \* M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X18    EARNINGS IN S.V.

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
X19	.07469	.03172	.31965	2.355	.0241
X2A	584.73346	221.31750	.33085	2.642	.0121
X15	543.27581	199.91089	.35265	2.718	.0100
X3	377.45451	201.11890	.24501	1.877	.0687
(Constant)	191.59199	261.23400		.733	.4681

End Block Number    1    All requested variables entered.

-----  
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REGRESSION VARIABLES X23 FSX231 FSX11X61 X31/DEPENDENT X23/METHOD ENTER

\*\*\*\*\* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \*\*\*\*\*

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. X23 FEE FOR PERMISSION

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter

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\*\*\*\*\* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \*\*\*\*\*

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. X23 FEE FOR PERMISSION

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1.. X31 HAS NO LEADER=1  
2.. FSX231 F.S. X72 X4 X12 X18  
3.. FSX11X61 F.S. X11 X6

Multiple R .61955  
R Square .38384  
Adjusted R Square .33388  
Standard Error 120.77842

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	3	336227.50563	112075.83521
Residual	37	539734.76153	14587.42599

F = 7.68304 Signif F = .0004

MULTIPLE REGRESSION: LEVEL OF FEES PAID, EXPLAINED BY THE  
DEPENDENCE ON A LEADER (NO=1, YES=0); A FACTOR SCORE (THE  
VENDOR HAS ANOTHER OCCUPATION/AGE/TENURE/CURRENT  
EARNINGS); AND ANOTHER FACTOR SCORE (PARENTS'  
OCCUPATION/PLACE OF BIRTH)

TABLE III.31

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\* \* \* \* MULTIPLE REGRESSION \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X23    FEE FOR PERMISSION

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
X31	79.07441	38.37812	.27041	2.060	.0464
FSX231	-63.68982	19.46566	-.43039	-3.272	.0023
FSX11X61	-42.37464	19.61356	-.28635	-2.160	.0373
(Constant)	76.43750	27.24320		2.806	.0080

End Block Number 1    All requested variables entered.

-----  
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This procedure was completed at 13:24:22

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- - - - F A C T O R   A N A L Y S I S   - - - -

Analysis Number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values

Extraction 1 for Analysis 1, Principal-Components Analysis (PC)

Initial Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X72	1.00000	*	1	2.15971	54.0	54.0
X4	1.00000	*	2	.83671	20.9	74.9
X12	1.00000	*	3	.73301	18.3	93.2
X18	1.00000	*	4	.27058	6.8	100.0

Factor Matrix:

	FACTOR 1
X72	-.64548
X4	.84202
X12	.84343
X18	-.56806

Final Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X72	.41664	*	1	2.15971	54.0	54.0
X4	.70900	*				
X12	.71137	*				
X18	.32269	*				

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: THE VENDOR HAS ANOTHER JOB (YES=1, NO=0); AGE, TENURE, AND CURRENT EARNINGS

TABLE III.32

TABLE III.33

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR ANALYSIS: PARENTS' JOB  
 (STREET TRADER=1, OTHERWISE=0); PLACE OF BIRTH (NATIVE=1,  
 MIGRANT=0)

- - - - FACTOR ANALYSIS - - - -

Analysis Number 1 Listwise deletion of cases with missing values

Extraction 1 for Analysis 1, Principal-Components Analysis (PC)

Initial Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X11	1.00000	*	1	1.33603	66.8	66.8
X6	1.00000	*	2	.66397	33.2	100.0

PC Extracted 1 factors.

Factor Matrix:

	FACTOR 1
X11	.81732
X6	.81732

Final Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
X11	.66802	*	1	1.33603	66.8	66.8
X6	.66802	*				

TABLE III.34

LOGISTIC REGRESSION: ZONE OF OPERATION (ILLEGAL HIGH-DEMAND ZONE=1, LEGAL LOW-DEMAND ZONE=0); EXPLAINED BY TENURE, AND CURRENT EARNINGS NET OF FEES

Page 127 SPSS/PC+  
Total number of cases: 41 (Unweighted)  
Number of selected cases: 41  
Number of unselected cases: 0  
  
Number of selected cases: 41  
Number rejected because of missing data: 0  
Number of cases included in the analysis: 41

## Dependent Variable Encoding:

Original Value	Internal Value
.00	0
1.00	1

-----  
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Dependent Variable.. X2A ZONE:ILL./HIGH.DEM=1

Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function

-2 Log Likelihood 45.554001

\* Constant is included in the model.

Beginning Block Number ` 1. Method: Enter

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number  
1.. X12 STRICT SENIORITY YRS  
X18M23 EARNINGS LESS FEES

Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because  
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
-2 Log Likelihood	30.304	38	.8086
Model Chi-Square	15.250	2	.0005
Improvement	15.250	2	.0005
Goodness of Fit	30.613	38	.7972

-----

		Predicted		Percent Correct
		LEGAL/LOW DEM. L	ILLEGAL/HIGH DEM I	
Observed				
LEGAL/LOW DEM.	L	7	3	70.00%
ILLEGAL/HIGH DEM	I	3	28	90.32%
Overall				85.37%

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
X12	.1922	.0797	5.8139	1	.0159	.2893	1.2119
X18M23	.0016	.0008	3.8808	1	.0488	.2032	1.0016
Constant	-2.4239	1.1735	4.2667	1	.0389		

TABLE III.35

MULTIPLE REGRESSION: LEVEL OF FEES PAID; EXPLAINED BY  
YEARS OF RESIDENCE IN THE CITY; AND DEPENDENCE ON A  
LEADER (NO=1, YES=0); (FOR THE MIGRANT GROUP)

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REGRESSION VARIABLES X23 X31 X148/DEPENDENT X23/METHOD ENTER.

\* \* \* \* M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N \* \* \* \*

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X23    FEE FOR PERMISSION

Beginning Block Number 1.    Method:    Enter

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\* \* \* \* M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X23    FEE FOR PERMISSION

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1..	X148	YRS.SINCE MIGRATION
2..	X31	HAS NO LEADER=1

Multiple R	.60879
R Square	.37062
Adjusted R Square	.30437
Standard Error	151.34072

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	256260.33540	128130.16770
Residual	19	435176.26243	22904.01381

F =            5.59422            Signif F =    .0123



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\* \* \* \* M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N \* \* \* \*

Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..    X23    FEE FOR PERMISSION

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
X148	-5.08664	2.55847	-.36185	-1.988	.0614
X31	174.64644	64.80045	.49053	2.695	.0143
(Constant)	165.38179	64.09966		2.580	.0183

TABLE III.36

LOGISTIC REGRESSION: ZONE OF OPERATION (ILLEGAL HIGH-  
DEMAND ZONE=1, LEGAL LOW-DEMAND ZONE=0) EXPLAINED BY  
YEARS OF RESIDENCE IN THE CITY, AND CURRENT EARNINGS NET  
OF FEES, (FOR THE MIGRANT GROUP)

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES X2A WITH X148 X18M23.

```

-----
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Total number of cases:                 41 (Unweighted)
Number of selected cases:              41
Number of unselected cases:           0

Number of selected cases:              41
Number rejected because of missing data: 19
Number of cases included in the analysis: 22

```

Dependent Variable Encoding:

Original Value	Internal Value
.00	0
1.00	1

```

-----
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Dependent Variable..  X2A              ZONE:ILL./HIGH.DEM=1

```

Beginning Block Number 0. Initial Log Likelihood Function

-2 Log Likelihood 25.781915

\* Constant is included in the model.

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter

Variable(s)	Entered on Step Number
1.. X148	YRS.SINCE MIGRATION
X18M23	EARNINGS LESS FEES

Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because  
Log Likelihood decreased by less than .01 percent.

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
-2 Log Likelihood	17.388	19	.5636
Model Chi-Square Improvement	8.394	2	.0150
Goodness of Fit	16.967	19	.5921

Classification Table for X2A

Observed		Predicted		Percent Correct
		LEGAL/LOW DEM. L	ILLEGAL/HIGH DEM I	
LEGAL/LOW DEM.	L	4	2	66.67%
ILLEGAL/HIGH DEM	I	2	14	87.50%
Overall				81.82%

## ----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
X148	.1178	.0693	2.8907	1	.0891	.1859	1.1250
X18M23	.0027	.0018	2.4349	1	.1187	.1299	1.0027
Constant	-3.7592	2.1995	2.9212	1	.0874		

TABLE III.37 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN YEARS OF EDUCATION (X5), AND OTHER VARIABLES

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: MORE EDUCATED VENDORS TEND:
X3:Male (1) Female (0)	+ 0.40 (0.005)	To be males
X4:Age in years	- 0.62 (0.000)	To be younger
X6:Native=1; migrant=0	+ 0.18 (0.136)	To be natives
X12:Seniority in years	- 0.49 (0.001)	To be short-tenured
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.36 (0.010)	To perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation
X18:Average monthly earnings	+ 0.45 (0.001)	To have greater current earnings
X19:Current value of stock	+ 0.44 (0.002)	To have a greater value of stock
X21:Member of PRI (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.31 (0.024)	Not to be affiliated with PRI
X29:Consider autonomy as valuable (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.40 (0.007)	Not to consider autonomy as valuable
X88:The vendor started as owner (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.30 (0.029)	To start in street vending as employees
X105:The vendor would shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.37(0.009)	To be willing to shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income
X38A:The vendor sells (more) durable goods (1); Otherwise (0)	+ 0.35 (0.012)	To sell (more) durable goods

X44A:The vendor sells imported goods (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.31 (0.024)	To sell imported goods
--	----------------	---------------------------

**TABLE III.38 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEIVED CAPABILITY TO GETTING A DIFFERENT OCCUPATION (X15), OTHER VARIABLES 1**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS CAPABLE TO GET A DIFFERENT OCCUPATION TEND:
X4:Age in years	- 0.72 (0.000)	To be younger
X5:Education in years	+ 0.36 (0.010)	To be more educated
X6:		
X12:Seniority in years	- 0.51 (0.000)	To be short-tenured
X18:Average monthly earnings	+ 0.42 (0.003)	To have greater current earnings
X19:Current value of stock	+ 0.31 (0.025)	To have a greater value of stock
X23:Average monthly fee	+ 0.36 (0.010)	To pay higher fees
X72:The vendor has another job (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.54 (0.000)	To have another job
X105:The vendor would shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.27 (0.042)	To be willing to shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income
X136:The vendor would start a new business if winning a lottery prize (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.32 (0.023)	To be willing to start a new business with such money
X148: Length of residence in the city (only for permanent migrants)	- 0.60 (0.002)	To have less years in the city (if migrants)

1 Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor considered him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation, and zero, otherwise.

**TABLE III.39 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VENDORS' WILL TO  
SHIFT TO A FORMAL JOB WITH IDENTICAL NET INCOME  
(X16), AND OTHER VARIABLES 1**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS WILLING TO SHIFT TO A FORMAL WAGE JOB WITH IDENTICAL NET INCOME TEND:
X17:Required monthly salary to shift to a formal wage job	- 0.35 (0.029)	To require lower salaries to shift to a formal wage job
X20:The vendor would leave street trade if winning a lottery prize (1=yes; 0=otherwise)	+ 0.35 (0.013)	To will leaving street trade if winning a lottery prize
X27:The vendor declared to dislike having a boss (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.50 (0.001)	Not to dislike having a boss
X29:The vendor considers autonomy as valuable (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.26 (0.060)	Not to consider autonomy as valuable
X72:The vendor has a second job (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.25 (0.059)	Not to have a second job
X86:The vendor has recommended or helped other people to enter into street selling (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.28 (0.046)	Not to recommended or help other people to enter street trade
X100:The vendor can earn more in other jobs	- 0.29 (0.087)	To declare they cannot earn more in other jobs

X133: The vendor did not acquire permanent stall because of economic constraints (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.38 (0.011)	To be limited to acquire a permanent stall due to economic constraints
X110A: The vendor considered street vending to be a hard work (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.26 (0.055)	To consider street vending to be a hard work

1 Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor declared to be willing to shift to a formal wage job with identical net income as street vending; and zero, otherwise.



**TABLE III.40 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VENDORS' WILL TO SHIFT TO A FORMAL JOB WITH AN 'ADEQUATE' INCOME (X105), AND OTHER VARIABLES 1**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS WILLING TO SHIFT TO A FORMAL WAGE JOB WITH AN 'ADEQUATE' NET INCOME TEND:
X4:Age in years	- 0.28 (0.039)	To be younger
X5:Education in years	+ 0.37 (0.009)	To be more educated
X13:The vendor entered into street trade due to economic reasons (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.39 (0.006)	To enter into street trade due to economic reasons
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.27 (0.042)	To perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation
X20:The vendor would leave street trade if winning a lottery prize (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.49 (0.001)	To leave street trade if winning a lottery prize
X27:The vendor declared to dislike having a boss (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.29 (0.023)	Not to dislike having a boss
X29:The vendor considers autonomy as valuable (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.25 (0.065)	Not to consider autonomy as valuable
X100:The vendor can earn more in other jobs	- 0.29 (0.087)	To declare they cannot earn more in other jobs

X136: The vendor would start a new business if winning a lottery prize (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.39 (0.007)	To be willing to start a new business with such money
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1 Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor declared to be willing to shift to a formal wage job with an 'adequate' net income; an zero, otherwise.

**TABLE III.41 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE WAGE REQUIRED BY  
THE VENDOR TO SHIFT TO A FORMAL JOB (X17), AND OTHER  
VARIABLES**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS REQUIRING A HIGHER WAGE TEND:
X5:Education in years	+ 0.37 (0.022)	To be more educated
X10:Number of relatives who are independent vendors	+ 0.28 (0.064)	To have more relatives who are independent vendors
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.30 (0.052)	To perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation
X18:Average monthly earnings	+ 0.75 (0.000)	To have greater current earnings
X19:Current value of stock	+ 0.43 (0.009)	To have a greater value of stock
X20:The vendor would leave street trade if winning a lottery prize (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.50 (0.002)	Not to leave street trade if winning a lottery prize
X29:The vendor considers autonomy as valuable (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.26 (0.098)	Not to consider autonomy as valuable *
X2A:The vendor operates in the illegal high-demand zone (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.31 (0.050)	To operate in the illegal high-demand zone

X44A: The vendor sells imported goods (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.30 (0.056)	To sell imported goods
---	----------------	---------------------------

\* The Regression Analysis presented in Table III.26 shows that the effect of X29 on X17 is positive, after controlling by current earnings.

**TABLE III.42 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VENDOR'S DECISION TO LEAVE OR NOT STREET TRADING IF WINNING A LOTTERY PRIZE (X20), AND OTHER VARIABLES 1**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS WHO WOULD LEAVE STREET TRADING IF WINNING A LOTTERY PRIZE TEND:
X3:Male (1) Female (0)	- 0.29 (0.032)	To be female
X6:Native=1; migrant=0	- 0.31 (0.025)	To be migrant
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.23 (0.075)	To perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation
X16:The vendor would shift to a formal job with identical net income (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.35 (0.013)	To be willing to shift to a formal job with identical net income
X17:Required monthly wage to shift to a formal job	- 0.50 (0.002)	To solicit a lower wage to shift to a formal job
X105:The vendor would shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.49 (0.001)	To be willing to shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income
X113:The vendor declared that one of his/her main problems is the authority (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.13 (0.21)	To declare that one of their main problems is the authority*

X136:The vendor would start a new business if winning a lottery prize (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.78 (0.000)	To be willing to start a new business with such money
X148:Years since migration (only for migrants)	- 0.40 (0.031)	To be short-term migrants
X44A:The vendor sells imported goods (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.33 (0.018)	To sell imported goods

1 Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor would leave street trade; and zero otherwise.

\* In the Logistic Regression presented in Table III.27 this variable is statistically significant

**TABLE III.43 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VENDOR'S  
DECISION TO START OR NOT A NEW BUSINESS IF WINNING  
A LOTTERY PRIZE (X136), AND OTHER VARIABLES 1**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS WHO WOULD START A NEW BUSINESS IF WINNING A LOTTERY PRIZE TEND:
X4:Age in years	- 0.37 (0.009)	to be younger
X6:Native=1; migrant=0	- 0.25 (0.057)	To be migrant
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.32 (0.023)	To perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation
X105:The vendor would shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.39 (0.007)	To be willing to shift to a formal job with an 'adequate' net income
X119:The vendor uses to shift to other product lines (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.39 (0.007)	To usually shift to other products within street selling
X148:Years since migration (only for migrants)	- 0.41 (0.033)	To be short-term migrants
X106A:The vendor feels proud of being a street vendor (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.22 (0.085)	Not to feel (very) proud of being a street vendor
X107A:The vendor considers street selling as a risky job (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.22 (0.089)	The consider street vending as a (more) risky job

1 Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor would start a new business; and zero, otherwise

**TABLE III.44 CORRELATION BETWEEN AVERAGE MONTHLY EARNINGS (X18), AND OTHER VARIABLES**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS EARNING HIGHER NET INCOME TEND:
X3:Male (1) Female (0)	+ 0.39 (0.005)	To be male
X4:Age in years	- 0.22 (0.082)	To be younger
X5:Education in years	+ 0.45 (0.001)	To be more educated
X11:The vendor's parents worked as street vendors (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.30 (0.029)	Not to be descendants of street vendors
X12:Seniority in years	- 0.35 (0.013)	To be short-tenured
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.42 (0.003)	To perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation
X19:Current value of stock	+ 0.55 (0.000)	To have a higher value of stock
X23:Average monthly fee	+ 0.27 (0.041)	To pay higher fees
X29:The vendor considers autonomy as valuable (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.51 (0.001)	Not to consider autonomy as valuable
X70:Number of persons who work at the stall	+ 0.20 (0.099)	To have more people working at the stall
X72:The vendor has another job (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.28 (0.040)	To have another job
X88:The vendor started as owner (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.26 (0.050)	To start in street vending as employees



X2A:The vendor operates in the illegal high-demand zone (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.23 (0.071)	To operate in the illegal high-demand zone
X38A:The vendor sells (more) durable goods (1); Otherwise (0)	+ 0.24 (0.068)	To sell (more) durable goods
X119:The vendor uses to shift to other product lines (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.33 (0.017)	Not to shift to other product lines
X106A:The vendor feels proud of being a street vendor (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.21 (0.089)	To feel proud of being a street vendor

**TABLE III.45 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE AVERAGE MONTHLY FEE PAID BY THE VENDOR (X23), AND OTHER VARIABLES**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS WHO PAY HIGHER FEES TEND:
X4:Age in years	- 0.25 (0.058)	To be younger
X6:Native=1; migrant=0	- 0.27 (0.046)	To be migrant
X11:The vendor's parents worked as street vendors (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.38 (0.007)	Not to be descendants of street vendors
X12:Seniority in years	- 0.28 (0.037)	To be short-tenured
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.36 (0.010)	To perceive themselves as capable of getting a different occupation
X18:Average monthly earnings	+ 0.27 (0.041)	To have greater earnings
X31:The vendor does not have a leader (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.28 (0.040)	Not to have a leader
X72:The vendor has another job (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.58 (0.000)	To have another job
X38A:The vendor sells (more) durable goods (1); Otherwise (0)	+ 0.34 (0.016)	To sell (more) durable goods
X16:The vendor would shift to a formal job with identical net income (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.36 (0.011)	Not to be willing to shift to a formal job with identical net income

**TABLE III.46 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ZONE OF OPERATION (X2A), AND OTHER VARIABLES 1**

VARIABLE LABEL	PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (1-TAILED SIGNIFICANCE)	RELATIONSHIP: VENDORS SELLING IN THE ILLEGAL HIGH-DEMAND ZONE TEND:
X4:Age in years	+ 0.42 (0.003)	To be older
X11:The vendor's parents worked as street vendors (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.33 (0.018)	Not to be descendants of street vendors
X12:Seniority in years	+ 0.40 (0.005)	To be high-tenured
X15:The vendor perceives him/herself as capable of getting a different occupation (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.25 (0.059)	To perceive themselves as not capable of getting a different occupation
X17:Required monthly wage to shift to a formal job	+ 0.31 (0.050)	To solicit a higher wage to shift to a formal job
X18:Average monthly earnings	+ 0.23 (0.071)	To have greater earnings
X18M23:Average monthly earnings net of fees	+ 0.22 (0.081)	To have greater earnings (net of fees)
X31:The vendor does not have a leader (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.58 (0.000)	Not to have a leader
X143:The vendor pays a fee for vending (1); otherwise (0)	- 0.36 (0.009)	Not to pay a fee for vending
X142:Number of associations that the vendor has belonged to	- 0.39 (0.007)	To have belonged to fewer associations

X107A:The vendor considers street selling as a risky job (1); otherwise (0)	+ 0.30 (0.030)	The consider street vending as a (more) risky job
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1 Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the vendor operates in the illegal high-demand zone; and zero if he/she operates in the legal low-demand zone.

**VIII.4 QUESTIONNAIRE**

**CUESTIONARIO PARA VENDEDORES AMBULANTES**

Elaborado por Jorge Mendoza. Tecnológico de Monterrey-  
Campus Cd. de México  
23 de febrero de 1994  
ENTREVISTA # \_\_\_\_\_

FORMA DE SELECCIONAR AL VENDEDOR: \_\_\_\_\_

FECHA DE APLICACION: \_\_\_\_\_

HORA DE INICIO: \_\_\_\_\_

HORA DE TERMINACION: \_\_\_\_\_ REALIZADO POR: \_\_\_\_\_

**ADVERTENCIAS PREVIAS AL ENTREVISTADO:**

1. - SE TRATA DE UN ESTUDIO UNIVERSITARIO.
2. - LA ENTREVISTA ES ANONIMA.
3. - LA INFORMACION QUE PROPORCIONE ES ESTRICTAMENTE CONFIDENCIAL, Y NO SERA DADA A CONOCER A NADIE; SOLO SERVIRA PARA LA TESIS.
4. - ALGUNAS PREGUNTAS SON DIFICILES DE RESPONDER DE MANERA EXACTA, POR LO CUAL SE LE PIDE SU MEJOR RESPUESTA APROXIMADA. SI DE PLANONO TIENE NINGUNA IDEA DE LA RESPUESTA, POR FAVOR INDIQUELO.

**I. INFORMACION GENERAL**

1. Nombre del líder del entrevistado: \_\_\_\_\_
2. ¿Es usted el dueño de la mercancía que vende?  
(1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO ES DUEÑO DE LA MERCANCIA, TERMINAR LA ENTREVISTA. SI ES DUEÑO, CONTINUE CON LA PREGUNTA 3**
3. Producto(s) que vende: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Tipo de puesto:  
(1) Puesto reubicado en un mercado de reciente construcción \_\_\_\_\_  
(2) Puesto improvisado en la vía pública \_\_\_\_\_  
(3) Puesto fijo en la vía pública \_\_\_\_\_  
(4) Puesto improvisado en un mercado o tianguis \_\_\_\_\_  
(5) Puesto que forma parte de un mercado o tianguis (fijo o desmontable) \_\_\_\_\_  
(6) Ambulante de casa en casa o en la calle \_\_\_\_\_

(7) Mercancías, servicios o alimentos ofrecidos en *motocicleta, bicicleta, vehículomotorizado, carretón, etc.* \_\_\_\_\_

(8) Otro tipo: \_\_\_\_\_ Especifique: \_\_\_\_\_

5. **Ubicación actual del puesto (dirección):**

\_\_\_\_\_

6. **¿Fue su puesto cambiado de lugar por el Programa de Mejoramiento del Comercio Popular?**

(1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_

(4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

7. **¿Desde cuándo se encuentra localizado en este lugar en el que opera?**

Desde (fecha): \_\_\_\_\_ de 19 \_\_\_\_

Hace \_\_\_\_\_ años

Hace \_\_\_\_\_ meses

8. **SI FUE CAMBIADO DE LUGAR ¿Dónde se localizaba su puesto antes de la reubicación?**

\_\_\_\_\_

9. **SI FUE CAMBIADO DE LUGAR ¿Cómo son sus ventas actualmente en comparación a lo que vendía antes de la reubicación?**

(1) mayores \_\_\_\_\_ (2) iguales \_\_\_\_\_

(3) menores \_\_\_\_\_

10. **OBSERVE LOS BIENES COMERCIALIZADOS, Y SI TIENE DUDA PREGUNTE:**

**¿Vende usted bienes nacionales o importados?**

(1) Sólo bienes nacionales \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Ambos tipos de bienes \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Sólo bienes importados \_\_\_\_\_

## II. ASPECTOS DEMOGRAFICOS Y SOCIOECONOMICOS

### A. ASPECTOS DEMOGRAFICOS

11. **Sexo:** (1) masculino \_\_\_\_\_ (2) femenino \_\_\_\_\_

12. **¿Cuál es su edad?** \_\_\_\_\_

13. **A) ¿Sabe leer?** (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

- B) ¿Sabe escribir? (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_
14. ¿Cuál fue el último año escolar que estudió completo? \_\_\_\_\_
15. ¿Qué religión tiene usted?  
 (1) Católica \_\_\_\_\_  
 (2) Otra (no católica) \_\_\_\_\_, especifique \_\_\_\_\_  
 (3) Ninguna \_\_\_\_\_
16. ¿Dónde nació?  
 Ciudad: \_\_\_\_\_ Estado: \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI EL ENTREVISTADO NACIO FUERA DE LA CIUDAD DE MEXICO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 17; SI NACIO EN LA CIUDAD DE MEXICO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 24.**
17. ¿En qué ciudad radica actualmente? \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI RADICA EN UN LUGAR DISTINTO A SU LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 18; SI RADICA EN SU LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 24.**
18. ¿Cuándo se vino a radicar a la Ciudad de México (o a la ciudad en la que radica)?  
 Fecha: \_\_\_\_\_ de 19\_\_ ó Edad: \_\_ ó Hace \_\_ años
19. ¿Con quiénes se vino a la Ciudad de México (o a la ciudad en la que radica)?  
 (1) Solo \_\_\_\_\_ (2) Con sus padres \_\_\_\_\_  
 (3) Con esposa y/o Hijos \_\_\_\_\_ (4) Con otros parientes \_\_\_\_\_  
 (5) Con otras personas \_\_\_\_\_
20. ¿Tenía parientes en la Ciudad de México (o en la ciudad en la que radica) cuando llegó?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_  
 (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 21.  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 22.**
21. ¿Recibió apoyo de sus parientes en la Ciudad de México (o en la ciudad en la que radica) cuando llegó?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_
22. ¿Tenía paisanos o conocidos en la Ciudad de México (o en la ciudad en la que radica) cuando llegó?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 23.  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 24.**



23. ¿Recibió apoyo de sus paisanos o conocidos en la Ciudad de México (o en la ciudad en la que radica) cuando llegó?

(1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

24. ¿Cuál es su estado civil?

(1) casado \_\_\_\_\_ (2) unión libre \_\_\_\_\_ (3) madre/padre soltero \_\_\_\_\_ (4) soltero \_\_\_\_\_ (5) divorciado \_\_\_\_\_ (6) viudo \_\_\_\_\_ (7) otro \_\_\_\_\_

25. A) ¿Tiene hijos?

(1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI" PASE A LA PREGUNTA 25.B  
SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO" PASE A LA PREGUNTA 26.**

B) ¿En total, cuántos hijos tiene? \_\_\_\_\_

26. A) La vivienda donde usted habita es...

(1) propia (o de su esposo[a]) \_\_\_\_\_  
(2) rentada (por usted o por su esposo[a]) \_\_\_\_\_  
(3) prestada \_\_\_\_\_  
(4) vive en casa de sus padres \_\_\_\_\_  
(5) vive en casa de otros familiares \_\_\_\_\_  
(6) vive en casa de otras personas \_\_\_\_\_  
(7) otra situación, especifique: \_\_\_\_\_

B) ¿Cuántos cuartos tiene la casa en que habita (incluyendo cocina y baño)? \_\_\_\_\_

C) ¿Con qué personas vive usted?

**MARQUE TODAS LAS OPCIONES SEÑALADAS POR EL ENTREVISTADO**

- Con padre(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
- Con su esposo(a) \_\_\_\_\_  
- Con hijo(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
- Con otro(s) familiar(es) \_\_\_\_\_  
- Con otra(s) persona(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
- Solo \_\_\_\_\_

D) ¿En total cuántas personas viven en la vivienda que habita? \_\_\_\_\_

27. ¿Cuántas de las personas que viven en su casa tienen ingresos propios? \_\_\_\_\_

28. ¿Cuenta su casa con servicios de...?

A) Agua entubada: (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

B) Drenaje: (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

- C) Electricidad: (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
 D) Excusado: (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

#### B. RELACIONES SOCIALES Y FAMILIARES EN EL AMBULANTAJE

29. ¿En total, cuántos parientes suyos trabajan por su cuenta en la venta ambulante? \_\_\_\_\_
30. SI EN LA PREGUNTA 25.A DECLARO QUE TENIA HIJOS, PREGUNTE:  
 ¿Cuántos de sus hijos trabajan por su cuenta en la venta ambulante? \_\_\_\_\_
31. ¿Se han dedicado su padre o su madre alguna vez al comercio ambulante?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_
32. Indique qué personas trabajan o le ayudan en este puesto:  
 A) El entrevistado -----Número (1 ó 0) \_\_\_\_\_  
 B) Esposo(a) sin remuneración-Número (1 ó 0) \_\_\_\_\_  
 C) Esposo(a) con remuneración-Número (1 ó 0) \_\_\_\_\_  
 D) Hijos sin remuneración -----Número \_\_\_\_\_  
 E) Hijos con remuneración ----Número \_\_\_\_\_  
 F) Otros parientes sin remuneración--Número \_\_\_\_\_  
 G) Otros parientes con remuneración-Número \_\_\_\_\_  
 H) Empleados remunerados -----Número \_\_\_\_\_  
 I) Empleados no remunerados -----Número \_\_\_\_\_  
 J) CALCULE LA SUMA DEL TOTAL DE PERSONAS QUE TRABAJAN EN EL PUESTO: \_\_\_\_\_
33. De las personas que viven en su hogar, ¿Cuántas trabajan en otros puestos de venta ambulante?  
 \_\_\_\_\_

#### III. ASPECTOS LABORALES

##### A. HISTORIAL LABORAL DEL ENTREVISTADO

34. ¿Tiene usted otra ocupación remunerada además de la venta ambulante?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 35;  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 39.

35. ¿En total cuántas ocupaciones remuneradas (o trabajos) tiene usted ? \_\_\_\_
36. A) ¿Es la venta ambulante su *principal ocupación*?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO" PASE A LA PREGUNTA 37.**  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI" PREGUNTE:**
- B) ¿Desde cuándo es la venta ambulante su *principal ocupación*?  
 Fecha: \_\_\_\_ de 19\_\_ ó Edad: \_\_\_\_ ó Hace \_\_\_\_ años
37. Respecto a su ocupación actual más importante *sin considerar la venta ambulante*, indique:
- A) Ocupación: \_\_\_\_\_
- B) Tipo de ocupación:  
 (1) Negocio propio (o auto-empleado) \_\_\_\_  
 (2) Empleado \_\_\_\_  
 (3) Otro \_\_\_\_, especifique \_\_\_\_\_
- C) ¿Tenía ya esta ocupación cuando empezó a trabajar en la venta ambulante?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA EN B) ES "EMPLEADO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 38;**  
**SI LA RESPUESTA EN B) NO ES EMPLEADO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 39.**
38. En esta *segunda ocupación actual*,
- A) ¿Tiene Seguro Social? (1) Sí \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_
- B) ¿Cuántos empleados tiene la empresa? \_\_\_\_\_
39. A) ¿Cuándo fue la *primera ocasión* en que usted *trabajó en la venta ambulante*?  
 Fecha: \_\_\_\_ de 19\_\_ ó Edad: \_\_\_\_ ó Hace \_\_\_\_ años
- B) ¿Desde cuando se dedica a la venta ambulante de *forma ininterrumpida*?  
 Fecha: \_\_\_\_ de 19\_\_ ó Edad: \_\_\_\_ ó Hace \_\_\_\_ años

40. ¿Por qué decidió dedicarse a la venta ambulante?

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SI LA RESPUESTAS INDICAN QUE EL ENTREVISTADO TUVO DIFICULTADES PARA SER CONTRATADO O LOS SUELDOS ERAN BAJOS, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 41.

41. ¿Por qué prefirió la venta ambulante sobre otros tipos de negocio propio o trabajo por su cuenta?

42. A) Ya después de haberse iniciado en la venta ambulante, ¿ha buscado usted una ocupación diferente? (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 42.B):  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 43.

B) ¿Cómo le ha ido en su búsqueda de otra ocupación? \_\_\_\_\_

C) ¿Por qué ha buscado otra ocupación? \_\_\_\_\_

43. A) ¿Quién le ayudó a conseguir su primer trabajo como vendedor ambulante?  
 (1) Padres \_\_\_\_\_ (2) Otros Parientes \_\_\_\_\_ (3) Paisanos \_\_\_\_\_  
 (4) Vecinos \_\_\_\_\_ (5) Amigos \_\_\_\_\_ (6) Nadie: \_\_\_\_\_ (7) Otra persona \_\_\_\_\_

B) ¿Ha ayudado o aconsejado a otras personas a entrar a la venta ambulante?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

C) ¿A cuántas personas ha ayudado a entrar en la venta ambulante? \_\_\_\_\_

44. ¿Empezó usted como empleado o como dueño del negocio en su primer trabajo como vendedor ambulante? (1) Dueño \_\_\_\_\_ (2) Empleado \_\_\_\_\_  
 SI LA RESPUESTA NO ES "DUEÑO", PASE A LA PREG. 45;  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES DUEÑO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 47.

45. ¿Qué relación tenía con el dueño del puesto donde obtuvo su primer trabajo como vendedor ambulante?  
 (1) Padres \_\_\_\_\_ (2) Otros Parientes \_\_\_\_\_  
 (3) Paisanos \_\_\_\_\_ (4) Vecinos \_\_\_\_\_ (5) Amigos \_\_\_\_\_  
 (6) Ninguna: \_\_\_\_\_ (7) Otro \_\_\_\_\_, especifique: \_\_\_\_\_

46. ¿Cuando se convirtió por primera vez en dueño de un puesto de venta ambulante?  
 Fecha: \_\_\_\_ de 19\_\_ ó Edad: \_\_ ó Hace \_\_ años
47. ¿De dónde obtuvo el dinero necesario para convertirse en dueño de su primer negocio de venta ambulante?  
 (1) Ahorros propios \_\_\_\_ (2) Préstamo bancario \_\_\_\_  
 (3) Préstamo de parientes \_\_\_\_  
 (4) Préstamo de otras personas \_\_\_\_  
 (5) Otro \_\_\_\_, especifique: \_\_\_\_\_
48. ¿Antes de iniciarse en la venta ambulante, había usted trabajado por su cuenta en otra actividad?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_
49. ¿Antes dedicarse a la venta ambulante, cuál era su principal ocupación laboral?  
 A) ¿Ya reportada en las preguntas 37 y 38?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 49.B;**  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 51.**
- B) ¿Cuál era esta ocupación? \_\_\_\_\_
- C) ¿Cuánto tiempo duró en esta ocupación?  
 De \_\_\_\_\_ a \_\_\_\_\_ ó  
 Número de Años \_\_\_\_\_ ó  
 Número de meses \_\_\_\_\_
- D) Tipo de ocupación:  
 (1) Negocio propio (o auto-empleado) \_\_\_\_  
 (2) Empleado \_\_\_\_  
 (3) Otro \_\_\_\_, especifique \_\_\_\_\_
- SI LA RESPUESTA EN D) ES "EMPLEADO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 50;**  
**SI LA RESPUESTA EN D) NO ES EMPLEADO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 51.**
50. En esta ocupación anterior a la venta ambulante,
- A) ¿Tenía Seguro Social? (1) Sí \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_
- B) ¿Cuántos empleados tenía la empresa? \_\_\_\_\_
- C) ¿Por qué abandonó esta ocupación?
-

51. En total, ¿Cuántas veces ha dejado la venta ambulante para tomar otra ocupación? \_\_\_\_\_

**B. OCUPACIONES ALTERNATIVAS DEL ENTREVISTADO**

52. Imagínese que tuviera que abandonar la venta ambulante,

A) ¿Cree que le sería posible encontrar alguna otra ocupación?

- (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_  
 (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 52.B  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 53.

B) ¿Qué otras ocupaciones podría usted encontrar? \_\_\_\_\_

53. ¿Cree que en alguna de esas ocupaciones podría usted ganar más que en la venta ambulante?

- (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_  
 (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI" PASE A LA PREGUNTA 54.  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO" PASE A LA PREGUNTA 55.

54. Dígame las razones por las que continúa en la venta ambulante y no toma otra ocupación que le permita ganar más: \_\_\_\_\_

55. A) ¿Aceptaría usted dejar su puesto para ser empleado (de otro puesto), si le garantizaran que ganaría lo mismo que en su puesto pero con Seguro Social y prestaciones ?

- (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_  
 (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

B) ¿Por qué? \_\_\_\_\_

56. ¿Cuánto le tendrían que pagar libre en otro empleo (como vendedor en otro puesto) para que usted dejara este puesto y aceptara ese empleo (con seguro social y prestaciones)?

(1) Pediría un sueldo de: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Al día \_\_\_ A la semana \_\_\_ A la quincena \_\_\_ Al mes \_\_\_

**CALCULE EL EQUIVALENTE MENSUAL \_\_\_\_\_**  
 (2) No dejaría la venta ambulante \_\_\_\_\_

**C. AUTO-EVALUACION DEL TRABAJO DE VENDEDOR AMBULANTE  
 EN ESTA SECCION INDICAR AL ENTREVISTADO QUE LAS  
 PREGUNTAS DEBERAN SER "SI" O "NO".**

57. **¿Se siente orgulloso de ser vendedor ambulante?**  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
 (4) No sabe \_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_
58. **¿Es riesgoso su trabajo como vendedor ambulante**  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
 (4) No sabe \_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_
59. **¿Cree que el comercio ambulante perjudique al país?**  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
 (4) No sabe \_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_  
 (6) Sí, pero es necesario \_\_\_
60. **¿Se siente contento con lo que gana en la venta ambulante?**  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
 (4) No sabe \_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_
61. **¿Le disgustaría tener un jefe o patrón?**  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
 (4) No sabe \_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_
62. **¿Es pesado su trabajo como vendedor ambulante?**  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
 (4) No sabe \_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_
63. **Su trabajo como vendedor ambulante, ¿Le facilita realizar otras actividades personales o familiares?**  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
 (4) No sabe \_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_
64. **¿Cuál de las prestaciones que tiene un empleado formal, le gustaría más tener a usted? \_\_\_\_\_**  
**PUEDA MENCIONAR LAS SIGUIENTES:**  
 (1) SEGURO SOCIAL,  
 (2) AGUINALDO,  
 (3) SEGURO DE AHORRO PARA EL RETIRO,  
 (4) INFONAVIT,

- (5) VACACIONES Y DIAS DE DESCANSO OBLIGATORIO,  
 (6) NINGUNA  
 (7) OTRA \_\_\_\_\_ especifique: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (8) PRÉSTAMOS

65. ¿Cuáles son sus principales problemas como vendedor ambulante?  
 MARQUE LOS MENCIONADOS POR EL VENDEDOR Y PREGUNTE POR LOS DOS MAS IMPORTANTES:

Rango de importancia:	Problema:
_____	(1) Pocos clientes _____
_____	(2) Falta de credito _____
_____	(3) Falta de recursos económicos _____
_____	(4) Bajas ganancias _____
_____	(5) Competencia excesiva _____
_____	(6) Problemas con las autoridades _____
_____	(7) Problemas con empleados _____
_____	(8) Problemas con clientes _____
_____	(9) Problemas con materias primas _____
_____	(10) Problemas con proveedores _____
_____	(11) Otros problemas _____
_____	(12) No tiene problemas _____

66. ¿Qué le gusta más de su trabajo como vendedor ambulante? \_\_\_\_\_

#### IV. ASPECTOS OPERATIVOS DEL NEGOCIO

##### A. ESTACIONALIDAD DEL NEGOCIO Y AJUSTE OCUPACIONAL

67. A) ¿Deja usted la venta ambulante temporalmente durante alguna época del año?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 67.  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 68.

B) ¿A qué ocupación(es) se dedica cuando deja la venta ambulante en alguna temporada? \_\_\_\_\_



68. ¿Dentro de la venta ambulante, cambia usted de giro en algunas temporadas del año?

(1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 69.  
SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 70.

69. ¿A qué giros cambia usted en algunas temporadas del año? \_\_\_\_\_

#### B. EXPECTATIVAS DEL NEGOCIO, PERSONALES Y FAMILIARES

70. ¿Qué ocupación, actividad laboral o negocio le gustaría más desarrollar en el futuro? \_\_\_\_\_

71. A) ¿A qué ocupación, actividad laboral o negocio le gustaría (o le hubiera gustado) que se dedicaran sus hijos? \_\_\_\_\_

SI NO MENCIONA LA VENTA AMBULANTE PASE A LA PREGUNTA 71.B

B) Le gustaría (Le hubiera gustado) que sus hijos se dedicaran a la venta ambulante?

(1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_\_\_

(4) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

#### C. LA OPERACION ECONOMICA DEL PUESTO

72. A) ¿Qué días de la semana abre este puesto?

(1) Todos \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Sólo sábados y domingos \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Otros días \_\_\_\_\_

B) Número total de días de operación del puesto a la semana: \_\_\_\_\_

C) ¿En promedio cuántas horas al día está abierto su puesto? \_\_\_\_\_

CALCULE EL NUMERO DE HORAS DIARIAS \_\_\_\_\_

73. ¿Cuánto gana usted libre de polvo y paja como vendedor ambulante?

A) Ganancia promedio \_\_\_\_\_ periodo de tiempo \_\_\_\_\_

B) Ganancia "alta" en periodos "buenos" \_\_\_\_\_

C) Ganancia "baja" en periodos "malos" \_\_\_\_\_

74. ¿Cuánto vale toda la mercancía que tiene en existencia? (Si vendiera toda la mercancía que tiene en existencia ¿cuanto dinero recibiría?)  
\_\_\_\_\_

75. ¿A cuántas personas, (o tiendas) distintas le compra usted su mercancía? \_\_\_\_\_

76. A) ¿Se siente comprometido a comprarle a esas personas (o tiendas)?

(1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
(4) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI" O "REGULAR", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 76.B:**

B) ¿Por qué? \_\_\_\_\_

#### V. OPINION DEL ENTREVISTADO SOBRE LA REGULACION GUBERNAMENTAL

77. ¿Cree que las autoridades son justas con el comerciante ambulante?

(1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
(4) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

78. ¿Cree que el gobierno ha administrado bien al comercio ambulante?

(1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
(4) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

79. En su opinión, ¿Qué debería hacer el gobierno con el comercio ambulante? \_\_\_\_\_

80. ¿Por qué razones no adquirió usted un puesto en las nuevas plazas y mercados recientemente construidos (como parte del Programa de Reordenamiento del Comercio Ambulante)? \_\_\_\_\_

81. Si tuviera el dinero para comprar un puesto en un nuevo mercado, ¿Seguiría vendiendo en la calle?

(1) Sí \_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_ (3) Regular ("más o menos") \_\_\_  
(4) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (5) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

82. Si usted se sacara N\$50 000 en la Lotería Nacional...

- A) ¿Dejaría usted el negocio de la venta ambulante?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A B);**  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A C).**
- B) ¿Instalaría otros puestos o ampliaría el que ya tiene?  
 (1) Instalaría otros puestos \_\_\_\_\_  
 (2) Ampliaría el que ya tiene \_\_\_\_\_  
 (3) Ambas cosas \_\_\_\_\_ (4) Ninguna de las dos cosas \_\_\_\_\_  
 (5) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (6) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_
- C) ¿Iniciaría usted otro negocio diferente?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A D);**  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 83.**
- D) ¿Qué otro tipo de negocio emprendería?  
 \_\_\_\_\_
- E) En este otro negocio, sería necesario para usted pagar impuestos?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_

## VI. CUESTIONES DIVERSAS

83. A) ¿Pertenece usted a algún partido político?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_  
**SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A 83.B.**
- B) ¿A qué partido? \_\_\_\_\_
84. A) ¿Tiene automóvil propio? (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_
- B) ¿Modelo? \_\_\_\_\_
85. A) ¿Es usted dueño de este puesto (o local) o lo renta?  
 (1) Dueño del local \_\_\_\_\_ (2) Lo renta \_\_\_\_\_  
 (3) Se lo prestan \_\_\_\_\_ (4) Local en vía pública \_\_\_\_\_,  
 (5) Otro, especifique: \_\_\_\_\_

B) ¿Cuántos más puestos de venta ambulante tiene usted? \_\_\_\_\_

C) ¿A cuántas asociaciones (líderes) diferentes de vendedores ha pertenecido desde que trabaja como ambulante? \_\_\_\_\_

86. A) ¿Paga usted dinero por vender en este lugar?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_ (3) No sabe \_\_\_\_\_ (4) No contestó \_\_\_\_\_  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI" PASE A LA PREGUNTA 86.B  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO" PASE A LA PREGUNTA 87

B) ¿Cuánto paga? \_\_\_\_\_ ¿Cada cuánto tiempo? \_\_\_\_\_

C) ¿A quiénes paga usted dinero? \_\_\_\_\_

87. ¿Aceptaría usted usted platicar más ampliamente sobre el tema del comercio ambulante en otra entrevista? (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

SI LA RESPUESTA ES "NO" TERMINE LA ENTREVISTA  
 SI LA RESPUESTA ES "SI", PASE A LA PREGUNTA 88.

88. ¿Ocupa usted todos los días este mismo lugar?  
 (1) Sí \_\_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_\_

89. Teléfono del vendedor, lugar, fecha y hora de la próxima entrevista:

Teléfono: \_\_\_\_\_

Lugar: \_\_\_\_\_

Fecha: \_\_\_\_\_

Hora: \_\_\_\_\_

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STREET VENDORS**

February 23rd, 1993

**Way in which the vendor was selected:**

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Starting time: \_\_\_\_\_

Finishing time: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

*PREVIOUS MESSAGE FOR THE RESPONDENT:*

1. - THIS IS AN ACADEMIC STUDY.
2. - THE INTERVIEW IS ANONYMOUS
3. - THE INFORMATION THAT YOU WILL PROVIDE IS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, AND IT WILL NOT BE DISCLOSED TO ANYBODY; IT WILL ONLY BE USED FOR THE DISSERTATION PURPOSES.
4. - SOME QUESTIONS ARE DIFFICULT TO ANSWER EXACTLY; IN THESE CASES, YOU ARE ASKED TO PROVIDE YOUR BEST APPROXIMATION. IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER, PLEASE INDICATE SO.

**I. GENERAL INFORMATION**

1. - What is your Leader's name? \_\_\_\_\_

2. - Are you the owner of the merchandise you sell?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

*IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER OF THE MERCHANDISE, FINISH THE INTERVIEW.*

*IF HE OR SHE IS THE OWNER, CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 3.*

3. - Products traded:

\_\_\_\_\_

4. - Type of stall: \_\_\_\_\_

5. - Stall's current address or location: \_\_\_\_\_

6. - Was your stall removed due to the implementation of the "Program for Improvement of Popular Retailing"?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

- 7.- For how long have you been operating in this location?  
 Since (date): \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ years ago  
 or \_\_\_\_\_ months ago
- 8.- Stall's address or location before the relocation: \_\_\_\_\_
- 9.- How are your current sales as compared with your sales before the relocation of your stall?  
 Currently your sales are: higher \_\_\_\_\_ lower \_\_\_\_\_  
 equal \_\_\_\_\_ than before the relocation.
- 10.- WATCH THE GOODS TRADED, AND IF YOU CANNOT ASSESS THE ORIGIN OF GOODS, THEN ASK:  
 Do you trade domestic or imported goods?  
 Domestic goods only \_\_\_\_\_ Both types of goods \_\_\_\_\_  
 Imported goods only \_\_\_\_\_

## II. DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

### A. DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS

- 11.- Sex: \_\_\_\_\_
- 12.- How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_
- 13.- Are you literate? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_
- 14.- What is your last schooling year? \_\_\_\_\_
- 15.- What is your religion?  
 Catholic \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Specify: \_\_\_\_\_  
 None: \_\_\_\_\_
- 16.- Where were you born?  
 City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_  
 Country \_\_\_\_\_  
 IF RESPONDENT WAS BORN OUTSIDE MEXICO CITY, GO TO QUESTION 17;  
 IF RESPONDENT WAS BORN IN MEXICO CITY, GO TO QUESTION 24.

## 17.- In what city do you currently live in?

*IF RESPONDENT LIVES IN A CITY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE IN WHICH HE/SHE WAS BORN, GO TO QUESTION 18.*

*IF RESPONDENT LIVES IN THE CITY IN WHICH HE/SHE WAS BORN GO TO QUESTION 24.*

## 18.- When did you emigrate to Mexico City (or to the city in which you currently live in)?

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ or Age: \_\_\_\_\_  
or \_\_\_\_\_ years ago

## 19.- Whom did you emigrate with?

Alone \_\_\_\_\_ With parents \_\_\_\_\_ With spouse and/or  
children \_\_\_\_\_ With other relatives \_\_\_\_\_  
With other persons \_\_\_\_\_

## 20.- Did you have relatives in Mexico City (or in the city you live in) when you first arrived to it?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
*IF THE ANSWER IS "YES", GO TO QUESTION 21;*  
*IF THE ANSWER IS "NO", GO TO QUESTION 22.*

## 21.- Did you receive support from your relatives established in Mexico City (or in the city you live in) when you first arrived to it? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

## 22.- Did you have acquaintance persons or fellow-countrypersons (paisanos) in Mexico City (or in the city you live in) when you first arrived to it?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
*IF THE ANSWER IS "YES", GO TO QUESTION 23;*  
*IF THE ANSWER IS "NO", GO TO QUESTION 24.*

## 23.- Did you receive support from acquaintance persons or fellow-countrypersons (paisanos) established in Mexico City (or in the city you live in) when you first arrived to it? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

## 24.- What is your marital status?

## 25.- A) Do you have children? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

*IF THE ANSWER IS YES, GO TO QUESTION 25.B;*  
*IF THE ANSWER IS NO, GO TO QUESTION 27.*

B) In total, how many children do you have? \_\_\_\_\_

- 26.- A) Are you owner of the house you live in?  
 YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_
- B) How many rooms does your house have? \_\_\_\_\_
- C) Who do you live with? \_\_\_\_\_
- D) How many people live in the house you live?  
 \_\_\_\_\_
- 27.- How many of the persons who live in your house earn their own income? \_\_\_\_\_
- 28.- Does the house you live in has....
- |                |           |          |
|----------------|-----------|----------|
| Sewage?        | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| Running water? | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| Electricity?   | YES _____ | NO _____ |
| Water closet?  | YES _____ | NO _____ |

**B) SOCIAL AND KIN RELATIONSHIPS IN STREET VENDING**

- 29.- Approximately, how many of your relatives operate their own street vending stall?  
 Number of relatives \_\_\_\_\_
- 30.- *IF THE RESPONDENT DECLARED TO HAVE CHILDREN (QUESTION 25.A), ASK:*  
 How many of your children operate their own street vending stall? \_\_\_\_\_
- 31.- Have your mother or father worked as street vendor?  
 YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_
- 32.- Who works at this stall?
- |  |           |              |
|--|-----------|--------------|
| The respondent                             | YES _____ | NO _____     |
| The respondent's spouse (without a salary) | YES _____ | NO _____     |
| The respondent's spouse (with a salary)    | YES _____ | NO _____     |
| Children (without a salary)                |           | number _____ |
| Children (with a salary)                   |           | number _____ |
| Other relatives (without a salary)         |           | number _____ |
| Other relatives (with a salary)            |           | number _____ |
| Paid employees                             |           | number _____ |



**CALCULATE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WORKS AT THE STALL: \_\_\_\_\_**

**33.- How many of the persons who live in your house, work in another street vending stall? \_\_\_\_\_**

### **III. LABORAL ASPECTS**

#### **A. RESPONDENT'S LABORAL HISTORY**

**34.- Besides street vending, do you have another paid occupation?**

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

**IF THE ANSWER IS "YES", GO TO QUESTION 35;**

**IF THE ANSWER IS "NO", GO TO QUESTION 39.**

**35.- In total, how many paid occupations do you have?**  
\_\_\_\_\_

**36.- Is street vending your main occupation?**

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

**IF THE ANSWER IS "NO", GO TO QUESTION 37;**

**IF THE ANSWER IS YES, THEN ASK:**

**For how long has street vending been your main occupation? \_\_\_\_\_**

**37.- Regarding your current most important occupation, excepting street vending, indicate:**

**A) What occupation is this? \_\_\_\_\_**

**B) Type of occupation:**

Own business (or self-employment) \_\_\_\_\_ Employee \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_, specify \_\_\_\_\_

**C) Did you already have this occupation when you first worked as street vendor?**

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

**IF ANSWER IN B) IS "EMPLOYEE", GO TO QUESTION 38;**

**IF "EMPLOYEE" IS NOT SELECTED, GO TO QUESTION 39.**

**38.- In this second current job,**

**A) Do you have Social Security? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_**

B) How many employees does the firm have? \_\_\_\_\_

39.- A) When did you first work as street vendor?

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ or Age: \_\_\_\_\_  
or \_\_\_\_\_ years ago

B) For how long have you been working in street vending continuously?

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ or Age: \_\_\_\_\_  
or \_\_\_\_\_ years ago

40.- For what reasons did you decide working in street vending?

- a) \_\_\_\_\_  
b) \_\_\_\_\_  
c) \_\_\_\_\_

41.- For what reasons did you prefer street vending over other type of self-employment?

- a) \_\_\_\_\_  
b) \_\_\_\_\_  
c) \_\_\_\_\_

42.- A) After you started working as street vendor, did you search for a different occupation?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

IF THE ANSWER WAS "YES", THEN GO TO QUESTION 42.B

B) What were the results of your job search? \_\_\_\_\_

C) How many people have you recommended or helped to start working in street trading? \_\_\_\_\_

43.- Who helped you to get your first job as street vendor?

Parents \_\_\_\_\_ Other relatives \_\_\_\_\_ Acquaintance fellow-  
countrypersons (paisanos) \_\_\_\_\_ Neighbors \_\_\_\_\_  
Friends \_\_\_\_\_ Nobody \_\_\_\_\_ Others \_\_\_\_\_, specify: \_\_\_\_\_

44.- Did you start in street vending as stall owner or as an employee?

Stall owner \_\_\_\_\_ Employee \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_, specify \_\_\_\_\_

IF THE ANSWER IS NOT "STALL OWNER", GO TO QUESTION 45;

IF THE ANSWER IS "STALL OWNER", GO TO QUESTION 47.

- 45.- In your first job as street vending employee, what relationship existed between the stall owner and you?  
 Parents\_\_\_\_ Other relatives\_\_\_\_ Acquaintance fellow-  
 countrypersons (paisanos)\_\_\_\_ Neighbors\_\_\_\_  
 Friends\_\_\_\_ None\_\_\_\_ Other\_\_\_\_, specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- 46.- When did you first become owner of a stall?  
 Date: \_\_\_\_\_ or Age \_\_\_\_\_  
 or \_\_\_\_\_ years ago
- 47.- From what source did you get the money to start-up your first own stall?  
 Own savings\_\_\_\_ Loan from banks\_\_\_\_  
 Loan from relatives\_\_\_\_ Loan from other persons\_\_\_\_  
 Other\_\_\_\_, specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- 48.- Before you first worked as street vendor, had you ever worked as self-employed in a different occupation? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_
- 49.- Before you first worked as street vendor, what was your main laboral occupation?  
 A) Already reported (in questions 37 and 38)?  
 YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
 IF THE ANSWER IS "NO" CONTINUE WITH THIS QUESTION;  
 IF THE ANSWER IS YES, GO TO QUESTION 51.
- B) What was this occupation? \_\_\_\_\_
- C) For how long did you remain in this occupation?  
 From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ years or \_\_\_\_\_ months
- D) Type of occupation:  
 Own business (or self-employment)\_\_\_\_ Employee\_\_\_\_  
 Other\_\_\_\_, specify \_\_\_\_\_  
 IF ANSWER IN D) IS "EMPLOYEE", GO TO QUESTION 50;  
 IF "EMPLOYEE" IS NOT SELECTED, GO TO QUESTION 51.
- 50.- In this former job,
- A) Did you have Social Security? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_
- B) How many employees did the firm have? \_\_\_\_\_
- C) For what reasons did you leave this job? \_\_\_\_\_

51.- In total, how many times have you left street vending for taking another occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

**B. RESPONDENT'S ALTERNATIVE OCCUPATIONS**

52.- A) Imagine that you had to leave street vending, could you find any other occupation?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

B) What other occupations could you find?  
\_\_\_\_\_

53.- Do you think that in any of such occupations you could earn more money than in street vending?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

*IF THE ANSWER IS YES, GO TO QUESTION 54;*

*IF THE ANSWER IS NO, GO TO QUESTION 55.*

54.- For what reasons do you remain as street vendor and do not take another occupation with greater earnings? \_\_\_\_\_

55.- A) Would you accept leaving your stall to become an employee, if you were guaranteed that your net earnings would be the same as in street vending, and that you would enjoy Social Security and benefits?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_

B) Why? \_\_\_\_\_

56.- How much should your (minimum) net income be in a wage job with social security and benefits, for you to decide leaving your stall and accepting such job?

a) Monthly after tax income \_\_\_\_\_ b) Would not leave street vending \_\_\_\_\_

**C. SELF-EVALUATION OF THE STREET VENDING JOB**

57.- Do you feel proud for being a street vendor?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ Somewhat proud \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_

- 58.- In your opinion, is it risky your job as street vendor?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ Somewhat risky \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
 Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_
- 59.- In your opinion, does street vending damages our country?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ It damages somewhat \_\_\_\_\_  
 Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_ Yes, but it is necessary \_\_\_\_\_
- 60.- Do you feel glad with your earnings in street vending?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Somewhat glad \_\_\_\_\_  
 Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_
- 61.- Would you be annoyed by having a boss?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Somewhat annoyed \_\_\_\_\_  
 Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_
- 62.- Is your street vending job hard?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Somewhat hard \_\_\_\_\_  
 Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_
- 63.- Does your job as street vendor facilitate you to do other personal or familiar activities?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Somewhat \_\_\_\_\_  
 Does not know \_\_\_\_\_ No response \_\_\_\_\_
- 64.- Which one of the benefits received by a formal employee would you most like having for yourself?  
 \_\_\_\_\_
- 
- 65.- What are your main problems as street vendor?  
 READ THE OPTIONS AND MARK THOSE INDICATED BY THE RESPONDENT. AFTERWARDS, ASK THE RESPONDENT TO INDICATE THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT ONES:
- Rank
- |       |   |
|-------|---|
| _____ | (a) Lack of customers _____                         |
| _____ | (b) Lack of credit _____                            |
| _____ | (c) Lack of economic resources _____                |
| _____ | (d) Low profits _____                               |
| _____ | (e) Strong competition _____                        |
| _____ | (f) Problems with authorities (bribing, etc.) _____ |
| _____ | (g) Problems with employees _____                   |
| _____ | (h) Problems with clients _____                     |
| _____ | (i) Problems with inputs _____                      |

- \_\_\_\_\_ (j) Problems with suppliers \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (k) Other problems \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (l) Does not have problems \_\_\_\_\_

66.- What do you like the most of your job?  
 \_\_\_\_\_

#### IV. OPERATIVE ASPECTS OF THE BUSINESS

67.- A) Do you temporarily leave street vending in certain seasons of the year?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
 IF THE ANSWER IS YES, GO TO QUESTION 68;  
 IF THE ANSWER IS NO, GO TO 69.

B) What occupations do you take when you temporarily leave street vending?  
 \_\_\_\_\_

68.- Within street vending, do you change your product line in certain seasons of the year?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
 IF THE ANSWER IS YES, GO TO QUESTION 70;  
 IF THE ANSWER IS NO, GO TO 71.

69.- To what product lines do you shift in certain seasons of the year? \_\_\_\_\_

#### B. EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE BUSINESS, PERSONAL LIFE AND FAMILY

70.- What occupation, job or business would you like best to have in the future?

Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_

71.- A) What occupation, job or business would you like for your children?

Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_

B) Would you like your children to work as street vendors on their own?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

## C. THE ECONOMIC OPERATION OF THE STALL

72.- A) How many days a week is your stall open? \_\_\_\_\_

B) Average number of days per week that the stall is open: \_\_\_\_\_

C) Average number of hours per day that the stall is open: \_\_\_\_\_

73.- Approximately, how much money (after subtracting inventory replacement costs) does this stall generate monthly?

Average net earnings per month \_\_\_\_\_

74.- What is the total value of your stock?  
\_\_\_\_\_

75.- In total, how many suppliers do you have? \_\_\_\_\_

76.- A) Do you feel committed to deal with your current suppliers? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

IF THE ANSWER IS "YES", THEN ASK: \_\_\_\_\_

B) Why? \_\_\_\_\_

## V. RESPONDENT'S OPINION ABOUT GOVERNMENT REGULATION

77.- Do you think that the authorities are fair with street vendors?

YES \_\_\_ NO \_\_\_ SOMEWHAT \_\_\_ DOES NOT KNOW \_\_\_ NO RESPONSE \_\_\_

78.- Do you think that the government has managed well street vending?

YES \_\_\_ NO \_\_\_ SOMEWHAT \_\_\_ DOES NOT KNOW \_\_\_ NO RESPONSE \_\_\_

79.- In your opinion, what should the Government do with street vending? \_\_\_\_\_

80.- For what reasons you don't have a stall in the new markets recently built (as a part of the Program for Improving the Popular Retailing)?  
\_\_\_\_\_

81.- Would you aim to acquire a stall in new markets, or would you prefer remaining at the street  
\_\_\_\_\_

82.- If you won 50,000 new pesos (about 15 700 Dls.) in the National Lotery....

A) Would you leave the street vending business?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ DOES NOT KNOW \_\_\_\_\_ NO RESPONSE \_\_\_\_\_

IF THE ANSWER IS "NO", GO TO B)

IF THE ANSWER IS "YES", GO TO C)

B) Would you acquire more stalls or expand this one?  
\_\_\_\_\_

C) Would you start-up a different business?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ DOES NOT KNOW \_\_\_\_\_

NO RESPONSE \_\_\_\_\_

IF THE ANSWER IS YES, GO TO D)

IF THE ANSWER IS NO, GO TO QUESTION 83.

D) What other type of business would you start-up?  
\_\_\_\_\_

E) In this latter business, would it be necessary for you to pay taxes?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_ DOES NOT KNOW \_\_\_\_\_ NO RESPONSE \_\_\_\_\_

## VI. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

83.- A) Are you affiliated to a political party?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

IF THE ANSWER IS YES, ASK:

B) What party do you belong to? \_\_\_\_\_

84.- A) Do you have your own automobile?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

B) Model? \_\_\_\_\_

85.- A) Are you the owner of this location?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

B) How many stalls do you own? \_\_\_\_\_

C) To how many associations of vendors have you belonged? \_\_\_\_\_

86.- A) Do you pay money in order to sell in this place?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_



B) How much do you pay (per month)? \_\_\_\_\_

C) Who do you pay such money? \_\_\_\_\_

87.- Would you accept having a deeper interview about street vending?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_  
IF THE ANSWER IS NO, FINISH THE INTERVIEW;  
IF THE ANSWER IS YES, GO TO QUESTION 92.

88.- Does your stall have the same location within the market every day ?

YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

89.- Vendor's phone number, and place, date and time for the next appointment:

Phone number \_\_\_\_\_  
Place: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Time: \_\_\_\_\_